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ABSTRACT 
Through the theoretical perspective of the Political Sociology of Public Policy Instruments 
(Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004), the thesis explores the role of the slum upgrading 
instrument in the evolution of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance. Specifically, 
it examines the significance of slum upgrading choice and use over the past two decades. 
The research is guided by the following question: how did the slum upgrading influence 
Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance development from 1993 to 2012? The 
research considers three hypotheses:  
1. The slum upgrading contributed to produce the inflexion points of the evolution of Rio's 
housing policy. 
2. The slum upgrading fostered the transformation of Rio's housing governance. 
3. The slum upgrading supported the depoliticization of Rio's housing policy. 
 
On its theoretical stand, the research builds on the one hand on the Political Sociology of 
Public Policy Instruments (PPI) approach that argues that policy instruments contribute to 
structure public policy as they generate specific effects (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004). On 
the other, the research builds on the Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) that understands 'the 
social' as an heterogeneous network of entities called 'actants' created by a specific 
movement of 'associations' conceptualized as 'translation' (Latour 2005; Callon 1986). 
Based on these perspectives, the thesis analysed the slum upgrading as a 'policy instrument', 
itself being an 'actant'. Subsequently, through 'detective work' (Austrin & Farnsworth 
2005), the thesis delved into the unfolding of Rio's slum upgrading network of 
'associations' using primary municipal archives, semi-structured interviews and policy 
documents. The investigation resulted in the production of a chronological 'thick 
description' which reveals the slum upgrading role in Rio's housing policy and governance 
transformation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
'We just follow the players. They all agree, in the end, about the death of Aramis. They blame 
each other, of course, but they speak with one voice: the approximate cause of death is of no 
interest―it's just a final blow, a last straw, a ripe fruit, a mere consequence. As M. Girard said 
so magnificently, 'It was built right into the nature of things.' There's no point in deciding who 
finally killed Aramis. It was a collective assassination. An abandonment, rather. It's useless to get 
bogged down concentrating on the final phase. What we have to do is see who built those 'things' 
in, and into what 'natures'. We 're going to have to go back to the beginning of the project to the 
remote causes' ( Latour 1996a: 10). 
 
 
In Rio de Janeiro the slum upgrading has been used as an important housing policy 
instrument since the 1990s. The existing literature on the topic has followed two main 
streams: one being the evaluative analyses that represent the bulk of the literature and focus 
on Rio's housing policy and slum upgrading efficiency and effectiveness, the other, the 
studies that focus on the explanation of policy functioning, adopting sociological 
approaches. This second stream includes two main types of analysis perspectives: studies 
that focus on how hidden processes or actors' interests influenced the municipal housing 
policy and the slum upgrading instrument; and studies that focus on how primarily 
conceptual, political, institutional social variables informed Rio's housing policy and its 
instrument's development.  
 
Both streams have contributed greatly to grasp different aspects related to Rio's housing 
policy and slum upgrading instrument. However, the existing literature has under examined 
the evolution of housing policy and governance, and neglected the slum upgrading 
instrument's role in these processes. This lack of attention is significant because policy 
'instruments' generate specific effects that contribute to shape policies and governance 
dynamics. Thus, the analysis of slum upgrading 'instrumentation', i.e. the problems that its 
choice and use produced, is necessary to better understand Rio's housing policy and 
governance transformation. Aiming to address these gaps, the thesis examines the role of 
the slum upgrading in the evolution of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance 
from 1993 to 2012. 
INTRODUCTION 
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FROM HOUSING CONSTRUCTION TO SLUM UPGRADING AS POLICY APPROACH 
The evolution of housing policies entails a shift from housing construction to slum 
upgrading in the past decades. During the 1950s and 1960s housing policies in the Global 
South were inspired by housing programmes in West Europe in the post-war period and 
involved the construction of large scale housing estates (Fiori et al. 2000). Informed by 
theories of modernisation these policies were underpinned by idea that housing 
construction would be affordable and an effective way to eradicate the unsanitary 
conditions and disorder of informal settlements (ibid). However, these policies did not 
meet the objectives and were criticized as among other issues they were located in distant 
areas with poor public services and were constructed with bad quality of materials (ibid)  
 
In this context, slum upgrading emerged at the end of the 1960s. Its development was 
linked to new ways of understanding the informal sector and informed by self-organization 
and self-production discourses and progressive development perspectives (Fiori & Brandao 
2010). In the 1970s, housing policies involving slum upgrading focused mainly on basic 
sanitation and infrastructure, overlooking the improvement of spatial qualities and 
neglecting the relation of informal settlements with its surrounding and with the city as a 
(ibid). 
 
During the 1980s, slum upgrading as the housing policy instrument continued to be used, 
yet in a more limited way as public policies shifted from project to sector level (Fiori & 
Brandao 2010). The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund during the 1980s 
supported stabilization and structural adjustment programmes. Under the influence of such 
programmes housing policies focused on how to enable housing markets, restructure 
housing finance systems, and support the housing sector as a whole (Fiori et al. 2000). 
Thus, housing policies prioritized and mobilized other policy instruments, leaving the slum 
upgrading in the backdrop.  
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, a new understanding emerged about the multiple and 
heterogeneous nature of poverty fostered by the poor results of neo-liberal poverty and 
social exclusion policies. Under this new understanding housing policies and slum 
upgrading made a return in force as they were seen to be key for poverty alleviation. The 
slum upgrading came back as a widely used housing policy instrument and included major 
INTRODUCTION 
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changes in relations to the previous period because this time it focused on multisectoriality 
and project's political and spatial relationships at different scales (Fiori & Brandao 2010). 
THE CASE OF RIO DE JANEIRO 
In Brazil the shift from construction of housing units to slum upgrading as housing policy 
response was consolidated in several municipalities during the 1990s. In particular, in Rio 
de Janeiro, there emerged an ambitious housing policy that included this instrumental 
change. The slum upgrading instrument developed mainly through the Favela-Bairro 
programme became key in the housing policy in the 1990s. During the first decade of the 
2000s Rio's housing policy faded and the slum upgrading instrument was abandoned. Since 
2007 Rio de Janeiro's housing policy gained strength and the slum upgrading instrument 
was revived mainly through the development of the Morar Carioca Plan.  
 
The thesis focuses on Rio de Janeiro for two main reasons. Firstly, it includes all the 
housing policy and governance changes that have occurred in Brazil since the 1990s and 
during the first decade of the 2000s. Thus, its analysis allows the exploration of the 
different phases of the Brazilian case. Secondly, it involves both a development and 
collapse period which allows the analysis of the dynamics of consolidation and erosion of a 
housing policy. The thesis acknowledges that Rio de Janeiro's housing policy does not 
represent all Brazilian municipality experiences and cannot be generalized at national level 
because other municipalities used other policy instruments, and relate to specific socio-
economic and politico-administrative landscapes. However, the investigation of Rio's 
housing policy contributes to reflect on other municipal experiences and consider other 
cases across the globe that have mobilized slum upgrading as a public policy instrument.  
 
Under Knoepfel et al. (2001)'s classification of public policy analysis, research in Rio de 
Janeiro's housing policy has followed two main streams over the past two decades. The 
first one relates to evaluative analyses and represents the bulk of the existing literature. 
These studies aimed primarily to assess Rio's housing policy efficiency and effectiveness 
(IBAM 1996; Cardoso 2002; Pamuk & Cavallieri 1998; Brakarz et al. 2002; Aduan & 
Brakarz 2004; TCMRJ 2005; Soares & Soares 2005; TCMRJ 2006; BID 2007; Abiko et al. 
2007; Rojas 2009; Abramo 1998). The second stream relates to studies that seek to explain 
policy functioning using sociological approaches. This second stream includes two main 
types of studies: studies whose main objective is to unveil hidden processes or interests 
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(Bahia 2000; Broudehoux 2001; Randolph 2004; Silva 2006; Simpson 2013) and studies 
such as Fiori et al. (2000) and Burgos (2003) that focused on how the case of Rio de 
Janeiro fits into the wider context of housing policies' evolution and change.  
 
The existing literature has made important contributions to the understanding of Rio de 
Janeiro's experience and enriched debates about housing policies in Latin America and 
elsewhere; however, it presents two major gaps. Firstly, the slum upgrading instrument's 
role for housing governance and policy development has been under explored or 
overlooked. The existing studies have analysed the slum upgrading instrument under a 
functionalistic perspective. The first stream has analysed it in terms of its effectiveness or 
efficiency while the second stream has studied it as an instrument at the service of the 
Carioca1 élite or political group, or neglected it as a variable for explaining housing policy 
and governance changes. However, the Political Sociology of Public Policy Instruments 
(PPI) approach argues that 'policy instruments' are not neutral nor available for ready use 
(Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004). Instead, it understands that policy instruments must be 
constituted; they create specific effects, influencing policies (ibid). Subsequently, the PPI 
approach points out that the analysis of 'policy instrumentation', i.e. the problems related to 
the choice and use of instruments, is key for public policy as it has social and political 
repercussions. Thus, the overlooking of the slum upgrading instrument's role in Rio's 
housing policy evolution is significant because its examination is needed to develop existing 
understanding about the dynamics that generate policy change.  
 
Secondly, the existing literature has under explored the governance of Rio's housing policy 
i.e. 'the interactions between the State and the society and to the modes of coordination to make possible the 
action of the State' (Le Galès 1995: 59). The lack of understanding of these interactions and 
modes of coordination represents an important gap as the assumption that 'governments 
govern' became more difficult to sustain (ibid). According to Le Galès (1995) the 
complexity of modern societies has increased, fostering their fragmentation and making 
more complicated their government. Thus, the exploration of the governance of housing 
policies can contribute to the understanding of how large cities such as Rio de Janeiro are 
governed. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The term 'carioca' designates the native inhabitants of the city of Rio de Janeiro.  
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In addition, the existing literature has under explored or excluded the following elements:  
-The analysis of the first decade of the 2000s remains insufficiently investigated. The 
analysis of this period is needed for understanding the dynamics of 'failure' of Rio de 
Janeiro's ambitious policy.  
-An analysis of Rio's experience covering the period 1990s-2010s at municipal level does 
not currently exist. The analysis of Rio's case covering this long period is essential to grasp 
the instrument's long term effects and policy and governance changes on a city scale.  
-New data sources are available thanks to the emergence and consolidation of the digital 
and 'big data' era. Their use represents a unique opportunity for reconsidering the existing 
understanding of Rio de Janeiro's case.  
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND METHODS 
Aiming to address these gaps the thesis examines the slum upgrading role for Rio de 
Janeiro's housing policy and governance transformations. In particular, it analyses the 
dynamics and outcomes produced by the slum upgrading 'instrumentation' over the past 
two decades. The thesis is guided by the following question: how did the slum upgrading 
influence Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance development from 1993 to 2012? 
The research considers three hypotheses2 in relation of Rio's slum upgrading 
instrumentation:  
1. It contributed to the (re)shape Rio's housing policy evolution.  
2. It fostered the transformation of the governance of Rio's housing policy.  
3. It contributed to Rio's housing policy depoliticization understood as the weakening of 
firm political control.  
 
To explore Rio's slum upgrading 'instrumentation', the thesis mobilizes Actor-Network-
Theory (ANT). This perspective conceptualizes 'the social' as an heterogeneous network of 
entities (human and non-human entities) named 'actants' (Latour 2005). ANT understands 
that 'actants' are open-ended entities brought into existence through an association 
mechanism conceptualized as 'translation' that includes the following moments: 
'problematization', 'interessement', 'enrolment', and 'mobilization' (or 'dissidence') (Callon 
1986). Accordingly, ANT considers reality as an emerging process produced by actants' 
                                                 
2 The thesis understands the term 'hypothesis' as a 'programme of negotiations' (Callon 1986) and 
an integral part of the 'problematization moment' of this research: 'the initial problematization defined a 
series of negotiable hypotheses on identity, relationships and goals of the different actors' (ibid: 15) that are 
'subsequently, weakened, confirmed or transformed' (ibid: 25).  
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translation and agency as produced through this mechanism. Based on this perspective the 
thesis examined the slum upgrading instrument as an 'actant', existing through the 
constitution of a network of human and non-human entities. Subsequently, it focused on 
the unfolding of slum upgrading network of associations through 'detective work' (Austrin 
& Farnsworth 2005), using primary municipal archives, policy documents and semi-
structured interviews. This investigation that extended over 16 months, out of which 7 in 
Rio de Janeiro and 9 in London, resulted in the production of a chronological 'thick 
description' which reveals its role in the transformation of Rio's housing policy and 
governance. 
 
ANT is relevant for this research for three main reasons. Firstly, it is in line with the 
understanding that the slum upgrading instrument played a role in the development of 
Rio's housing policy and governance. Secondly, ANT focuses on the dynamics of 
association/dissociation of different human and non-human entities, which relates to the 
analysis of the slum upgrading 'instrumentation' that involves the interaction of 
heterogeneous entities such as actors and policy instruments. Furthermore, ANT allows the 
research to focus on how the housing policy and governance got built through the 
interaction of human and non-human entities, including the slum upgrading instrument 
itself (also constituted by heterogeneous entities) and what outcome these dynamics 
produced. Lastly, ANT strongly relates to this research as the hypotheses call into question 
the role of political figures or moments, suggesting that the slum upgrading 
'instrumentation' played an important role in the policy process.  
 
The mobilization of both, ANT and the PPI approach, for analysing Rio's housing policy 
can be related to the 'methodological articulation' made by some 'urban assemblages'3 
studies between ANT and urban political economy (Brenner et al. 2011). This type of 
studies 'retains the central concerns, concepts and analytical orientations of political economy within a 
methodologically expanded framework' (ibid: 232). This research retains the PPI approach 
concerns, in particular policy 'instrumentation' and the issues of policy 
development/change, power relations (specifically how actor became powerful or weak 
over time) and processes of depoliticization. It also expands the methodological framework 
                                                 
3 'Urban Assemblages' literature focuses on the use of ANT for urban research such as Farías & 
Bender (2009)  
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by considering and analysing Rio's housing policy and the slum upgrading instrument as 
'actor-networks', i.e. a collective of human and non-human entities. 
 
In addition, the use of ANT and the PPI approach relates to Walsham (1997: 478) 
understanding that 'there is not, and never will be, a best theory. Theory is our chronically inadequate 
attempt to come to terms with the infinite complexity of the real world. Our quest should be for improved 
theory, not best theory, and for theory that is relevant to the issues of our time'. The thesis understands 
that rather than being the best approaches to explain Rio's case, the PPI approach and 
ANT enable to reveal dynamics and processes which expands and improve the existing 
knowledge on housing policy and governance transformation.  
THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis is structured as follows. CHAPTER 1 and CHAPTER 2 are complementary 
literature reviews that involve the analytical perspective and the problematization of the 
case of Rio respectively. CHAPTER 1 presents the PPI approach which is the theoretical 
frame that underpins this research hypotheses and is divided into three parts. The first part 
explores the specificity of a political sociology perspective. The second part presents in 
detail the PPI approach which includes two core concepts: policy 'instruments' and 
'instrumentation'. The third part discusses the use of the PPI approach for analysing Rio de 
Janeiro's housing policy, its major critics and the gap in relation to an explicit method for 
undertaking this type of analysis.  
 
CHAPTER 2 calls into question the case of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy, mobilizing the 
PPI approach. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first two parts examine the 
evolution of housing policies at national level in order to localize Rio de Janeiro's case. The 
last part presents Rio's housing experience, examines how this case has been analysed, 
arguing the existence of three majors gaps, and presents the research question, hypotheses.  
 
CHAPTER 3 presents and discusses the method used in this research. The chapter is 
divided into three parts. The first part explores ANT which informed the research 
methods. The second part details the understanding of the slum upgrading as an 'actant', 
presents the 'detective work' as general method and explains Rio de Janeiro investigation's 
first steps. The third part explains the investigation's further steps: the data collection, 
pointing out the limitations of interviews and written documents and how they were 
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overcome; the data analysis which entailed a micro processing of facts in order to establish 
slum upgrading instrumentation sequence of events that allowed the instrument's 
associations to unfold; the data organization which involved the creation and use of 
different tools; and the production and specificity of the empirical chapters that formed the 
chronological 'thick description' of the slum upgrading instrument which reveals its role in 
the transformation of Rio's housing governance and policy. 
 
CHAPTER 4 introduces in detail the case of Rio de Janeiro in order to grasp the framing 
conditions of the choice and use of the slum upgrading from 1993 to 2012. The chapter is 
divided into three parts. The first part reviews the emergence of housing initiatives at the 
time when Rio de Janeiro was still a federal district, showing it swinging between favelas' 
urbanization and housing construction (1900s-1950s). The second part explores the 
housing experience when Rio de Janeiro became the city state of Guanabara and the 
dominant approach supported by the military regime was the razing of favelas and housing 
construction (1960s-1975). Finally, the last part focuses on Rio de Janeiro's housing 
initiatives after it became a municipality in 1975, highlighting the consolidation of 
knowledge, know-how and institutional capacity at the municipal level in relation to favelas' 
urbanization by the end of the 1980s. 
 
CHAPTER 5, CHAPTER 6 and CHAPTER 7 constitute the chronological 'thick 
description' of the choice and use of the slum upgrading instrument. CHAPTER 5 explores 
slum upgrading emergence and development as Rio de Janeiro's housing policy instrument 
during the 1990s. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines the 
constitution of the instrument, highlighting the existence of cognitive and normative 
frames that supported its emergence as main housing policy instruments (1993-1994). The 
second concentrates on its development from about 1995 to 1997, stressing its role in the 
development and evolution of the policy and governance. The last part explores slum 
upgrading further development from about 1998 to 1999.  
 
CHAPTER 6 explores the use of slum upgrading from 2000 to 2007. The chapter is 
divided into three parts. The first part explores the politico-administrative change at the 
beginning of the 2000s and its effects on the instrument’s implementation. The second part 
examines the further weakening of the slum upgrading during Maia's second administration 
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(2001-2004). The third investigates the abandonment of the slum upgrading during Maia's 
third administration (2005-2008). 
 
CHAPTER 7 explores the use of the slum upgrading instrument from 2007 to 2012. The 
chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores how the slum upgrading 
instrument re-emerged in 2007. The second part analyses its redevelopment during the first 
half of the Paes administration (2009-2010) while the third part explores the use of the 
slum upgrading instrument during the second half (2010-2011).  
 
The Conclusions section is divided into four parts. The first part reviews the learning from 
the investigation showing how it supports the research hypotheses. The second part 
considers the implications of the investigation for the understanding of housing 
development and housing governance, and reflects on the use of the PPI approach and 
ANT. The third part considers the limitations of the investigation while the fourth part 
proposes the future research agenda. 
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CHAPTER 1 ANALYSING PUBLIC POLICY BY ITS 
INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
'Public policy instruments are not inert, simply available to socio-political mobilizations. They have 
their own force of action: as they are used, they tend to produce original and sometimes unexpected 
effects' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter aim is to present the theoretical frame that underpins this research hypotheses. 
It reviews the theoretical roots and linkages of the Political Sociology of Public Policy 
Instrument (PPI) approach, and explores how this perspective understands 'policy 
instruments' and 'instrumentation'. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part 
explores the specificity of a political sociology perspective. The second part presents in 
detail the PPI approach which includes two core concepts: 'policy instruments' and 
'instrumentation'. The third part discusses the use of the PPI approach for analysing Rio de 
Janeiro's housing policy, its major critics and the gap in relation to an explicit method for 
undertaking this type of analysis.  
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1.2 ADOPTING A POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY PERSPECTIVE 
1.2.1 Policy analysis discipline 
Emergence and development  
The political sociology perspective proposed by Lascoumes & Le Galès (2004; 2007a) 
relates to the development of the policy analysis that emerged in the USA during the 1930s 
and has been recognized as a relatively autonomous discipline (Boussaguet et al. 2004). The 
development of policy analysis was influenced by Max Weber and his work on bureaucracy 
(Muller 2008). Policy analysis was also influenced by the emergence of the theory of 
organizations that emerged in the 1920s and mobilized concepts such as 'actor', 'strategy' 
and 'power' to analyse small groups, then large organizations (ibid). Lastly, the development 
of policy analysis was informed by the development of public management which sought 
to improve public performance at a minimal cost (ibid).  
 
The most influential studies for the consolidation of policy analysis as a discipline were 
Lasswell's (1936) and Lasswell & Lerner's (1951) (Muller 2008). Overall, these works 
sought to improve public policy efficiency and effectiveness by mobilizing the social 
sciences (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007b). During the 1960s and 1970s, the interest in policy 
analysis increased as the economic and political crises in industrialized countries 
undermined the ideas of State's efficiency and the welfare model that legitimized public 
policies (Draelants & Maroy 2007). 
Major contributions 
The development of policy analysis made significant contributions to the understanding of 
State and public policies. Firstly, policy analysis showed that political representation was 
only one of many elements accounting for policy processes and policy change (Muller 
2000). In addition, policy analysis contributed to understand the State in connection with 
its capacity to solving problems rather than its capacity to imposing a political order (ibid). 
This shift was crucial as it challenged the idea of an omniscient and omnipresent State and 
called into question the rationality of public policies (ibid). In relation to the latter, policy 
analysis contributed to decision-making being considered as 'an imperceptible process during 
which actors of a distinct nature (politicians, civil servants, interest groups), participate in a kind of 
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progressive decantation of choices (who are never given in advance), mobilizing in a not very coherent way, 
information and extremely heterogeneous data' (ibid: 191).  
 
Furthermore, policy analysis studies showed that policy implementation could not be 
simply deduced from the decision-making process because it could create unexpected 
outputs and change the policy content (Muller 2000). However, the most important shift 
was the development of an analysis toolkit that included concepts such as 'actors', 'power' 
and 'strategies' borrowed from the sociology of organizations (ibid). By mobilizing them, 
policy analysis contributed to the development of a sociological perspective that study the 
State through the analysis of its interventions (public policies), considering State and society 
synergies (Muller & Surel 1998). 
1.2.2 Towards a political sociology perspective 
Policy analysis streams  
The different works related to policy analysis can be classified into three major streams 
even though they are not completely isolated from each other (Knoepfel et al. 2001). The 
first stream involves 'evaluative analyses' which seek to assess rather than explain policy 
outputs and their influence on society. Knoepfel et al. highlighted that such analyses tend 
to focus on the development of a method and toolkit for policy evaluation, and the study 
of the evaluation process in order to improve it.  
 
The different works related to policy analysis can be classified into three major streams 
even though they are not completely isolated from each other (Knoepfel et al. 2001). The 
first stream involves 'evaluative analyses' which seek to assess rather than explain policy 
outputs and their influence on society. Knoepfel et al. highlighted that such analyses tend 
to focus on the development of a method and toolkit for policy evaluation, and the study 
of the evaluation process in order to improve it.  
 
The second stream includes analyses centred in the theories of the State (Knoepfel et al. 
2001). These studies conceptualize public policies as indicators of the nature of the State. 
Developed by political science, they combine public policy together with the theory of the 
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State and political philosophy, seeking to shed light on the role of the State and its 
evolution4.  
 
The third stream includes studies that focus on the 'explanation of policy functioning' and 
relates to sociological approaches (Knoepfel et al. 2001). These analyses understand the 
State as a complex and heterogeneous politico-administrative system, and have a scientific 
or professional purpose (analysis of the policy or for the policy). This stream can be broken 
down into four main approaches: interests (actors’ interests and decision-making 
processes); institutions (institutional forms, proceeding and structures); ideas (role of ideas 
and representations); and instruments (laws, regulations, economic incentives, etc.).  
Emergence of a political sociology perspective 
Lascoumes & Le Galès (2007b) observed that a tension between the last two streams has 
been at the core of the policy analysis discipline since its inception. On the one hand the 
political science stream 'gives a pre-eminent role to the State, the rulers in the organization and 
government of society' (ibid: 14). On the other the sociological stream gives an important role 
to 'actors' interactions, exchanges, coordination mechanism, group formation, norms, and conflicts' (ibid: 
15). These top-down and bottom-up reasoning respectively generate a crucial question 
about public policies: 'Are they determined by robust institutions consolidated over time, pursuing their 
own logic? Or by autonomous social systems that progressively define their own rules for action?' (ibid).  
 
The re-structuring of the contemporary State moved the political science stream towards a 
'political sociology perspective' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007b). This perspective considers 
at the same time the actors and their interactions, the polity dimension, and the re-
structuring of State (ibid). Thus, the political sociology of public policy instruments (PPI) 
approach includes exploring public policy through the analysis of instruments while 
considering at the same time 'the transformation of the State, the modes of domination and the 
government' (Lascoumes & Le Gales 2004: 366).  
 
The following part explores the PPI approach's theoretical roots and core concepts.  
                                                 
4 This stream can be broken down into three models: (i) pluralism, (ii) neo-Marxism and neo-
managerial and (iii) neo-institutionalism and neo-corporatism. For more details see Mény & 
Thoenig (1989).  
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1.3 PPI AS ANALYTICAL ENTRY 
1.3.1 The PPI approach and its theoretical linkages 
Instruments as institutions 
The political sociology perspective of policy instruments (PPI) emerged as a response to 
various gaps in the existing literature (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004, 2007a). Firstly, policy 
instruments have been understudied because even if the technologies of government have 
been analysed by the sociology of the State, they have remained at the background of the 
analyses. Secondly, when considered, analyses have followed a functionalistic perspective as 
they understand the choice and use of policy instruments as purely technical choices. 
Finally, analyses have understood instruments as minor issues in comparison to the 
traditional policy analysis variables (ideas, interests and institutions): 'Public policy 
instrumentation and its choice of tools and modes of operation are generally treated either as a kind of 
evidence, as a purely superficial dimension..., or as if the questions it raises... are secondary issues, merely 
part of a rationality of methods without any autonomous meaning' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 2).  
 
By contrast, the PPI approach argues that 'instruments at work are not neutral devices: they produce 
specific effects, independently of the objectives pursued (the aims ascribed to them), which structure public 
policy according to their own logic' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 3). Therefore, the PPI 
approach considers public policies as 'a socio-political space constructed as much through techniques 
and instruments as through aims or content' (ibid: 4). By doing so, the PPI challenges the idea that 
public policies are just the result of actors' interests or institutional contexts. In addition, 
the PPI approach argues that a 'policy instrument' 'constitutes a condensed form of knowledge about 
social control and ways of exercising it' (ibid: 3). Based on this understanding the PPI approach 
seeks to reveal 'power relations associated to instruments and issues of legitimacy, politicization, or 
depoliticization dynamics associated with different policy instruments' (ibid: 4).  
 
The PPI approach proposes to conceptualize policy instruments as institutions which are 
understood from a sociological perspective as 'a more or less coordinated set of rules and procedures 
that governs the interactions and behaviours of actors and organizations' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 
2007: 8)5. This understanding suggests that 'they may need to be brought into existence, constructed 
                                                 
5 According to (Hood 2007) by understanding instruments as institutions in a sociological sense the 
PPI approach relates to a new shift of the 'Institutions as instruments' perspective which is one of 
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or composed rather than readily available objects' (Kassim & Le Galès 2010: 4). To support the 
conceptualization of instruments as institutions, the PPI approach points out that policy 
instruments generate uncertainty about power relations, influence actors’ behaviour and 
shape actors' capacity for action (limit or facilitate actors' initiatives), and convey a specific 
representation of the issue at stake (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004, 2007a). Furthermore, the 
PPI approach highlights that instruments can be considered as institutions because they 
determine when, how and who questions, and contribute to the stabilization of collective 
action (ibid). 
Theoretical roots and linkages to other works  
The PPI approach is grounded in the sociology of science and the history of techniques 
(Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004, 2007a). Lascoumes & Le Galès observed that these 
disciplines have showed that the success of a technical innovation was related to the 
alliances and associations that supported them rather than the specific characteristics of the 
object (Simondon 1952; Hacking 1987). In particular, Lascoumes & Le Galès (2004, 2007a) 
noted that Simondon understood innovation to be a disordered process that emerges 
through the combination of divergent elements in synergy. According to them Akrich, 
Callon and Latour (Akrich et al. 1988a, 1988b) further developed this idea 'by rejecting the 
retrospective view that suppresses moments of uncertainty and sees creation only as a series of inevitable 
stages moving from the abstract to the concrete, from the idea to its concretization. Translation of and 
through technical instruments is a constant process of relating information and actors, and regularly 
reinterpreting the system thus created' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 7). 
 
The PPI approach relates to analyses of the State and public policies developed by Max 
Weber and Michel Foucault. Lascoumes & Le Galès (2004) highlighted that Weber's work 
on bureaucracy allowed to consider government technologies independently and they 
suggested that Weber was the first to question instruments' role when he conceptualized 
them as domination techniques. As for Michel Foucault, Lascoumes & Le Galès (ibid) 
pointed out that he proposed to analyse the State through the study of 'governmentality' 
which entailed 'on the one side rational forms, technical procedures, instrumentation through which it 
operates, and on the other, strategic issues that make unstable and reversible the power relations that they 
                                                                                                                                               
 
the three main perspectives that instrument-centred analyses have taken in the last 30 years. For a 
comprehensive understanding of these perspectives see Hood (2007; 2008) 
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must secure' (Foucault cited by Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004: 17). This understanding relates 
to Foucault's conceptualization of power. He conceptualized power in a productive mode, 
moving away from the idea that power was located within the State and perspectives that 
associated it to an ideology or repressive instance (Lascoumes 2004). Foucault's analysis 
also related to the development of an anti-essentialist approach of the State: '[Foucault] 
refuses to assign to the State a unity, an individuality and an absolute functionality, he sees in it less a cause 
than an effect, less an autonomous actor that an aggregate of results' (ibid: 3).  
 
Foucault's notion of governmentality considered the shift of political rationality as 
consolidated in the 18th century (Lascoumes 2004). This change was fostered by the 
development of specific government techniques and systems of knowledge that changed 
the exertion of power: 'It is no longer to conquer and possess, but to produce, generate, organize the 
people to enable them to develop their potentials' (ibid:4). Foucault consolidated this understanding 
by analysing the cameral sciences which involved the differentiation of politics from police 
(politik from polizei) (ibid) . He identified that Police had a goal rationality that included the 
'interdependence between productivity of society and the State power'; and a means rationality that 
involved 'the construction of the collective through concrete practices in security, economy, culture, that are 
essential State missions' (ibid: 5). From this understanding, Foucault considered that the key 
question was the 'Statisation' of society understood as the 'development of a set of specific devices, 
practices through which the power is materially exerted' (ibid).  
 
As Lascoumes (2004) indicated the role of government technologies in Foucault's analysis 
was clarified in the 1980s. Foucault (1984) identified three different levels in his analysis of 
power: strategic relations, government techniques and states of domination. He pointed out 
that it was necessary to differentiate the strategic relations that seek to shape actors' 
behaviours and the states of domination that related to what people call power. He added 
that in between these two are located the technologies of government and their analysis is 
necessary because 'it is often through such techniques that the states of domination are established and 
maintained' (ibid). This led Lascoumes (2004) to highlight that the analysis of 'policy 
instrumentation' contributes to the understanding of how public policies structure state-
society and society-society relationships. 
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1.3.2 The PPI approach: core concepts 
Policy instruments  
The PPI approach involves two core concepts: Public Policy Instrument and Public Policy 
Instrumentation. Public policy instrument is defined as 'a device that is both technical and social, 
that organizes specific social relations between the State and those it is addressed to, according to the 
representations and meanings it carries. It is a particular type of institution, a technical device with the 
generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the politics/society relationship and sustained by a concept of 
regulation' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 4). This definition has several implications. Firstly, 
the definition suggests that instruments are aggregates that include technical and social 
entities. Secondly, the definition implies that they influence policy 'according to their own logic' 
as they are considered to be 'bearers of values, fuelled by one interpretation of the social and by precise 
notions of the mode of regulation envisaged' (ibid). Thus, they are not neutral devices and produce 
outcomes which can be different from the stated goals. In addition, the definition includes 
the conjecture that instruments as institutions influence actors' behaviours by opening (or 
closing) windows of opportunities, suggesting that 'policies determine politics' (Kassim & Le 
Galès 2010: 4). Lastly, by acknowledging that instruments structure policies, this 
conceptualization enables an analysis of public policies that involves an exploration 
through its instruments, rather than an analysis through its substance (ibid). 
Policy instrumentation 
The second core concept is Public Policy Instrumentation that is defined as 'the set of 
problems posed by the choice and use of instruments (techniques, methods of operation, devices) that allow 
government policy to be made material and operational' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004: 12). This 
definition considers policy instrumentation to be the process through which instruments 
are chosen and used, highlighting policy instrumentation as 'a means of orienting relationship 
between political society (via the administration) and civil society (via its administered), through 
intermediaries in the form of devices that combine technical (measuring, calculating, the rule of law, 
procedures) and social components (representation, symbols)' (Kassim & Le Galès 2010: 5). 
Furthermore, policy instrumentation enables to explore the concept of 'power' because the 
choice and use of policy instruments 'carry implications for social and political interactions and have 
effects independent of the intended goal' (ibid: 5). As a result, the PPI approach proposes 
classification based on the type of political relation and legitimacy that the instruments 
presuppose (Table 1).  
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The first type relates to 'Legislative and Regulatory instruments' which have been the 
traditional instruments used by the State. Lascoumes & Le Galès (2004, 2007a) observed 
that this type of instruments articulates symbolic, axiological and pragmatic functions. The 
second type of instruments are 'Economic and Fiscal instruments'. These instruments are 
perceived in terms of their economic and social efficiency. According to Lascoumes & Le 
Galès, the three other types known as the new public policy instruments involve less 
interventionist forms of regulation and have facilitated the renewal of State legitimacy by 
fostering political relations through communication and consultation.  
 
The first type of the new public policy instruments is 'Agreement-based and incentive-
based instruments'. Lascoumes & Le Galès pointed out that these instruments emerged as 
a response to the various critics around bureaucracy and legislative/regulatory instruments. 
The second type includes 'Communication-based and information-based instruments'. 
These instruments relates to the development of what has been called as 'democracy of 
opinion' which has made the right to information an obligation for the State. The last type 
is 'De jure et de facto standards and best practices instruments'. Lascoumes & Le Galès 
stressed that these instruments organize specific power relations as their legitimacy is based 
on both, scientific/technical and democratic rationalities, neutralizing political debates 
around them. These instruments usually impose objectives, competition mechanisms and 
robust constraints.  
 
The PPI approach highlighted that instruments can generate three major effects 
(Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004, 2007b). Firstly, policy instruments can produce 'Inertia 
effects' , 'enabling resistance to outside pressures (such as conflicts of interests between actor-users, or global 
political changes)' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 10). Thus, policy instruments can be 
considered as 'obligatory passage points' and are key in the 'problematization phase' 'which 
allows heterogeneous actors to come together around issues and agree to work on them jointly' (ibid: 10)6. 
Public policy instruments also create 'representation effects' as they offer a frame 'for 
describing the social, a categorization of the situation addressed' (ibid). Lastly, public policy 
instruments produce 'problematization effects' as they contribute to the organization of 
variables and production of interpretations. For instance, Lascoumes & Le Galès observed 
                                                 
6 'Obligatory passage point' and 'problematization phase' are concepts of the 'translation' 
mechanism which is at the core of Actor-Network-Theory. They are presented in CHAPTER 3. 
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that 'the calculation of averages and the research for regularity have led to systems of causal interpretation 
that are always presented as scientifically justified' (ibid: 34). 
 
Table 1 Instruments classification proposed by Lascoumes & Le Galès. Source: Lascoumes 
& Le Galès 2004; 2007a 
Type of instrument Type of Political Relation Type of Legitimacy 
Legislative and 
Regulatory 
Social guardian State Imposition of a general interest by 
mandates 
Economic and Fiscal Wealth producer state and 
redistributive State 
Seeks benefit to the community 
social and economic efficiency 
Agreement-Based and 
Incentive-Based 
Mobilizing State Seeks direct involvement 
Information-Based and 
Communication-Based 
Audience democracy Explanation of decisions and 
accountability of actors 
De Facto and De Jure 
Standards, Best Practices 
Adjustment within civil 
society or competitive 
mechanisms 
Mixed: scientific/technical, 
democratically negotiated and /or 
competition, pressure of market 
mechanisms 
 
A note on policy innovation and change 
Lascoumes & Le Galès (2004) stressed that the announcement of instrument innovation 
usually relates to a political gesture, a search for efficiency, and the introduction of new 
values. However, they pointed out that innovation is often an illusion because 'the announced 
changes rely heavily on sliding, reconversions-adaptations, of instruments recycling that have already been 
tested and well worn' (ibid: 359). Furthermore, the creation of 'new' instruments commonly 
entails the association of two or more existing instruments. Lascoumes & Le Galès 
suggested that these cases are related to what Hood called meta-instruments that seek to 
coordinate heterogeneous intervention modes (ibid).  
 
These remarks about instrument innovation, or more precisely instrument adaptation and 
recycling raise the question of policy change. Lascoumes & Le Galès (2007a) argued that 
the instrument-centred analysis can contribute to understanding policy change and question 
'the "heroic" view of policy changes often put forward by the actors' (ibid: 16). They also pointed out 
that Hall's work on policy paradigms brought back into the debates the question about 
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change. Hall (1993) conceptualized that policy process involved three main variables: 
general objectives, techniques and methods to attain them, and specific adjustment of 
instruments (Draelants & Maroy 2007). From this understanding, Hall suggested different 
orders of policy change. The first and the second order included changes within the 
techniques and adjustment of instruments, yet they did not involve change in policy aims. 
The third order of change identified by Hall refers to the change not only regarding 
techniques and adjustments but also the paradigm (ibid).  
 
Lascoumes & Le Galès observed that Hall's work was further developed by Joubert (1994) 
who showed that policy change does not only come from paradigm change but also 
through policy instruments. Furthermore, they reasoned that Palier (2002) illustrated how 
an instrument-centred analysis could reveal a variety of possible policy changes as his study 
identified the following combinations: 'change of instruments without change of aims, modification of 
the use or degree of use of existing instrument, change in objectives through change of instruments, or change 
of instruments that modify objectives and results and so gradually leads to change in objectives' 
(Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 16). 
1.4 THE PPI AT THE 'BIRTHPLACE OF SAMBA AND BEAUTIFUL SONGS' 
1.4.1 Considering new territories and limitations  
Analytical entry rather than a theory  
The PPI was developed and so far mobilized for analysing national and supranational 
public policies in Europe and the USA. A first collection of works using the PPI approach 
was published in 2004 (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004) and included studies about French 
policies and some European cases such as the United Kingdom and Italy. A second 
collection of works was published in a special issue on West European Politics in January 
2010 and included analyses on European Union policy instruments (Kassim & Le Galès 
2010). The publication of a set of studies was published at the beginning of 2014 (Halpern 
et al. 2014)7. The concentration of works in these specific territories led to the 
consideration of implications in the use of the PPI approach in analysing Brazilian public 
policies, and in particular Rio de Janeiro's housing policy case.  
 
                                                 
7 The exploration of the PPI in this thesis do not includes these works as they were very recently 
published.  
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The PPI approach primarily involves a research positioning (angle of research) rather than 
a theory about public policy in European countries, the European Union or the USA. 
Based on this, this research considers that the instrument's frame shares the orientation of 
Foucault's 'governmentality' which involves 'not ideal typification, but an empirical mapping of 
governmental rationalities and techniques...Government is not assumed to be a by-product or necessary effect 
of immanent social or economic forces or structures' (Rose et al. 2006: 99). Thus, the use of the PPI 
approach outside its traditional territories does not demand a re-conceptualization. 
Furthermore, the use of the PPI approach for analysing Rio de Janeiro's housing policy can 
enrich the existing literature by revealing the slum upgrading instrumentation outcomes at 
the municipal housing policy level. In relation to the latter, this research considers that the 
use of the PPI approach for studying a municipal policy can contribute to the exploration 
of how this approach can shed light on local governance dynamics that has been 
understudied in the existing PPI literature as analyses tend to focus on national or 
European Union policy instruments. 
PPI approach limitations 
There are two major limitations around the instrument's frame. Menon & Sedelmeier 
(2010) analysed the European Union security policy through the study of two instruments: 
civilian crisis management and enlargement conditionality. In their work they observed that 
the PPI assumed that the selection of instruments related to an intentional choice made by 
policy makers. Menon & Sedelmeir argued that this assumption was problematic 'because it 
neglects the possibility that the selection of instruments may not be the result of policy-makers' deliberate 
choice but rather the consequence of developments that they had not initially intended or anticipated' (ibid: 
76). This research agrees with this criticism and acknowledges that the selection of policy 
instruments might not be the result of an intentional choice. Thus, the analysis called into 
question policy-makers intentionality.  
 
Secondly, Leca (2009) observed that policy instruments analysis is useful for understanding 
the political effects of instruments; however, he stressed that policies do not determine 
politics entirely. Leca noted that policy problems are not the totality of politics, as they 
include 'pure politics problems that relates to the determination and signification of a collective, within and 
beyond the identity produced by a public policy mobilization and its effects over its public' (Leca 2009). In 
that sense, this investigation acknowledges the limitations of the PPI approach in this 
regard.  
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
34 
1.4.2 PPI methods: some considerations 
This work considers that the PPI approach might lead to a techno-deterministic position 
when analysing policies through instruments. The PPI approach stresses the role of 
instrument in shaping and reshaping policies. Based on this, the PPI approach challenges 
the socio-deterministic position which neglects the role of technologies. Nevertheless, it 
could be possible that the PPI approach leads towards a techno-determinist position 
supported by the understanding that 'technology develops independently from social context - but 
directly affects society' (Cordella & Shaikh 2006: 6). This research argues that technologies and 
humans both shape each other (see CHAPTER 3). This position is shared by the PPI 
approach as Lascoumes & Le Galès (2007b) relate to a moderated constructivism 'which 
certainly takes into account the plasticity of interpretations of social issues and the institutions, but considers 
as well that there are cognitive and normative frameworks that often guide in a decisive way the attributable 
meanings and possible actions' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007b: 112). Therefore, a crucial 
methodological question is how to avoid falling into these techno-determinist or socio-
determinist positions?  
 
In addition, the PPI approach propose to focus on policy 'instrumentation', yet it does not 
clearly states methods (an operational framework). The different studies that used the PPI 
approach do not either elaborate on data collection and data analysis. One major reason for 
this absence is advanced by Bongrand & Laborier (2005). These authors explored the 
methods used in policy analysis in the French literature, and concluded that methods are 
rarely discussed as the focus is primarily on theories. These scholars highlighted as well the 
lack of innovation in terms of methods in the policy analysis literature. Therefore, the use 
of the PPI approach demanded the elaboration of an explicit operational frame for 
investigating Rio de Janeiro's slum upgrading 'instrumentation' (see CHAPTER 3).  
1.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed and presented the PPI approach and explored its theoretical roots in 
order to show how this approach substantiates the hypotheses of this research. The first 
part of the chapter explored the roots and aspirations of the political sociology perspective 
that underpins the PPI approach, stressing that it considers public policies in relation to 
sociological, political and State transformation dimensions. Thus, the political sociology 
perspective substantiates the double considerations of this research in Rio de Janeiro's 
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housing policy: to explore the municipal housing policy process; and to investigate 
municipal government transformation, governance changes and the process of 
depoliticization in relation to the housing sector.  
 
The second part of this chapter presented the PPI approach, its theoretical linkages, and 
detailed its core concepts. From this review, this work retain two main aspects. Firstly, 
policy instruments are not neutral devices and promptly for use. Instead they produce 
specific effects according to their own logic and must be constituted. Thus, policy 
instruments shape policies in spite of the aims ascribed to them. Secondly, policy 
instrumentation is a central concern in public policy as the choice and use of instruments 
have social and political repercussion. As a result, the analysis of policy instrumentation can 
reveal power dynamics and how instruments organize public action according to their own 
properties. In addition, this investigation retains that the 'instrumentation' analysis can 
reveal more nuanced understanding about policy change as it allows to consider a variety of 
possibilities.  
 
The third part discussed the mobilization of the PPI approach outside its traditional 
territories. It observed that the PPI approach does not relate to a specific European 
theorization of public policies or policy instruments. Thus, the PPI approach can be 
mobilized for understanding public policies in other locations such as Brazil, and in 
particular Rio de Janeiro. In addition, this third part pointed out that the PPI literature does 
not elaborate an explicit operational frame for investigating policy instrumentation. 
Moreover, it stressed the risk of moving from a socio-deterministic towards a techno-
deterministic approach by mobilizing a PPI frame. Considerations that are addressed in 
CHAPTER 3.  
 
Using as analytical lens the PPI approach, the next chapter calls into question the case of 
Rio de Janeiro.  
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CHAPTER 2  RIO'S CASE AND GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to call into question the case of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy, 
mobilizing the Political Sociology of Public Policy Instruments (PPI). The chapter is 
divided into three parts. The first two parts examines the evolution of housing policies at 
national level in order to identify the framing conditions from which Rio de Janeiro's 
housing policy emerged and developed. The first of them examines the decentralization 
and democratization process and emergence of a diversity of housing policy responses at 
municipal level. The second part covers the Federal Government comeback in the first 
decade of the 2000s through new institutional rearrangement, regulations and important 
investments. The last part explores the case of Rio de Janeiro. Firstly, this part describes 
the evolution of housing policy in Rio de Janeiro marked by institutional, instrumental, and 
financial changes. Secondly, it examines how this case has been analysed while observing 
the existence of three majors gaps and presents the research question, hypotheses.  
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2.2 REDEFINING MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT ROLE IN THE HOUSING POLICY 
2.2.1 The decline of the Federal Government housing interventions 
Emergence of the Housing Financial System 
Government initiatives around low income housing emerged in Brazil during the 1940s. 
President Dutra's administration created in 1946 the first national body for financing 
infrastructure and constructing houses called 'Popular Housing Foundation' (Fundação 
Casa Popular) (Shidlo 1990). However, this body had little impact in the sector as it had 
inadequate financial resources, an unsuitable economic landscape (inflationary 
environment), and an inefficient organizational and managerial structure (ibid). Years later, 
in 1964, the Brazilian army forces organized a coup d'état against President Goulart, 
leading to the establishment of the military dictatorship. During this period national 
housing initiatives became stronger. 
 
The military government, upon its arrival to power, conducted banking system, capital 
market, and administration reforms that enhanced the administrative and financial 
capacities of the Federal Government (Melo 1995). Specifically, in relation to the housing 
sector, the military government established the Housing Financial System (SFH) in 1964. 
Controlled by the Federal Government through the National Housing Bank (BNH) created 
the same year, the SFH included two major sub-systems. The first one called Brazilian 
Savings and Loan System (SBPE) was directed to the middle class and was financed by a 
voluntary saving system and real estate bonds. The second one aimed at low income 
groups and was funded by the Severance Pay Fund (FGTS) created in 1966 and financed 
by a compulsory saving (8% of employees monthly pay was deposited into the FGTS)8. In 
addition, public-private companies controlled by the States and the Municipalities called 
COHABs (Companhias de Habitação) were created as promoting agents for the housing 
government programmes (Azevedo 1990).  
 
With the creation of the BNH and the development of its activities the housing policy 
became strongly centralized. The Federal Government through the BNH developed the 
exclusive capacity to design housing programmes and financing schemes. In addition, the 
                                                 
8 Since its creation, it was stipulated that the FGTS could be used for severance pay and housing 
and urban infrastructure programmes. 
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BNH was the only body entitled to use and distribute the FGTS resources, and had the 
discretionary capacity to allocate and commercialize housing units (Arretche & Rodriguez 
1999).  
Crisis and collapse of the Housing Financial System  
The Financial Housing System (SFH) gained strength with the creation of the FGTS as this 
fund gave to the BNH important liquid assets. The BNH had controlled US$6 billion by 
1973 and over US$16 billion by 1975 (Shidlo 1990). Nevertheless, the SFH faced two 
major problems: an escalating rate of default on the mortgage by the borrowers; and an 
increasing gap between the debit balance and instalment readjustments (Azevedo 1996). In 
trying to stabilize the SFH, from the middle of the 1970s onwards the houses constructed 
by the COHABs that used to be directed towards the lowest income group were mostly 
directed towards the lower middle income group (ibid).  
 
In the 1980s, the growing economic and fiscal crisis, and the Government's measures to 
address it, exacerbated the default on the mortgage by the borrowers (Azevedo 1996). In 
addition, the social output of the housing policy was limited. Between 1964 and 1986 the 
BNH financed 4.5 million housing units, yet only 1.5 million beneficiated the lower income 
groups (ibid). The BNH from 1975 developed alternative programmes to serve the lowest 
income group of the population9; however, they only represented 5.9% of the housing 
units constructed by the BNH (ibid).  
 
In 1985 the military regime collapsed and democracy was re-established in Brazil. Under 
this new period called 'New Republic', President Sarney faced three major housing sector 
issues: the housing system had low liquidity, there was a high rate of default of mortgages, 
and the housing policy was socially ineffective. Sarney's administration started restructuring 
the system; however, in 1986 the Federal Government decided to abolish the BNH (ibid). 
The BNH bureaucracy was dispersed and its functions distributed across different federal 
bodies. The Federal Saving Bank (CAIXA) retained several BNH functions, including the 
administration of the FGTS, and centralized the finances of the housing sector by the 
beginning of 1990 (Arretche & Rodriguez 1999). This fragmentation limited federal 
housing initiatives. Furthermore, the economic recession at the beginning of the 1980s 
                                                 
9 For a comprehensive overview of the housing alternative programmes developed by the BNH see 
Azevedo 1990. 
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limited federal investments on housing programmes and brutally restricted the use of 
FGTS for housing financing during that decade (ibid).  
From Collor to Cardoso: Federal Government housing initiatives 
During the 1990s, Federal Government housing initiatives remained limited. The Collor 
administration from 1990 to 1992 did not realize an in-depth reform of the Housing 
Financial System (SFH), and the Immediate Action Plan for Housing (PAIH) that was the 
main federal housing initiative remained uncompleted (Azevedo 2007). Furthermore, the 
Collor administration authorized investments well beyond the FGTS limits in number and 
volume, leading to the total cessation of investments through the FGTS from 1992 to 
1995, compromising housing investments (Arretche & Rodriguez 1999). After Collor's 
impeachment, Itamar Franco took over the Federal Government. He pursued previous 
administration housing initiatives and launched two other housing programmes dissociated 
from the SFH: Habitar-Brasil and Morar-Municipio (Azevedo 2007). These programmes 
were expected to involve about US$100,000 in 1993, but this amount was reduced due to 
the economic stabilization plan (ibid).  
 
Itamar Franco was succeeded by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso who at the 
beginning of his administration in 1995 announced investments of R$26.5 billion for the 
housing sector. Institutionally, Cardoso's administration transferred the housing matters to 
the Urban Policy Secretariat, articulating housing together with urban and sanitation 
policies (Azevedo 2007). Cardoso promoted as well the role of municipal governments in 
the housing sector, incentivizing municipalities to promote housing construction and slum 
upgrading. Among the different housing programmes implemented by the Cardoso 
administration, the most important were the continuation of Habitar-Brasil and the launch 
of the Pro-Moradia programme (ibid)10. Nevertheless, these Federal Government 
programmes were partially implemented, mainly because of the macro-economic 
constraints that restricted States' and Municipalities' levels of debt (Bonduki 2008). For 
instance, between 1996 and 2000 from the R$5.2 billion that were forecasted for 
implementing Pro-Moradia and Habitar-Brasil programmes, only R$ 1.69 billion were 
invested (Azevedo 2007).  
                                                 
10 For more details of the Cardoso administration housing programmes see Azevedo 2007; Bonduki 
2008; and Valença & Bonates 2010.  
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2.2.2 The rise of municipalities as key actors in the housing sector  
At the same time Federal Government housing initiatives were limited, Brazilian 
municipalities started to become key actors of the housing sector thanks not only to the 
absence of the Federal Government but also to the process of re-democratization of the 
country and the emergence of new governance arrangements.  
New responsibilities for local governments 
After the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1985, Brazil started the elaboration of a new 
constitution that was enacted in 1988. In this process the National Movement for Urban 
Reform (MNRU) elaborated a Constitutional Popular Amendment (Souza 2005)11. The 
MNRU proposal recognized 'the autonomy of municipal governments, the democratic management of 
cities, the social right to housing, the right to the regularization of consolidated informal settlements, the 
social function of the urban property, and the need to combat land and property speculation in urban areas' 
(Fernandes 2007: 180). The amendment was heavily modified (ibid); nevertheless, the 
MNRU principles influenced the urban and housing chapters of the new constitution (Fiori 
et al. 2000).  
 
The new constitution included three key elements concerning the evolution of urban policy 
(Fernandes 1995). The first element was the transfer of the decision-making of land use 
and urban space from the federal to the municipal level. In particular, the constitution 
established that municipalities were responsible for ensuring the 'full development of the city’s 
social functions' (ibid: 62). In the case of cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants, the 
constitution stipulated the elaboration of a Master Plan aiming to regulate their urban 
development. The second key element was the recognition of the social function of private 
property in relation to social justice principles. As a result, the new constitution established 
that urban property covered social functions when it was in accordance with the basic 
principles of the Master Plan. The final key element was the inclusion of the right to 
adverse possession (usucapião). This right applied in private urban areas of up to 250m² 
after 5 years of peaceful occupation, which was relevant since it was considered that it 
concerned half of the favelas across the country (ibid).  
                                                 
11 For more details about the elaboration of the 1988 Constitution and the Constitutional Popular 
Amendment functioning see Souza 2005. 
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Local housing initiatives 
As for housing, contrary to the urban development and other sectors such as education and 
health, the new constitution did not set up a preferential hierarchy for organizing housing 
policies (Arretche & Rodriguez 1999). The Federal Government became responsible for 
setting up the guidelines for housing policies. However, municipalities' role remained vague 
as the three levels of government became equally responsible for promoting housing 
initiatives. Thus, the different housing-related constitutional articles did not strongly 
promote a new institutional arrangement for the sector and the responsibilities of each 
federal entity remained ambiguous (ibid). Nevertheless, the new constitution gave the 
capacity to municipalities to develop housing programmes. 
 
The new constitution modified as well inter governmental finances, contributing to the 
increase of funds at municipal level (C. Souza 2001). These changes occurred gradually and 
were completed in 1993, benefiting municipalities and in particular the states' capitals such 
as Rio de Janeiro. In addition, the military regime in 1982 allowed direct elections at the 
regional state level and increased federal transfers to municipal governments so to maintain 
and reinforce their alliances (Souza 2005). These changes strengthened local governments 
which started to implement a variety of housing initiatives (Cardoso 2007). These housing 
initiatives at municipal level were further developed thanks to the democratic opening after 
1985. For instance, the use of participatory budgeting as a way to address housing and 
urban issues was strengthened by the increase of leftist local governments (Souza 2005).  
Different public policy instruments 
During the 1990s a variety of housing policies were developed across the 5,564 
municipalities and some of them aroused interest and gained national and international 
recognition. Building on the PPI policy instrument's classification (see page 29 and Table 1 
page 31), these different municipal housing policies can be divided into three main types12. 
The first type of housing policies that were developed were land-centred experiences. They 
mobilized primarily 'legal instruments' such as the Special Zones of Social Interest (ZEIS) 
developed in Recife (F. de Souza 2001). This experience inspired the creation of Special 
Areas of Social Interest (AEIS) in the municipality of Diadema, which sought through this 
                                                 
12 Nowadays, there does not exist a comprehensive classification of these experiences. In recent 
years some studies have addressed this gap (Cardoso 2007; Arretche et al. 2007, 2012). This 
research proposes a classification based on the PPI approach, contributing to this effort. 
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legal instrument, the concretization of the principle of social function of private property 
(Cardoso 2007). This type of policies was developed through legislative and regulatory 
traditional policy instruments.  
 
The other two types relates to the 'New Public Policy Instruments'. As Lascoumes & Le 
Galès (2004; 2007a) mentioned these instruments involve less interventionist forms of 
regulation. The first type of housing policies was democracy-centred housing policies. They 
were supported by 'agreement-based and incentive-based policy instruments' such as the 
participatory budgeting in Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre (Lara 2010; C. Souza 2001). 
The second type was spatial-centred policies such as in Rio de Janeiro (Fiori & Brandao 
2010). This last main type used slum upgrading as the main policy instrument which can be 
related to 'de facto and de jure standards, best practices' policy instruments.  
2.3 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COMEBACK  
2.3.1 Reorganization of housing sector 
Institutional restructuring 
During the first decade of the 2000s the Federal Government re-emerged as a key actor in 
the housing sector. In 2003, Lula's administration created the Ministry of Cities. As 
proposed by the Moradia Project this ministry became responsible for coordinating 
sanitation, urban planning, transport and housing policies13. The National Housing 
Secretariat (SNH) was mandated to restructure the housing sector institutionally and legally, 
review the existing housing initiatives, and increase housing sector investments (SNH 
2010). One year later, in 2004, the SNH elaborated a National Housing Policy (PNH) 
which set up the Federal Government housing policy guidelines. The PNH general 
objectives included the universalization of access to housing, the coordination of housing 
with urban policies, the strengthening of government role, the focus on lower income 
groups, and economic stimulation by increasing jobs and income-generation (SNH 2004). 
 
In order to materialize these objectives the SNH created the National Housing System 
formed by two subsystems: the National Market System (SNM) and the National Social 
Housing System (SNHIS). The SNM was directed at people earning between 5 to 10 times 
                                                 
13 The major features of the housing restructuring during Lula's administrations were informed by 
the Moradia project. For more details see Instituto Cidadania (2000). 
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of the minimum wages and beyond, and financed by the SBPE (Brazilian Loan and Service 
System) and stock market funds. The SNHIS was directed to people earring from 0 to 3 
and 3 to 5 of the minimum wages, and financed by the FGTS (Guaranteed Saving Fund) 
and federal budget. The SNHIS planned to focus on housing construction and 
rehabilitation as well as on precarious settlements urbanization which included 
urbanization, land regularization and housing construction for relocations.  
The SNHIS involved two main instruments (SNH 2004): the National Social Housing 
Fund (FNHIS) and the National Housing Plan (PlanHab). The creation of the FNHIS 
sought to centralize all the resources for social housing. This fund was supposed to 
articulate the different government initiatives and secure social control through the creation 
of a managing council (CGFNHIS) constituted by government and civil society 
representatives. The elaboration of PlanHab aimed at developing a national long term 
housing strategy that should include housing construction and favelas' urbanization. The 
regional states and municipalities were expected to join the SNHIS by signing an agreement 
with the Federal Government. This agreement made compulsory the elaboration of state 
and municipal housing plans (PLHIS) aiming to design local solutions and strategies for 
addressing housing deficit over a long term, in harmony with PlanHab. In addition, the 
agreement made compulsory for the states and municipalities the creation of local social 
housing funds (FLHIS) and local managing councils (CGFLHIS) also constituted by local 
government and civil society representatives in order to channel Federal Government 
resources reunited in the FNHIS.  
National Housing Policy: materialization 
In 2005 the law establishing the SNHIS was enacted, and this in spite of the Mensalão 
scandal that destabilized Lula's administration' including the Ministry of Cities14. As 
mentioned, the states and municipalities must create local funds (FLHISs), local funds 
managing councils (CGFLHISs) and elaborate local housing plans (PLHISs) in order to 
join the SNHIS. Nevertheless, the idea of mixing federal budgets together with the FGTS 
was abandoned as the creation of the national fund (FNHIS) was approved as a investment 
fund only running with federal budget resources (Bonduki 2008).  
 
                                                 
14 The Mensalão scandal related to a corruption scheme that involved key politicians of Lula's 
administration. In order to reinforce his alliances, Lula demanded Olivio Dutra to step down from 
the Ministry of Cities, and offered the ministry to a conservative party (Azevedo 2007). 
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From 2003 to 2005 federal housing initiatives directed towards low income groups 
remained limited because of the macro-economic measures established by Cardoso and 
maintained by Lula (Bonduki 2008). Nevertheless, during the second half of Lula's first 
administration, the National Housing Policy (PNH) gained financial strength. The National 
Market System (SNM) expanded thanks to a federal law that increased housing financing 
legal certainty, and a resolution of the National Monetary Council (CMN) that obliged the 
banks to expand housing loans using the resources of the Brazilian Loan and Saving 
System (SBPE). Furthermore, housing loans became cheaper as the interest rate fell, 
benefiting lower income groups (ibid). Moreover, from 2004 the Federal Government 
increased the amount of subsidies for low income groups as that year it approved the use 
of a vast amount of resources of the Guaranteed Saving Fund (FGTS) for subsidizing 
social housing (ibid).  
2.3.2 Reshaping municipal actions through massive investments 
Accelerated Growth Programme (PAC): a new scale of slum upgrading 
Right at the beginning of Lula's second administration in January 2007, the Federal 
Government announced the launch of the Accelerated Growth Programme (PAC). The 
emergence of the PAC related to the stabilization of the Brazilian economy achieved during 
Lula's first administration (2003-2006) and a continuous international economic growth 
cycle. The PAC aimed to accelerate Brazil's economic growth pace, maintain the 
macroeconomics fundamentals, and increase income and jobs while decreasing social and 
regional inequalities (PAC 2007a). Thus, the PAC sought to incentivize private 
investments, increase public investment in infrastructure and eliminate the constraints for 
growth (PAC 2007b).  
 
PAC investments in infrastructure were expected to reach R$503.9 billion in three different 
areas: logistics, energy and social and urban infrastructure15 (ibid). In particular, PAC 
investments in social and urban infrastructure included $R106.3 billion for housing projects 
(ibid). These housing initiatives involved slum upgrading, housing construction and 
improvement and housing financing. PAC investments for housing projects included 
subsidies; loans and resource transfers to the regional states and municipalities; mortgages 
                                                 
15 R$ 58.3 billion, R$ 274.8 billion and R$170.8 respectively.  
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and loans to organizations; and residential leasing. By the end of 2010 the expected 
investment in housing projects were surpassed as they reached R$217 billion (PAC 2010a).  
My Home My Life programme (MCMV) 
In addition to the PAC investments, the Federal Government launched My Home My Life 
Programme (MCMV) in 2009. This massive housing construction programme emerged as a 
anti-cyclical measure to fight against the economic crisis that started in the USA with the 
subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 and was intensified by the financial crash at the end of 
2008. The MCMV aimed to develop a reliable economic milieu in which a formal housing 
market for the low income and the middle class could prosper (SNH 2010). The main 
strategies for achieving this goal were the creation of a guarantee fund, the improvement of 
mortgage interest rates and the increase of subsidies. The Federal Government anticipated 
the construction of 1 million houses and R$ 34 billion in investments.  
 
The Provisional Measure No.45925/2009 that then became the Federal Law No. 
11977/2009 regulated the MCMV. This law included the creation of the Guarantee Fund 
(FGHAB) that secured borrower instalments, and a decrease in insurances' cost, notary 
fees and time, taxes for low income housing construction and environmental licensing 
time. Furthermore, the MCMV involved investments for modernizing the construction 
sector and establishing standards for the introduction of environmentally-sustainable 
materials. This law also integrated measures for squatter settlements' regularization and 
titling, incentives for housing construction and subsidies inversely proportional to 
beneficiaries' income for housing purchasing (see Annexe, page 285) 
 
The functioning of the MCMV involved the allocation of resources by the Federal 
Government and the FGTS. Developers submitted their projects to the CAIXA which was 
responsible for analysing, authorizing and commercializing the projects (CAIXA n.d.). To 
join the programme, it was compulsory for the regional states and municipalities to sign an 
agreement with the Federal Government. They were responsible for elaborating a 
beneficiaries' register and facilitating projects' elaboration and licensing (SNH n.d.). In 
addition, so as to guarantee the quality of real estate projects the agreement establish that 
regional states and municipalities might provide urbanized and well-located land (SNH 
n.d.). 
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2.3.3 Latest Federal Government housing initiatives 
PAC 2 and MCMV 2  
In 2010 Lula's government launched PAC 2 giving continuity to PAC 1. PAC 2 included 
R$1.59 trillion in investments, of which R$958.9 billion were expected to be spent from 
2011 to 2014. PAC 2 prioritized the same three key areas as the previous programme 
(logistics, energy and social and urban infrastructure). However this time the PAC 2 
integrated housing construction, housing financing and favelas' urbanization into an 
investment area called 'PAC My Home My Life' (PAC 2010b; PAC n.d.). Through the PAC 
MCMV the Federal Government expected to invest R$278.2 billion in the housing sector 
(ibid).  
 
Specifically, R$71.7 billion in investments were earmarked for the construction of 2 million 
houses in 4 years, of which 60% were for the lowest income group, and 30 % for the lower 
medium income (PAC 2010b; PAC n.d.). In relation to the urbanization of favelas the PAC 
MCMV allocated R$ 30.5 billion for the transformation of the favelas into popular 
neighbourhood and the improvement of the quality of life in these areas. The urbanization 
of favelas included the following items: housing improvements, infrastructure works 
(water, sewage, drainage, roads, public lighting); public services (health, education, sport, 
leisure and culture); and land regularization (ibid). As previously, the bulk of the 
investments was mainly reserved for the regional metropolis, capitals and largest 
municipalities. Finally, for housing financing, the PAC MCMV earmarked R$176 billion of 
the Brazilian Loan and Saving System (SBPE) for the construction and acquisition of new 
and old real estates and refurbishment works, granting the access to housing and 
invigorating the housing market (ibid).  
 
In June 2011, the Federal Government regulated the MCMV (Federal Law No. 
12424/2011) and increased the investments. It decided to earmark R$125,7 billion, out of 
which R$ 53.1 for housing financing and R$ 72.6 billion for subsidies. The subsidies were 
expected to come from the federal budget (R$ 63.1 billion), and the FGTS (R$9.5 billion) 
(SNH 2011). 
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SNHIS, PAC and MCMV by the end of 2012  
By the end of 2012, the Federal Government had invested vast amounts of money in 
housing initiatives. The MCMV 1 and 2 totalized 2.28 million of contracted houses and 1.5 
million of allocated houses (PAC 2013). In relation to the urbanization of favelas, the 
Federal Government investments reached R$ 28.2 billion through the PAC 1 and 2 (ibid). 
Finally, housing financing through the SBPE reached R$307.3 billion from 2010 to 2012, 
benefiting almost 900 thousand households across the country (see Annexe, page 285).  
 
In addition, the National Social Housing System (SNHIS) expanded but within limitations 
as the bulk of Federal Government investments since 2007 (PAC and MCMV) was not 
channelled through the National Social Housing Fund (FNHIS). The National Housing 
Plan (PlanHab) was elaborated between 2007 and 2008 (SNH 2009). By the beginning of 
2012 about 95% of the regional states and municipalities joined the SNHIS; 72% of them 
created a local housing fund (FLHIS) and 68% created a housing fund managing council 
(Arretche et al. 2012). However, only 633 local governments presented their local housing 
plans (PLHIS) to the CAIXA as stipulated by law (ibid). 
*** 
The first part reviewed the emergence of a centralized housing policy during the military 
dictatorship and its collapse in the middle of the 1980s. Then, it described that during the 
1990s the role of the Federal Government weakened while the municipalities emerged as 
key actors. In particular, this part identified the existence of three main types of local 
housing policies: land-centred policies that mobilized mainly legislative and regulatory 
instruments; democracy-centred experiences that used participatory budgeting; and spatial-
centred experiences that put into operation the slum upgrading instrument. The second 
part showed that during the first decade of the 2000s the Federal Government gradually 
enhanced its role in the housing sector through the development of the National Social 
Housing System (SNHIS) that entailed, at the national and local levels, the creation of 
housing funds (FNHISs and FLHISs) and funds' managing councils (CGFNHISs and 
CGFLHISs), and elaboration of housing plans (PlanHab and PLHISs). Lastly, the second 
part, noted that since 2007 the Federal Government increased its participation in the 
housing sector through the implementation of PAC and MCMV that involve substantial 
investments for slum upgrading projects and housing construction. Thus, after almost 20 
years of absence since the dissolution of the National Housing Bank (BNH), in the first 
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decade of the 2000s the Federal Government re-emerged as a key actor in the housing 
sector together with municipal governments (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 Brazilian national housing policy evolution overview.  
President Period  Major events / federal housing initiatives Observations 
Military 
Regime 
1960s 1964: Creation of the Housing Financial 
System (SFN); 1966: Creation of the 
Guaranteed Saving Fund (FGTS); 1967: 
Creation of the Brazilian Loan and Saving 
System (SBPE).  
Emergence 
consolidation of the 
of the federal 
government as key 
actor in the housing 
sector. 
1970s Consolidation of the SFH while emerging 
housing sector crisis 
1980-1985 End of the military Regime (1985). 
Crisis of the SFH and emergence of local 
housing initiatives. 
Decay of the Federal 
Government in the 
housing sector. 
Sarney 
1986 Dissolution of the BNH 
Collapse of the SFH.  
Absence of the 
Federal Government 
and rise of 
municipalities as key 
actors in housing 
policies. 
1988 Enactment of the new Constitution 
Collor 1990-1992 Immediate Action Plan for Housing (PAIH) 
Franco 
1993-1994 Habitar-Brasil programme  
Morar-Municipio programme 
Cardoso 
1995-1998 Habitar-Brasil programme 
Pro- Moradia programme 
Cardoso 1999-2002 Residential Lease Programme (PAR)  
Lula 
2003 Creation National Housing Secretariat 
(SNH). 
Comeback of the 
Federal Government. 
Institutional 
restructuring of the 
national housing 
sector . 
2004 Elaboration of the National Housing Policy 
(PNH) 
2005 Creation of the National Social Housing 
System (SNHIS) 
Lula 
2007 Growth Acceleration Pogramme (PAC) Consolidation of the 
Federal Government 
as key actor in the 
housing sector, in 
particular through 
massive investments 
2008 Elaboration of the National Housing Plan 
(PlanHab) 
2009 My Home My Life programme (MCMV) 
2010 Launch PAC 2 and MCMV 2 
Rousseff 2011-2012 MCMV 2 regulations 
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2.4 RIO DE JANEIRO CASE: GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
2.4.1 Rio experience: an introduction 
Rio de Janeiro's housing policy during the 1990s 
After the enactment of the 1988 constitution, in 1992 the Rio de Janeiro Master Plan was 
approved. Later that year Cesar Maia won the municipal elections. Under his 
administration from August 1993 the municipal housing policy guidelines were developed. 
By December 1993 these guidelines were officially announced and involved seven 
programmes ranging from slum upgrading to housing construction. From January 1994 the 
municipality started the materialization of the housing policy through the different 
programmes. In particular, the municipality focused on the Favela-Bairro programme, that 
included the implementation of slum upgrading projects in 16 medium size favelas.  
 
By the end of 1994 the Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH) was created, and the first 
Favela-Bairro projects were implemented. One year later the Municipality and the Inter-
American Development Bank (BID) signed a contract for the investment of US$300 
million (BID 1995) which allowed the expansion of the Favela-Bairro programme to 54 
favelas and various informal housing estates (TCMRJ 2006). In 1997 Luz Paulo Conde, 
Maia's ex-urban planning secretary became Mayor. During his administration the Favela-
Bairro was consolidated as Conde's administration flagship. Slum upgrading projects were 
expanded to small and larger favelas (Bairrinho and Grandes Favelas programmes 
respectively) through other contracts with the Federal Government and the European 
Union. Moreover, at the end of the Conde administration a second BID loan was signed 
which financially secured the continuity of the slum upgrading in another 54 favelas 
(TCMRJ 2006). 
Rio housing policy during the first decade of the 2000s 
At the beginning of the first decade of the 2000s, there was a political battle for the 
municipality between Maia and Conde. Maia won the elections and during his second 
administration, the housing policy and in particular the Favela-Bairro pogramme, were 
relegated to a second plan and several controversies around its denaturalization, 
implementation and effectiveness emerged. In 2004 Maia managed once again to win the 
municipal elections. During his third administration, municipal housing initiatives were 
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almost non-existent. The resources coming from the BID contract ended in 2006 and by 
2007 the SMH had one of the lowest annual budgets since its creation (CGMRJ n.d.). In 
addition, while the municipality joined the SNHIS and created an FLHIS, it did not 
elaborate a PLHIS and the managing council fund was not operating. However, this 
situation did not last long as the launch of the PAC reactivated municipal housing 
investments in Rio de Janeiro; in particular, these were directed to slum upgrading projects 
such as the Alemão and Manguinhos complex.  
 
In 2009 Eduardo Paes won the municipal elections and his administration implemented 
slum projects through the PAC and other federal programmes, while starting to promote 
housing construction mainly through the MCMV. In 2010 the municipality launched a local 
slum upgrading programme called Morar Carioca. This programme in line with the Favela-
Bairro sought to urbanize and integrate Rio's favelas into the city by 2020, through an 
investment of R$ 8 billion (IAB-RJ 2010a; PCRJ 2010a). The investments were expected to 
come from different sources: PAC, BID, Pro-Moradia, FNHIS and the municipal budget 
(SMH 2011). In addition, in relation to the SNHIS, the managing council of the FLHIS 
became operational and Rio de Janeiro PLHIS was elaborated.  
 
By the end of 2012 Rio de Janeiro's housing policy differed from the previous initiatives in 
three ways. First of all, the amount of investments was higher than before, increasing from 
R$1,785 billion from the 1995 to 2009 period to R$1.612 billion between 2009 to 2012 
(CGMRJ n.d.). Secondly, housing construction became central to the local housing policy 
while slum upgrading took a secondary role (SMH 2011). Thirdly, a challenging 
coordination with Federal and State governments emerged. Indeed, besides the need of 
coordination with the Federal Government, the municipality needed to negotiate with the 
state of Rio de Janeiro. For instance, the state of Rio de Janeiro was key in the largest slum 
upgrading projects such as the Alemão complex and Rocinha.  
 
In particular, the slum upgrading differed from the previous experience as it emerged as 
part of the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games legacy. The slum upgrading included as 
well new items such as housing construction and transport equipments. Finally, current 
slum upgrading changed perspective as besides integrating a city scale approach, it 
acknowledged groups rather than individuals favelas, and it included a temporal frame for 
urbanizing all Rio's favelas. 
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In sum, during the 1990s came into existence Rio de Janeiro's housing policy. This process 
included the emergence and consolidation of slum upgrading as a policy instrument. 
During the first decade of the 2000s the housing policy and in particular the Favela-Bairro 
programme and the municipal housing policy took a secondary role and almost 
disappeared. In recent years the municipal housing policy and the slum upgrading 
instrument became visible again through the launch of the Morar Carioca plan that seems 
to give a new lease to the old Favela-Bairro programme and other initiatives financed by 
Federal Government mainly through PAC and MCMV (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 Rio de Janeiro housing policy evolution overview 
Period Mayor of Rio 
de Janeiro 
Municipal Houising 
Secretary 
Major events at municipal and 
national levels 
1993-1996 
Cesar Maia Sergio Magalhães 
1993 Housing basis 
1994 Launch of the Favela-Bairro 
1995 Creation SMH 
1995 BID contract 
1997-2000 Luis P. Conde Sergio Magalhães 2000 BID contract 2 
2001-2004 
Cesar Maia Solange Amaral 
2003 Creation of SNH 
2004 Elaboration of the PNH 
2004 Alemão complex proposal 
2004-2008 
Cesar Maia 
Solange Amaral 
Luiz Humberto 
Paulo A. Figueira 
2005 Creation of the SNHIS 
2006 end of the BID contract 2 
2007 Launch of the PAC 
2007 Pan-American Games 
2007 Launch of the PAC Rio 
2009-2012 
Eduardo Paes Jorge Bittar 
2009 Launch of the MCMV 
2010 Launch of the PAC 2 
2010 Launch of the Morar Carioca 
2012 Rio+20 
2012 BID contract 3 
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2.4.2 The policy instrument and gaps in the literature 
Overview and classification 
Rio de Janeiro's favelas and housing policies have generated an extensive literature. Overall 
this literature can be divided in two major groups. On the one hand studies that have 
focused on favelas and favela dwellers such as the pioneering analyses of Leeds (1969) on 
poverty and favelas, and Perlman (1979)16 on favela dwellers' representations and the 
theory of marginality17. On the other studies which central objective has been the analysis 
of Rio's housing policy. This thesis focused on the latter as it was interested on housing 
policy analysis rather than favelas phenomenon. Building on Knoepfel et al. (2001) policy 
analysis classification (see CHAPTER 1, page 24), the second group of studies can be 
broken down into two main streams.  
 
The first one relates to 'evaluative analysis' and represents an important share of the 
existing literature. These studies assessed housing policy efficiency and effectiveness and 
considered how problems, side effects or poor results can be overcome. They focused as 
well on describing the housing policy materialization process in order to develop a 
methodology that could be replicated elsewhere. This type of assessments involves official 
evaluations that belonged to the policy process or municipal exertive control routines such 
as the one realized by the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (IBAM 1996), the 
Municipal Court of Auditors (TCMRJ 2005; TCMRJ 2006), and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (BID 2007). These also include evaluations conducted by municipal 
staff and scholars focusing on whether or not Rio de Janeiro's housing policy met its 
objectives and how the experience could be improved. For instance, Cardoso (2002) and 
Pamuk and Cavallieri (1998) reviewed the strengths and challenges of Favela-Bairro; 
Abramo (1998) assessed Favela-Bairro impact on real estate market in favelas; Soares & 
Soares (2005) measured Favela-Bairro's socio-economic impact; Abiko et al. (2007) 
explored slum upgrading cost in different Brazilian cities, including Rio de Janeiro. In 
addition, several publications have explored the case of Rio de Janeiro for the pourpose of 
developing a methodology that can be replicated elsewhere, promoting Rio's housing policy 
as best practice (Brakarz et al. 2002; Aduan & Brakarz 2004; Rojas 2004; Rojas 2009).  
 
                                                 
16 This analysis has been recently revisited in Perlman 2010 
17 For more details about this literature on Rio's favelas see Valladares 2006.  
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The second stream relates to studies that focus on the 'explanation of policy functioning', 
following sociological approaches. This second stream includes two main types of studies. 
The first type entails analyses taking an 'unveiling' perspective18. They explored Rio de 
Janeiro's case in order to uncover hidden processes or interests, denounce government's 
rhetoric on policy change, and/or identify meagre, inexistent or perverse policy results. 
This type of analysis focused mainly on three major topics: the policy objective of 
integrating the favelas into the city; how the policy beneficiated an elite or a political 
interest; and how Rio de Janeiro case relates to the urban neo-liberal agenda. The analyses 
taking the unveiling perspective are best illustrated by the study of Broudehoux (2001) on 
the Favela-Bairro and city marketing, Randolph (2004) concentrated on the limits of the 
housing policy inclusion objective and Silva (2006) on the cooptation of the housing policy 
by conservative groups related to the neo-liberal economy perspective while Bahia (2000) 
on the social integration rhetoric of the Favela-Bairro programme. More recently Simpson 
(2013) identified the lack of citizen's participation as the main factor of Rio's experience 
failure. At the international level these studies relate to the work of scholars such as Gilbert 
(2014) on the limitations and meagre results of Colombian housing policies.  
 
The second type of studies within the 'explanation of policy functioning' stream focused on 
social, institutional and cognitive changes for understanding Rio de Janeiro' case and how it 
fits into the wider context of housing policies evolution across the globe. Their objective 
was to understand and characterize housing policies development and change such as Fiori 
et al. (2000) who argued about the emergence of a new generation of housing policies in 
the 1990s illustrated by the case of Rio de Janeiro, and Burgos (2003) who reviewed the 
evolution of Rio de Janeiro's housing initiatives since the 1940s up to the Favela-Bairro 
programme in the 1990s. These studies share the same objectives as the ones that focused 
on the Brazilian national housing policy evolution (Azevedo 1996; Cardoso & Ribeiro 
2000; Cardoso 2007; Azevedo 2007; Arretche & Rodriguez 1999). At the international level 
these studies can be related to the work of scholars focusing on macro institutional and 
cognitive changes that impact housing policies evolution such as Pugh (2001).  
                                                 
18 The term 'unveiling' is borrowed from Alain Faure's mapping and classification of studies on 
territorial policies (Faure 2007). 
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Rio de Janeiro literature gaps and avenues for investigation 
These studies have made important contributions to the understanding of Rio de Janeiro's 
experience; however, in the view of the PPI approach this literature presents two major 
gaps. Firstly, the 'evaluative' stream that represents the bulk of the existing literature, has 
tended to focus on housing policy efficiency and effectiveness, overlooking Rio's housing 
governance evolution. This tendency may be the result of the fact that housing deficit is 
perceived as a crucial issue to be addressed, pushing other lines of inquiry and in particular 
the question of governance into the background. Secondly, the literature has tended to 
analyse the 'slum upgrading instrument' and its 'instrumentation' under a functionalistic 
perspective without any role whatsoever in the policy process. On the one hand the 
'evaluative' stream has analysed the slum upgrading instrument in terms of its effectiveness 
or efficiency. On the other the 'explanation of policy functioning' stream has studied the 
slum upgrading as an instrument at the service of the Carioca élite or political group, or has 
overlooked it as this stream has primarily focused on social, conceptual, institutional 
and/or political changes for explaining policy development and change. However, as 
mentioned in CHAPTER 1 'policy instruments' are not neutral devices. Instead they 
produce specific effects and structure public policy according to their own properties. 
Thus, 'policy instrumentation' also contributes to the shaping of policies. Under this 
understanding, the existing literature has overlooked how the choice and use of 'policy 
instruments' i.e. its 'instrumentation', account for Rio de Janeiro's housing governance and 
policy transformation.  
 
In addition, to these main gaps in Rio de Janeiro's housing policy literature, there are five 
other elements that support reviewing the case of Rio de Janeiro:  
  Most of the literature focuses on the 1990s period while the first decade of the 
2000s remains unexplored. The analysis of the 2000s is necessary for understanding 
the dynamics of collapse of Rio de Janeiro's ambitious policy.  
 Few are the studies that explored the case over a long period of time. This limits 
the understanding of long term policy and governance dynamics which are essential 
as novelty and change tend to be an integral part of public policy pronouncements 
as mentioned in CHAPTER 1 (see page 31). Thus, without a diachronic perspective 
it is difficult to identify policy innovation and evolution.  
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 Studies tend to focus on specific projects rather than on a city scale perspective. 
This is problematic because, by focusing on projects, analyses overlooked city-wide 
housing dynamics.  
 New data sources are available thanks to the emergence and consolidation of the 
digital and 'big data' era that allow to reconsider the existing understanding of Rio 
de Janeiro's case. For instance, nowadays the municipal council archives include 
data about housing policy since 1975 that can be scrutinized thanks to the 
development of new technologies.  
 The recent launch of the Morar Carioca programme and the Federal and regional 
state governments comeback call into question the previous housing policy 
development in order to understand and consider the novelty and the new 
arrangement and dynamics surrounding Rio de Janeiro's housing policy, and 
housing sector future. 
2.4.3 Research question and hypotheses 
In the view of these gaps, this research aims to contribute to the field of housing by 
attempting to address them. Building on the PPI approach, this research understands that 
slum upgrading as a policy instrument created specific effects, influencing Rio de Janeiro's 
housing policy and housing governance evolution. With this understanding this research 
questions how the slum upgrading instrument influenced Rio de Janeiro's housing policy 
and housing governance evolution since the 1990s. This question suggests an analysis of 
Rio de Janeiro's policy through the exploration of the choice and use of the slum 
upgrading. The hypotheses related to Rio's slum upgrading instrumentation are:  
 
1. It fostered the inflexion moments (emergence, development, collapse and renewal) that 
marked Rio de Janeiro's housing policy evolution.  
2. It supported the transformation of Rio's housing policy governance.  
3. It contributed to the depoliticization of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy understood as 
'the marginalization of strictly political regulation' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004: 367).  
 
The case of Rio cannot account for all municipal housing experiences across Brazil. Not all 
municipalities used the slum upgrading instrument and each municipality related to 
different housing sector arrangement and dynamics. Nevertheless, the investigation of the 
Rio de Janeiro case can be used to reflect on the other Brazilian municipal experiences, and 
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consider other cases that have mobilized slum upgrading as a public policy instrument 
across the globe. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduced the case and presented the research question and hypotheses. The 
first and second parts offered an overview of Brazil's housing policy evolution in order to 
present the landscape from which Rio de Janeiro's case emerged and developed. The first 
part reviewed the emergence of a centralized housing policy during the military dictatorship 
and its collapse in the 1980s. Then, it described the weakening of the Federal Government, 
while the municipalities emerged as key housing sector actors during the 1990s. In relation 
to the different municipal experiences that were developed three main approaches were 
highlighted: land-centred that mobilized mainly legislative and regulatory instruments; 
democracy-centred experiences that used participatory budgeting; and spatial-centred 
experiences that constituted the slum upgrading instrument.  
 
The second part explored the comeback of the Federal Government into the housing 
sector from the beginning of the first decade of the 2000s. The re-emergence of the 
Federal Government during Lula's first administration mainly related to an institutional 
restructuring with the creation of the Ministry of Cities and the National Housing 
Secretariat (SNH). In addition, the Federal Government created the National Social 
Housing System (SNHIS) which included the elaboration of housing plans at national and 
local levels (PlanHab and PLHIS respectively) to coordinate social housing policy, and the 
creation of housing funds at national and local level (FNHIS and FLHIS respectively) for 
financing housing initiatives. During Lula's second administration, the Federal Government 
gained strength with the launch of the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) that 
channelled important resources for slum upgrading projects in 2007 and in 2009 with the 
launch of the My Home My Life programme (MCMV) for housing construction. By the 
end of 2012 the government continued these investments with the launch of the PAC 
MCMV that included important investments for housing construction, housing financing 
and slum upgrading. In relation to the SNHIS, even if the PAC and MCMV were informed 
by the National Housing Policy (PNH), they weakened its role as the bulk of the subsidies 
were not channelled thought the FNHIS. 
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The third part gave an overview of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy evolution, and reviewed 
Rio's housing policy literature. It stated that the existing literature followed two main 
streams: (i) 'evaluative' studies that represent the bulk of the existing literature and focus on 
policy efficiency and effectiveness; and (ii) 'explanation of policy functioning' analyses, 
following sociological approaches. The exploration of these different streams contributed 
to the identification of two major gaps: housing governance dynamics have been 
understudied and the role of the slum upgrading instrument has been overlooked. Aiming 
to address these gaps the research focuses on how did the choice and use of the slum 
upgrading instrument influence Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance evolution.  
 
The next chapter discusses and presents the methodology and methods. 
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CHAPTER 3 INVESTIGATING THE SLUM UPGRADING AS 
AN 'ACTANT' 
 
 
 
'It is if we were saying to the actors: 'we won't try to discipline you, to make you fit into our 
categories; we will let you deploy your own worlds, and only later will we ask you to explain how you 
came about settling them' (Latour 2005: 23) 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 reviewed the Political Sociology of Public Policy Instruments approach 
(PPI). The PPI argues that policy instruments produce specific effects and contribute to 
structure public policy according to their own properties. Building on this understanding 
CHAPTER 2 calls into question the case of Rio de Janeiro by reviewing the existing 
literature. Specifically, it notes that the existing literature has understudied housing 
governance development and neglected the slum upgrading instrument's role. Aiming to 
address these gaps this research focuses on how the slum upgrading 'instrumentation', i.e. 
the choice and use of this housing instrument, influenced Rio de Janeiro's housing policy 
and governance evolution.  
 
The research question and hypotheses entail analysing the housing policy through the slum 
upgrading instrumentation; however, the PPI literature did not explicitly elaborate on the 
method or operational framework for conducting this type of analysis. Thus, this research 
mobilized Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) that is one of the theoretical roots of the PPI 
approach to elaborate an explicit method for analysing Rio de Janeiro slum upgrading 
instrumentation. 
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 This chapter aims to present and discuss the method used in this research. The chapter is 
divided into three parts. The first part explores ANT and discusses its linkages with policy 
analysis and governmentality, drawing its relevance for this research. The second part 
details the understanding of the slum upgrading as 'actant', presents the 'detective work' as 
general method and explains Rio de Janeiro investigation's first steps which included the 
isolation of the 'actant', a preliminary 'walk through', and first account that redefined the 
research hypotheses. The third part explains the investigation's further steps. Specifically, 
the third part describes the data collection, pointing out the limitations of interviews and 
written documents and how they were overcome; the data analysis which entailed a micro 
processing of facts in order to establish slum upgrading instrumentation sequence of events 
that allowed instrument's 'associations' to unfold, revealing the role of the slum upgrading 
for housing governance and policy evolution and transformation; the data organization 
which involved the creation and use of different tools; and the production and specificity 
of the empirical chapters. 
3.2 ANT AS OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
3.2.1 ANT: an overview 
The world as a collective of 'actants' 
Actor-Network-Theory emerged in the 1980s. The most important scholars that represent 
this perspective are Michelle Callon, Bruno Latour, John Law and Arie Rip (Latour 2005). 
ANT understands the social 'not as a special domain, a specific realm, or a particular sort of thing, but 
only as a very peculiar movement of re-association and reassembling' (Latour 2005: 7). This movement 
of 're-association' and 'reassembling' entails the building of heterogeneous network of 
human and non-human entities (Law 1992). Called 'actants' (or actor-networks), they can 
be anything: ‘a storm, a rat, a rock, a lake, a lion, a child, a worker, a gene, a slave, the unconscious, or 
a virus' (Latour cited by Harman 2007: 36). 'Actants' are open-ended entities generated in 
and by 'associations' (Cordella & Shaikh 2006), which become strong by 'assembling' more 
'allies' (other 'actants'), and weak when they become isolated (Harman 2007). 'Actants' 
associate and dissociate through 'translation' understood as a process rather than a result 
that includes both displacement and transformation (Callon 1986).  
 
In particular, in his seminal work on the Saint Jacques scallops, Callon (1986) identified 
four different translation moments which do not relate to a linear process and can overlap 
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The first one is the 'problematization' and 'describes a system of alliances, or associations, between 
entities, thereby defining the identity and what they ''want'' (ibid: 8). Callon stressed that the 
problematization includes some 'actants' becoming 'Obligatory Passage Points' (OPP), i.e. 
indispensable in the network they are building.  
 
The second moment is 'interessement' understood as 'the group of actions by which an entity ... 
attempts to impose and stabilize the identity of the other actors it defines through its problematization' 
(Callon 1986: 8). For this second moment Callon highlighted that the word interessement 
was used because it refers to be inter-esse (in between). In that sense to interest other 
'actants' is 'to build devices which can be placed between them and all other entities who want to define 
their identities otherwise' (ibid: 9). Callon observed as well that the variety of strategies to 
achieve these interruptions are unlimited.  
 
The third moment is 'enrolment' and it indicates 'the device by which a set of interrelated roles is 
defined and attributed to actors who accept them. Interessement achieves enrolment if it is successful' 
(Callon 1986: 10). Callon stressed that 'describing' enrolment includes tracing 'the group of 
multilateral negotiations, trials of strength and tricks that accompany the interessements and enable them to 
succeed' (ibid). 
 
The fourth moment is called 'mobilization' and relates to 'the chains of intermediaries which result 
in a sole and ultimate spokesman' (Callon 1986: 14).  
 
In addition, Callon observed that 'dissidence' can emerge which involves questioning and 
rejecting the spokesman: 'the actors implicated do not acknowledge their roles in this story nor the slow 
drift in which they had participated, in their opinion, wholeheartedly. As the aphorism says, traduttore-
traditore, from translation to treason there is only a short step' (ibid). Thus, this dissidence involves 
'betrayal' and 'controversy' which is understood as 'all the manifestations by which the 
representativity of the spokesman is questioned, discussed, negotiated, rejected, etc.' (ibid: 15).  
Agency and reality under ANT perspective  
ANT proposes a specific understanding in relation to the structure-agency debate. Cordella 
& Shaikh (2006) pointed out that from the perspective of ANT 'actors do not embody action or 
actantiality (potential for action) but it is their relational dimension that generates instance of action' (ibid: 
11). Therefore, ANT localizes agency in the 'actant', i.e. in the relation of human and non-
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human entities. Laurier (2010) highlighted that by granting agency to 'actants' Latour (and 
ANT) moved away from the binary opposition between individual agency and social 
structures. Indeed, for ANT there is no such thing as isolated objects or humans: 'the agency 
of any human being, his ability to conceive of actions, to plan them and to accomplish them by following the 
plan; the ability to have ideas and to associate them; the ability to be moved or gripped by compassion, the 
capacity to define his expectations and needs, all that depends on the arrangements, the socio-technical niches 
in which she or he is situated' (Callon 2004: 7). 
 
While sometimes perceived as another method of the social sciences, ANT involves a 
specific ontological and epistemological position that diverges from positivist and 
interpretative perspectives (Cordella & Shaikh 2006). Under a positivist perspective, nature 
and society are recognized to exist 'out there'. Thus, the research is 'characterised by formal 
propositions and quantifiable measures of variables articulated to describe the reality that is considered as 
objectively given' (ibid: 13). Under an interpretative perspective, nature and society are 
recognize to be constructed through intermediation. Therefore, the research includes 'to 
interpret and hence explain the processes that are ''producing'' the phenomenon' (ibid). However, for 
ANT reality does not exist 'out there' nor is it the result of an interpretation process. ANT 
recognizes reality as an emerging phenomenon created by the interaction of 'actants': 'reality 
does not exist per se...the construction of reality is achieved through the interplay between different actors, 
both human and non-human, with equal constitutive characteristics' (ibid: 14). Thus, a research under 
ANT perspective involves unfolding the actor-network in order to reveal how they were 
brought into existence, how they last or perish, 'it [ANT] does not claim to explain the actor's 
behaviours but to find the procedures which render actors able to negotiate their ways through one another’s 
world-building activity' (Austrin & Farnsworth 2005: 151). 
3.2.2 ANT and the PPI approach convergences 
ANT and policy analysis 
The integration of ANT into the analysis of Rio de Janeiro must not be perceived as a new 
conceptual connnection. As mentioned in CHAPTER 1, the PPI approach was influenced 
by the sociology of science and the history of techniques and, in particular, by the work of 
Akrich, Callon and Latour (see page 27). For instance, the conceptualization of the 'inertia 
effect' produced by policy instruments (see page 30) was informed by ANT as the PPI 
approach considers that policy instruments 'constitute a point of inevitable passage [Obligatory 
Passage Point] and play a part in what Callon (1986) has called the State of "problematization", which 
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allows heterogeneous actors to come together around issues and agree to work on them jointly' (Lascoumes 
& Le Galès 2007a: 10). In addition, ANT has influenced other policy analysis approaches in 
the past two decades. For example, the notions of actor-network and translation informed 
Muller and Surel's work on policy analysis (Muller & Surel 1998) and, in particular, Muller's 
conceptualization of 'mediator' (Muller 2000, 2005) and Lascoumes' concept of 
'transcodeur' (Lascoumes 1996). 
 
Lascoumes (1996) highlighted that the notion of 'translation' was relevant for the analysis 
of contemporary public policy. Lascoumes pointed out that the field of public policies has 
changed, becoming more complex to analyse mainly because it includes a triple 
heterogeneity. The first heterogeneity relates to the diversification of public policies aims as 
they try to address at the same time several issues related to different sectors, knowledge, 
and know-how. For instance, Lascoumes stressed that '"urban policy" seeks to combine the 
actions of public security, urban planning, social welfare, education, job training, cultural animation, 
integration of foreigners, etc.'(Lascoumes 1996: 329). The second heterogeneity relates to the 
public policy itself because it involves a variety of programmes which are not always 
harmonized. Lascoumes stresses that 'the unity is just as illusory as the novelty displayed insofar as 
most of the programmes recycle pre-existing modes of action by enriching, moving or reformulating them' 
(ibid). Finally, the third heterogeneity relates to the actors involved in public policies. The 
latest generation of public policies mobilizes a wide range of actors, groups and 
organizations which can relate to several sectors, or scales (local national, supranational or 
international).  
 
In addition, Lascoumes (1996) observed two other changes in contemporary public policies 
that make ANT relevant for their analysis. Firstly, public policy sectors that were well 
structured have gone through a partially or complete re-problematization. Secondly, public 
policies are becoming 'policies of organization' as 'the decisions they objectivize and the choices of 
instruments they make focus more on procedures than on the definition of substantial content' (ibid: 332). 
Thus, contemporary public policies produce interaction instances in which the different 
actors interrelate. Lascoumes (1996) argued that these latest policy evolutions can be 
grasped by ANT as it allows to focus the analysis on four elements 'linking of heterogeneous 
universe, relation and exchange activities, mobility of alliances and oppositions, and finally the role of 
intermediaries (actors and actant) in these dynamics' (Lascoumes 1996: 330). 
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ANT and governmentality 
ANT shares similarities with Foucault's work that underpins the PPI approach (see page 
27). Rose et al. (2006) observed that ANT and Foucault's 'governmentality' have three main 
points of convergence. Firstly, both are interested in 'how knowledge and other resources flow and 
get recycled in particular networks' (ibid: 93), moving away from structural reflection. Secondly, 
Rose et al. highlighted that ANT and governmentality focus on 'how things get done', as both 
are doubtful about the 'why and in whose interests' considerations (ibid). Thirdly, they reject 
favouring great men or moments for accounting the development of a process, considering 
that 'material things and processes might play an active role' (ibid). However, Rose et al. (2006) 
pointed out that the agency of things included in ANT have not been explicitly 
acknowledged by governmentality studies.  
 
Furthermore, Beuscart & Peerbaye (2006) highlighted the influence of Foucault's concept 
of 'dispositif' on ANT. Beuscart & Peerbaye (2006) pointed out that 'Surveiller et Punir' 
(Foucault 1975) was mobilized by Latour for taking into consideration the non-human 
entities. They observed as well that John Law acknowledged the importance of Foucault's 
understanding of 'power' as 'linking process within heterogeneous networks' and differentiation 
between 'power to' and 'power over' (ibid: 6). Nevertheless, Beuscart & Peerbaye (2006) argued 
that overall ANT tended to recognize Michel Serres, and Deleuze and Guattari influences, 
while Foucault remained in the background because his work stayed in the social science 
domain. Moreover, they suggested that Foucault was criticized by ANT scholars for not 
expanding his analysis to the hard sciences.  
ANT: some considerations 
The use of ANT for analysing a public policy demanded some clarification as this choice 
raised some considerations. In spite of the advantages of using ANT for analysing 
contemporary public policy, Lascoumes (1996) argued that the notion of translation was 
limited for analysing public policy as their boundaries and reach were more difficult to 
grasp than the ones of an object or a machine. Lascoumes also highlighted that the notion 
of translation related to a specific transformation from a precise universe to another, while 
in the case of collective actions these transformations take multiple modes and are 
heteroclites. Finally, he pointed out that the sociology of translations assumed that all 
actors in the network, i.e. human and non-human entities, have an equal capacity in the 
'translation process'. Lascoumes stated that this assumption was due to the fact that the 
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scholars that developed the notion of 'translation' favoured social weightlessness in order 
to fight against the tendency of privileging actors (human beings) to the detriment of 
objects (non-human entities). Furthermore, he noted that these researchers have already 
shown that the sociology of translation was compatible with more classical approaches. 
However, Lascoumes argued that this assumption was problematic because 'the performative 
capacities of actants (humans and non-humans) depend on a set of economic and social determinants that 
structure the spaces in which the interactions are accomplished' (Lascoumes 1996: 328).  
 
The first two concerns relate to the idea that the notion of 'translation' was limited when 
analysing more complex phenomena. Nevertheless, the development of ANT and the use 
of the notion of translation for exploring other process different from technological 
innovation have showed that they were relevant for exploring complex phenomena. For 
instance, building on ANT 'urban assemblages' literature focuses on cities and urban 
phenomena (Farías & Bender 2009)19. In relation to the criticism about social 
weightlessness this research argues that ANT takes into account what Lascoumes called 
'economic and social determinants' (Lascoumes 1996: 328). ANT understands that 'actors embody 
various characteristics that are the outcomes of their relationship with "heterogeneous elements animate and 
inanimate, that have been linked to one another for a certain period of time"' (Callon cited by Cordella 
& Shaikh 2006: 11). These characteristics called prescriptions are understood as 'what a 
device allows or forbids from the actor-human and non-human that it anticipates; it is the morality of a 
setting both negative (what it prescribes) and positive (what it permits)' (Akrich and Latour cited by 
Cordella & Shaikh 2006: 11). Therefore, ANT acknowledges that 'actants' have different 
levels of 'flexibility' (ibid): 'actants' are not equal and how they perform in a specific 
'association' depends on the previous 'translation' processes in which they were involved. 
3.2.3 ANT and Rio's investigation  
Based on this review, ANT is relevant for this research for three main reasons. Firstly, it is 
in line with the understanding that the slum upgrading instrument played a role in the 
development of Rio's housing policy and governance. Under the perspective of ANT this 
research considers Rio's housing policy as an 'actant' constituted among others by policy 
instruments such as the slum upgrading. The latter also understood as an 'actant'; an open-
ended entity (rather than a closed object) constituted through 'translation' and which 
                                                 
19 The use of ANT for analysing the urban has generated lively debates see Brenner et al. (2011) and 
Farías (2011).  
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participated in the 'translation' of another 'actor-network' (Rio's housing policy). This 
conceptualization supports the research hypotheses that overall suggest that the slum 
upgrading instrument participated in Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance 
transformation.  
 
Secondly, ANT focuses on the dynamics of association/dissociation of different human 
and non-human entities, which relates to the analysis of the slum upgrading 
'instrumentation' that involves the interaction of heterogeneous entities such as actors, and 
policy instruments. Furthermore, ANT prevents falling into a technological determinism 
discussed in CHAPTER 1 as a major concern (see page 34). The PPI approach did not aim 
to 'promote any School of Instrumental Studies or Tools Policy Theory' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004: 
364). Thus, the PPI approach even if it questions public policy through the instrument's 
instrumentation, it does not aim to foster a technological deterministic approach. Cordella 
& Shaikh (2006) observed that ANT changes the focus of analysis from technologies or 
society, towards the study of their interaction. Thus, ANT allows the research to move 
away from an analysis of what the slum upgrading instrument did to the actors (humans) or 
society, towards an analysis of how the housing policy and governance got built through 
the interaction of human and non-human entities, including the slum upgrading instrument 
itself (also constituted by heterogeneous entities) and what outcome these dynamics 
produced.  
 
Lastly, ANT moves away from structural reflections by focusing on 'how' questions, 
considers how things are built rather than in 'whose interest' or 'why', and rejects 
privileging important moments or men as it considers that processes and things play an 
important role. This positioning strongly relates to this research as the hypotheses call into 
question the role of political figures or moments, suggesting that the slum upgrading 
'instrumentation' played an important role in the policy process.  
*** 
This part presented ANT, highlighting that it understands 'the social' as an heterogeneous 
network of entities called 'actants' created by 'translation' which involves the following 
moments: 'problematization', 'interessement', 'enrolment', and 'mobilization' or 'dissidences' 
(betrayal and 'controversy'). 'Actants' become strong by 'assembling' more 'allies' (other 
'actants'), and weak when they become isolated. In particular, some 'actants' can become 
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'Obligatory Passage Points' (OPP) as they are indispensable in the network that is being 
constituted. In addition, this part observed that ANT understands 'reality' as an emerging 
process produced by actants' linking process ('translation'); and that ANT localizes agency 
in the 'actants'. Then, this part highlighted ANT linkages with the PPI approach and 
Foucault's work, and answered the concerns it raised for analysing public policy. This part 
ended by stressing the relevance of the use of ANT for this research.  
 
The following two parts of this chapter present in detail the methods used for analysing the 
role of Rio de Janeiro's slum upgrading instrument for housing governance and policy 
transformation. 
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3.3 RIO DE JANEIRO INVESTIGATION: FIRST STEPS  
3.3.1 Adopting a detective approach 
Mobilizing ANT, I considered the slum upgrading instrument as an 'actant' of Rio's 
housing policy brought into existence by the association (translation mechanisms) of 
human and non-human entities. In addition, I recognized for this investigation that reality 
is an emerging phenomenon resulting from the interactions of things: 'a sentence does not hold 
together because it is true, but because it holds together we say that it is ''true'' (Latour cited by Harman 
2007: 43). Thus, rather than measuring (positivist perspective) or interpreting 
(constructivist perspective) the research involved reconstructing how the instrument was 
assembled, dismantled and then reassembled, so to understand how the slum upgrading 
influenced housing policy and governance transformation.  
 
The thesis conceptualizes that the slum upgrading as an actant i.e. an heterogeneous 
network of human and non-human entities brought into existence by translation. Thus the 
thesis does not treat the slum upgrading as a non-human entities. I consider that the 
misunderstanding relates to the fact that in ANT -related literature emphasize there is 
tendency to use the terms of "actors" and "actants" , the later for naming "non-human 
entities". Under ANT, this use of "actant" is wrong.  
 
Detective method  
In order to reconstruct the sequence of events of the slum upgrading instrumentation I 
followed 'detective work' methods. According to Latour these methods are relevant for the 
social scientist and, in particular, for ANT researchers as 'its modes of investigation, its means of 
enquiry and its practices of assemblage offer a suggestive method for the social science. Such method involves 
tracking and tracing; its outcome is the production of new knowledge – knowledge which, almost by 
definition, has a sense of surprise or unpredictability to it, as detective stories often do' (Austrin & 
Farnsworth 2005: 148). According to Austrin and Farnsworth the 'detective work' was 
conceptualized as a hermetic method by Latour and Serres and included 'explication and 
unpleating: tracing and unfolding complex arrangements to reveal the implicate, unforeseen elements and 
practices that constitute them' (ibid).  
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Austrin and Farnsworth (2005) highlighted that the detective work relates to ethnographic 
methods because as a detective investigator, the scholar conducting an ethnographic 
research arrives once the events have occurred. Thus, it is necessary to conduct a micro 
processing of facts in order to immerse in the case and reconstruct the original sequence of 
events. However, Austrin and Farnsworth pointed out that the detective inquiry does not 
mobilize the notion of exoticism. Instead, this specific ethnographic research includes the 
notion of uncertainty of anthropology. Moreover, unlike traditional ethnographic studies, 
the terrains of a detective investigation 'aren't territories. They have weird borders. They're networks, 
rhizomes' (Latour cited by Austrin & Farnsworth 2005: 157). In addition, Laurier (2010) 
stressed that the micro processing of data should not be associated to ethnomethodological 
studies of sciences because ANT does not aim to produced a mere detailed account but 'to 
map out his infralanguage of paths, connections, displacements, associations, topologies and networks, 
strands of ordering which are otherwise invisible since they are hidden behind terms like "science", "genius" 
and "society"' (ibid: 440). 
 
Based on this understanding I conducted a detective inquiry about Rio de Janeiro's case 
which involved tracing and unfolding slum upgrading 'associations' (and dissociations) in 
order to reveal the outcomes of the slum upgrading instrumentation and assess the 
research hypotheses. In that sense the investigation focuses on how things were built. The 
unfolding of slum upgrading 'associations' was achieved through a micro processing of data 
that allowed the reconstruction of the slum upgrading instrumentation sequence of events. 
Isolation of the 'actant' 
The open-ended nature of 'actants' can lead to the belief that ANT is impossible to put into 
practice. In the case of Rio de Janeiro people can argue that since the 'actants' are open-
ended entities, the analysis should take into account everything such as the building, the 
table, the chairs and even the mosquito that was in the room at the moment of the 
approval of the policy guidelines back in December 1993. This type of argument and 
rationale that aim at critically questioning ANT's relevance and feasibility do not realize that 
even if actor-networks are open-ended, they can and should be isolated for analytical 
purpose: 'in ANT actors are not defined and analysed in a stable set of relationships. It is the researchers 
who artificially define the analytical range of the study to see "what the various actors in a setting are doing 
to one another"' (Akrich and Latour cited by Cordella & Shaikh 2006: 10). Thus, it is through 
this delimitation that 'it is possible to study and understand some of the relationships that are shaping 
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both actors and their relational network' (ibid). These clarifications allows the highlighting of the 
use of ANT including closing artificially the 'actant' in relation to the researcher's own 
interest which limits the analysis even if the broad and natural openness of 'actants' is 
acknowledged.  
 
In order to isolate the 'actant' under study, i.e. the slum upgrading, I delimited a preliminary 
temporal frame from the beginning of 1990s to the beginning in of the 2010s. This long 
temporal frame coincided with the diachronic perspective favoured by the PPI approach as 
it allows to grasp the long term effects of policy instruments and reflect on policy change 
(Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004, 2007b). In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the two decade frame 
allowed the reconstruction of slum upgrading's long history in order to explore slum 
upgrading instrumentation, so to reflect on policy and governance transformation without 
falling into limited results whose validity only applies for a short period of time. The 
chosen temporal frame contributed to produce a long term analysis of the slum upgrading 
which did not exist. Indeed, the existing literature related to the case of Rio de Janeiro is 
extensive, yet most of the time it focuses on the 1990s period as if after 2000 nothing 
happened. In addition, the research broadened the investigation to the period prior to the 
adoption of the slum upgrading and policy instrument in the 1990s. This is in order to 
explore the choice of the instrument. Finally, I reviewed Rio's housing policies wider 
evolution. The inclusion of this review aimed at understanding the economic, political 
social and administrative landscapes from which the instrument emerged, allowing to grasp 
the level of flexibility or prescription of each entity involved.  
 
Another major delimitation for the Rio de Janeiro investigation was the level of analysis. As 
it was mentioned the research aimed at understanding the dynamics and outcome of policy 
and governance, in particular in relation to the municipal administration. Thus, the research 
focused on the slum upgrading at programme rather than at project level. This choice 
allowed a city scale scope, addressing the question of the municipal housing policy and 
governance evolution as an investigation focused on projects would tend to hide municipal 
level dynamics which are at the heart of this research. Nevertheless, exploration of specific 
cases were conducted and contributed to enhance the investigation and achieve case 
immersion.  
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Case 'walk through' 
The walk through was conducted through a preliminary data collection and data analysis 
about Rio housing policy and slum upgrading implementation demarcated as mentioned 
above. The main documents used in this phase were: evaluations, press articles, contracts, 
official publications, books and journal articles. I conducted a content analysis in order to 
identify clues that could help to unfold slum upgrading instrument 'associations'. This 
research considers that the 'actant' under study (slum upgrading) came into existence by the 
association of a vast variety of heterogeneous entities with different levels of prescription 
as they related to different and countless associations. In practical terms, this understanding 
demanded to endlessly unfold these entities so as to grasp actants' levels of flexibility. In 
order to achieve this within this investigation's major limits (time frame and word limit), 
the research mobilized Rip's concept of 'landscape' (Rip 2010). Building on the notion of 
affordance he argued that 'landscapes shape actions and perceptions'. Specifically, Rip stressed that 
a 'landscape is not just a passive backdrop against which humans play out their affairs. It is itself 
constructed, and part of the ''play'' is to construct parts of the backdrop' (idem). By analysing slum 
upgrading social, political, administrative and economic landscapes this research considers 
the previous associations that influenced actants' flexibility while respecting ANT's position 
that contexts do not pre-exist as reality is understood as an emerging phenomenon. 
 
Thus, I elaborated a preliminary map of the social, political, administrative and economic 
landscapes. The mapping involved the electoral cycles and identification of the different 
levels of government included in the preliminary time frame. This mapping included as well 
the pre and post electoral campaign periods. It also involved identifying the personal and 
professional careers of some actors such as Rio de Janeiro's Mayors and Municipal 
Secretaries, and the history of institutions and organizations such as the Municipal Housing 
Secretariat (SMH) and the State Water Company (CEDAE), and the evolution of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs). I 
mapped as well the municipal finances, in particular the municipal investment in housing 
during the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. The objective of this preliminary 
mapping was to identify actants' level of flexibility or prescription that would allow to 
better grasp the complexity of the translation process rather than 'contextualizing' the slum 
upgrading implementation. 
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3.3.2 Rio de Janeiro's investigation direction 
 Preliminary outcomes: first clues 
This preliminary Rio de Janeiro case 'walk through' contributed to identify different actors, 
institutions, laws and decrees, procedure, regulations, and policy devices and tools and 
specific moments. In addition, it allowed the identification of two main phases for Rio de 
Janeiro's housing policy evolution. The first one included the emergence and development 
of the instrument during the 1990s and the second involved the instrument's abandonment 
during the first decade of the 2000s. This preliminary assessment corroborated the 
existence of a gap in the literature from 2005 onwards. This gap became more evident 
when the municipality launched in July 2010 the slum upgrading programme Morar 
Carioca. In particular, the 'walk through' contributed to identify main slum upgrading 
implementation moments or stages: the launch of the programme in 1994, the signature of 
the Inter-American Development Bank (BID) contract at the end of 1995, the politico-
administrative change at the municipal level in 2001, the instrument's abandonment during 
the first decade of the 2000s and its comeback in 2007. 
 
I also identified two different divergent accounts about Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and 
slum upgrading development. On one side there was a slum upgrading success story that 
emerged in the 1990s and continued during the first decade of the 2000s. On the other 
hand there existed stories that included the successful implementation of the slum 
upgrading throughout the 1990s but argued its failure and erosion during the first decade 
of the 2000s. Instead of discarding or privileging one of them I mapped the convergences 
and divergences. This exercise allowed me to record slum upgrading implementation 
controversies and debates that were going to be explored and expanded during the field 
work as they represented stabilized moment of the process that needed to be unfolded, so 
to understand how they were built. 
First reconstruction for expanding the investigation 
This preliminary analysis contributed to elaborate the first account of the slum upgrading 
instrumentation. This account involved the first attempt to reconstruct the slum upgrading 
instrumentation so to understand how the instrument was assembled, dismantled and then 
reassembled; and how these processes influenced municipal housing policy and governance 
transformation. Thus, the account allowed to redefine the research hypotheses. 
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Furthermore, it contributed to the identification of two major challenges for tracing the 
slum upgrading instrument 'associations'. The first one related to the 1990s period. 
Extensively studied, the accounts around this period tended to describe stable relations, 
undermining the slum upgrading controversies. The second one related to the first decade 
of the 2000s period because it was underexplored and little data existed or was available. 
 
The Rio de Janeiro case 'walk through' and the elaboration of the account contributed as 
well to the establishment of the next steps in the investigation. Drawing from their 'walk 
through' and prior cases, the detectives follow lines of investigation according to each case. 
Similarly, Rio de Janeiro case 'walk through' allowed the establishment of lines of 
investigation to explore and during the investigation some of them were discarded while 
other added. Thus, the lines of investigation emerged from the case and not from 
theoretical categories and changed according to the research development. 
  
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
73 
3.4 EXPANDING THE NETWORK: EXPLORING INSTRUMENTATION 
3.4.1 Investigation between Brazil and the UK 
Overview 
After the preliminary research I conducted the detailed slum upgrading investigation in five 
main phases. From June to October 2011 I conducted a first fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro to 
gather data through interviews, written sources, and gain immersion in the case. Right after 
my return to London and until May 2012, I processed the collected data and continued to 
gather more information via online databases related to Rio de Janeiro's case such as the 
Official Journal of Rio de Janeiro Municipal Chamber (DCMRJ). Then, I carried out a 
second fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro from June to September 2012. During this phase I 
conducted a focused data collection through specific interviews and specialized archives, 
and completed the micro processing of data. During these phases I wrote several accounts. 
Finally, after the second field work and until September 2013 I wrote the first complete 
text (first draft), then a second one in May 2014 and a final text (this thesis) in August 
2014.  
 
The investigation was mainly facilitated by the following factors. The access to written 
sources or interviewees was facilitated by my supervisor's contacts and my personal 
relations. Furthermore, my nationality facilitated as well the access to sources. Most of the 
scholars that have or are studying Rio de Janeiro are either Brazilians, North Americans or 
Europeans. As a Mexican I was a very peculiar researcher, 'not from here and neither from 
there'. In addition, for most of the people I had contact with, Mexico was an exotic and 
faraway country, yet similar and familiar; thus, I was perceived as what I called an 'out-
insider'. The strangeness coupled with the 'out-insider' I embodied opened me several 
doors. The data collection was also facilitated by my familiarity with the Rio de Janeiro case 
developed in the past 10 years. I did an internship in an architectural practice in Rio de 
Janeiro dealing with slum upgrading projects from November 2004 to June 2005. After this 
experience I deepen my understanding of Rio de Janeiro's case through my M. Arch. 
during which I conducted a fieldwork in February 2006 and elaborated a urban project 
proposal for the neighbourhood of 'City of God'. Then, prior to start this investigation I 
explored my understanding about Rio's housing policy through my M.Sc. in Town 
Planning dissertation on Rio de Janeiro's favelas integration. Finally, key to the data 
collection and in particular immersion in the case was the timing in which the investigation 
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took place. During the different investigation phases several events or processes occurred 
that nourished the research and gave me access to people involved in Rio de Janeiro's 
housing policy (see Immersion page 75).  
Written and oral sources  
I gathered data from written sources. These sources included mainly policy documents, 
evaluations, financial accounts, decrees and laws, publications, and journal articles. I also 
collected data through the 35 interviews I conducted during the two fieldwork sessions. In 
order to grasp the slum upgrading 'translation' moments ('problematization', 
'interessement', 'enrolment', 'mobilization' and 'dissidence') , I chose to interview people 
who participated at different stages of the slum upgrading implementation process and 
related to different sectors, groups or organizations: municipal administration, federal 
administration, municipal legislative body, private sector, CBOs, NGOs, and international 
organizations, For a detailed list of interviewees see page 268. However, interviewing a 
wide range of people from different organizations and with different interests led to some 
confidentiality issues. This problem concerned the data relating to the recent slum 
upgrading 'instrumentation' that involved, among others, tension around evictions and high 
value contracts negotiations. Furthermore, I faced an ethical dilemma since I hold 
information that could potentially benefit a specific person or a group that were fighting 
against evictions. Thus, investigating Rio slum upgrading implementation involved 
releasing information that enable the unfolding of the 'actant' without breaking 
confidentiality agreements.  
 
All the interviews were recorded and were semi-structured: I prepared for each of them a 
list of themes and specific questions that emerged from the ongoing data collection 
process, including previous interviews. For more details see the interview templates in 
Annexes starting page 286. Most of the interviews I conducted during the first fieldwork 
were exploratory while during the second fieldwork they were focused on specific 
controversies around the use of the slum upgrading. The interviews allowed me as well to 
access more information. For instance, Fernando Cavallieri special advisor at the Municipal 
Urban Institute (IPP) shared his journal archives and Andre Gouvêa Vieira municipal 
councillor shared the power point presentations of the SMH used during the public 
hearings of the committee of finance, budget and audit at the Municipal Chamber. 
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Besides gathering information from the interviews, I used them as well for testing the 
accounts about the slum upgrading translation process that I elaborated through the 
different writing trials during the investigation. In addition, the interviews served as an 
immersion technique. Conducting interviews allowed me to travel to different places 
related to the slum upgrading implementation process: the Municipal Housing Secretariat 
in Rio de Janeiro, the National Housing Secretariat in Brasilia, the Inter-American 
Development Bank headquarters in Washington, favelas in Providência, Babilônia and the 
Alemão Complex amongst others. Travelling to these places allowed me to enrich the lines 
of inquiry, questions and hypotheses about the 'translation' process under study.  
Immersion 
In addition to the interviews and written sources I immersed myself in the case. This 
immersion was useful for gathering information about the latest slum upgrading 
implementation debates and controversies. It was valuable as well because the immersion 
allowed reflection on past housing policy controversies and consideration on new lines of 
inquiry. My immersion in the case was facilitated by a burgeoning period in Rio de Janeiro 
around housing policy that generated several public debates, publications and events. 
Indeed, the massive investments in the city through several programmes such as the 
Accelerated Growth Programme (PAC), and the mega events that Rio hosted such as the 
2007 Pan-American Games or will host such as the 2016 Olympic Games, have placed 
housing at the forefront. For instance, the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridors (TransOeste, 
TransCarioca, TransOlimpica and TransBrasil), the Harbour Regeneration Project (Projeto 
Porto Maravilha), and the Olympic Park, were among the major urban projects in progress 
that fostered forced evictions controversies and housing debates.  
 
Furthermore, at the time of the investigation the latest municipal slum upgrading plan 
called Morar Carioca was launched and the Municipal Social Housing Plan (PMHIS) was 
being elaborated in order to comply with the SNHIS regulations. These processes 
generated several events in which I participated. Overall, I took part in three main types of 
forums: civil society organizations led activities such as the Social Popular Council 
meetings; specialized forums such as the ones organized by the Brazilian Institute of 
Architectes in Rio de Janeiro (IAB-RJ); and mixed forums such as the PMHIS meetings 
that gathered together civil society, municipal administration, municipal councils and 
NGOs among other groups (Table 4) (Figure 1).  
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Table 4 Forums that facilitated the immersion in the case. 
Type of forum Organizer  Major topics relevant for the 
investigation  
Civil society:  Social Popular Council Evictions, housing policy 
Resident's association of 
Favela Tabajaras and Favela 
do Metro 
Housing policy, Evictions, Areas of 
Risk, Legal defence,  
Specialized: urban 
and housing 
specialists from 
different disciplines 
and organization 
IPP /debates Porto Maravilha ( Rio's harbour 
regeneration project) 
OAB-RJ /Urban law 
seminar 
World Cup, Rio de Janeiro 
Master Plan, Evictions,  
IAB-RJ  Morar Carioca plan, Porto Maravilha, 
Olympic Games Park 
Rio +20 conference  Slum upgrading projects, Rio de 
Janeiro's housing policy 
Mixed : CBOs, 
NGOs, municipal 
administration, 
politicians, others 
Mangueira -architectural 
practice  
PAC 2 Mangueira (CBO and architect 
strategies 
PMHIS  Housing issues and possible strategies 
Work Party (PT) PMHIS methodology 
 
In addition, I got deeper in the case by following more closely some slum upgrading 
projects (Table 5). This follow up included gathering specific data about the projects 
through interviews, visits, and participation in activities (Figure 2).  
Table 5 Specific cases. 
 Name of the favela Programme that was (or is being) implemented  
Vidigal PROAP I  
Providência PROAP II / Urban Cell/ Morar Carioca 
Alemão complex PAC I 
Mangueira PROAP I / PAC II / MCMV 
Favela do Metro  PAC II ( evictions) and MCMV 
Chapéu Mangueira and 
Babilônia 
Green Morar Carioca  
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Figure 1 PMHIS meeting AP3. The event sought to discuss housing issues and possible 
strategies in the planning zone 3 (AP 3) of Rio de Janeiro. In the meeting participated 
representatives from the municipal administration, CBOs and NGOs.  
Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011 
 
 
Figure 2 Green Morar Carioca project in Chapéu Mangueira and Babilônia. Municipal staff 
working in the project organized a visit for me.  
Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2012 
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3.4.2 Overcoming data collection 
Following the instrument: limitations 
Traditional data collection methods for analysing a public policy such as interviews, 
studying policy documents and case immersion proved limited for the investigation from 
the ANT perspective. On one hand, the information collected through interviews lacked 
precision and accuracy. Interviewees tended to mix the sequence of events and people 
involved and remembered major changes but not details. Furthermore, they tended to 
focus on facts and very little on the 'controversies' that led to the stabilization of those 
facts. Thus, trying to trace slum upgrading 'associations' (and dissociations) during the 
1990s and the first decade of the 2000s using the interviews proved to be a difficult task. 
On the other hand, written sources were not fully useful either for three main reasons.  
- Firstly, there was a lack of relevant literature. For instance, studies about the dynamics 
between the state of Rio de Janeiro and the municipality of Rio de Janeiro were almost 
inexistent. 
- Secondly, as for the interviews, most of the literature favoured facts to the detriment of 
descriptions of the details of the negotiations, adaptations and calculations. The documents 
available were most of the time official publications, or final documents, limiting their 
significance for exploring slum upgrading 'controversies'. 
- Thirdly, there was no general Rio de Janeiro's housing policy records. The documents that 
existed were in different locations and usually disorganized. Some municipal administration 
staff had personal archives but they tended to be fragmented.  
 
The limitations of traditional oral and written sources were overcome by the consolidation 
of the digital and 'big data' era from the first decade of the 2000s that have fostered new 
ways of gathering, producing, storing, and displaying data. Nowadays, people can be traced 
thanks to diverse devices such as their Google searches, smart phones and Facebook, 
Twitter and Instagram accounts. Similarly, policy processes and in particular, 'policy 
instrumentation' can be followed closely thanks to this kind of devices. 
 
For the investigation, I gathered information from the world wide web thanks to powerful 
research engines that allowed me to retrieve data from different supports such as web 
pages, electronic documents and publications, audio, video, pictures, power points, and 
digitalized archives. In the case of Brazil this traceability has been fostered as well by the 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
79 
development of transparency and accountability policies. This new generation of sources 
was key for the investigation as they allowed the establishment of a detailed sequence of 
the slum upgrading materialization process, and the follow up of instrument's 
controversies. Among these new sources that I used for the investigation, the digitalized 
Official Journal of Rio de Janeiro Municipal Chamber was the most valuable.  
Official Journal of Rio de Janeiro Municipal Chamber (DCMRJ) 
The Official Journal of Rio de Janeiro Municipal Chamber (DCMRJ) is a daily publication 
that includes not only the different legislative acts such as bills but also the transcripts of a 
wide range of events such as work sessions, public hearings and debates in which a wide 
range of people and organizations participate. The DCMRJ represents thousands of pages. 
In recent years it was digitalized and a specific research engine was developed, making its 
systematic consultation easier. The DCMRJ was important for the investigation because it 
allowed the keeping of a clear sequence of events and the identification and follow up of 
housing policy controversies.  
 
In order to select the relevant documents for tracing the slum upgrading, I tried several key 
words in the DCMRJ research engine. From that trial 'Favela-Bairro' was the most accurate 
key work for the investigation. Using 'Favela-Bairro', I conducted a systematic research 
from January 1993 to December 2012. Each hit on the research engine was evaluated in 
function of its excerpt. The number of hits evaluated were more than 8000 which 
represented about 1700 pages. In order to complete this search I tried other 'key works' 
such as specific issue, names or other housing programmes. However, these were not 
systematically searched. The bulk of the final selected documents included transcripts of 
public hearings organized by different Municipal Chamber committees on housing or Rio 
de Janeiro's housing policy; and public hearing of the committee of finance, budget and 
finance audit involving the Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH). They allowed me to 
follow slum upgrading controversies and together with the other sources such as the 
interviews and documents, I reconstructed the sequence of events around the use of the 
slum upgrading.  
 
The public hearings of the committee of finance, budget and finance audit at the Municipal 
Chamber that were analysed included the presentation and discussion of the three different 
budget instruments in place since the beginning of the first decade of the 2000s : the pluri-
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annual plan (PPA) that covers a period of 4 years and establishes the municipal executive 
objects and priorities, the budget guidelines law (LDO) that concerns the objectives and 
priorities of the yearly exercise, and the annual budget law (LOA) that involved the annual 
expected revenues and expenses. These public hearings involved municipal councillors, the 
housing secretary and staff, and civil society. The selected public hearings included as well 
debates about specific topics or issues organized by different Municipal Chamber 
committees or a specific municipal councillor. For instance, the Parliamentary Commission 
of Inquiry (CPI) on the Favela-Bairro (2001-2002) was approved and organized by the 
municipal chamber, and the public hearing for following the Favela-Bairro implementation 
(2006) was organized by municipal councillor Brizola Neto. These events included the 
participation of a vast range of actors from different organizations such as the municipal 
secretariats, CBOs, NGOs, private sectors, unions, favela dwellers, researchers. For a 
detailed list of the DCMRJ public hearings and participants see page 270.  
Other main sources  
In addition to the DCMRJ other digitalized or electronic databases were exploited (see 
Table 6). The research engines of the Rio de Janeiro Municipal Chamber (CMRJ), the 
Legislation inquiry called 'Consulta á Legislação', and the Official Diary of Rio de Janeiro 
(DORJ) were useful for following municipal executive and legislative acts such as law, 
decrees and resolutions related to the housing policy. These documents allowed me both to 
establish a chronological order of the housing policy materialization process and to identify 
a vast range of activities related to the instrument's use. For a detailed list of these acts see 
page 278. The internet site of the Office of the Municipal Controller General and the 
websites 'Rio Transparente' were used to trace the financial activities related to the case. 
The following websites were also used for collecting data: Municipal Housing Secretariat 
(SMH), Municipal Urban Institute database (Armazen de dados do IPP), Rio de Janeiro 
Municipal Administration, Rio de Janeiro State Public Works Company (EMOP), Ministry 
of Cities-National Housing Secretariat (SNH), and the Growth Acceleration Programme 
(PAC). I consulted as well the archives of the newspapers 'Jornal do Brasil' and 'O Globo' 
to follow the news about the slum upgrading implementation. Other websites such as the 
one of the Superior Electoral Tribunal, CAIXA, CBOs and NGOs were used on an ad hoc 
basis for tracing specific information and debates. The data collected through the web 
included a variety of formats such as electronic documents, videos and power points.  
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
81 
Table 6 Main online sources. 
Site name / organization site Type of data Most complete 
period 
Rio de Janeiro Municipal Chamber 
(CMRJ) 
Official Journal of the CMRJ 
(DCMRJ). 
Municipal legislative acts. 
1990-date 
 
 
Official Diary of Rio de Janeiro 
(DORJ) 
Municipal executive acts. 2006-date 
Legislation inquiry (Consulta á 
legislação) 
Municipal executive and 
legislative acts.  
1990-date 
Office of the Municipal Controller 
General 
Municipal accountability  2000-date 
Rio Transparente  Municipal accountability  2008-date 
Municipal Housing Secretariat 
(SMH) 
Activities  
News 
Policy documents 
2009-date 
Municipal Urban Institute database 
(Armazen de dados do IPP) 
Evaluations, analysis 
Maps, cartography 
Quantitative data  
1990-date 
Rio de Janeiro Municipal 
Administration 
Policy documents 
News  
2009-date 
Rio de Janeiro State Public Works 
Company (EMOP) 
Electronic news  2007- date 
Ministry of Cities - National 
Housing Secretariat (SNH) 
Policy documents  
News 
Publications 
2003-date 
Growth Acceleration Programme 
(PAC) 
Evaluations 
News  
2007-date 
Superior Electoral Tribunal  Election data 2002-date 
O Globo  News 2005-date 
Jornal do Brasil  News 1990-2004 
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Advantages, disadvantages and limitations  
The major disadvantage of this new generation of sources was their size. Their use was 
time consuming, and sometimes the possibility of searching everything distracted the 
investigation. In addition, not all the emerging databases that I used had sophisticated 
research engines; thus, it was necessary to conduct several searches with different 
keywords, to collect data about a specific element. Furthermore, the amount of data 
sharply changed in relation to the periods. Data about slum upgrading before 2000s was 
few, while after 2005 the data available was of a great size. Another disadvantage was their 
stay online feature. Indeed, some of the acceded online information was no longer available 
a year later. Despite these disadvantages, these sources allowed to overcome traditional, 
oral and written sources limitations. 
 
The new sources allowed me to collect systematically information which was necessary for 
unfolding the slum upgrading instrument 'associations'. This vast amount of existing data 
also allowed me to evaluate the accuracy and precision of the information. This was crucial 
in relation to the DCMRJ public hearings. Indeed, even if they included different people, 
topics and types of events, they all related to the specific setting of the municipal chamber, 
which could put into question their relevance at the city level debates. The complex data 
triangulation (triangulation of data and sources) that was facilitated and extended with the 
new generation of sources allowed me to evaluate the reliability of the data I collected from 
the DCMRJ. 
3.4.3 Processing and organizing data 
The data analysis consisted in a reconstruction of the sequence of events around the slum 
upgrading instrumentation through a micro processing of data collected from the 
mentioned sources. In particular, I focused on the controversies around and about the 
slum upgrading instrument, paying attention to the interaction of the heterogeneous 
entities at play (humans and non-human). This work allowed to unfold the slum upgrading 
'translation' process, revealing how the slum upgrading influenced housing policy and 
governance transformation, while considering the hypotheses. Therefore, the analysis of 
the collected data did not involve any interpretation or measurement through their use as 
this investigation, adopting the ANT perspective, considered that reality is an emerging 
phenomenon that results from the interactions of things rather than being socially 
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constructed or objectively given. Finally, the data analysis ended when I gathered enough 
evidence for supporting this investigation hypotheses beyond reasonable doubt.  
 
In order to organize and process the data I created an 'Investigation Diary' in which I 
traced the research process. I started the diary at the beginning of the first fieldwork in 
June 2011 and I kept it until today. This first device related to the 'log of the inquiry' 
notebook whose role is to 'document the transformation one undergoes by doing the travel' (Latour 
2005: 134). However, Latour highlighted that 'this is neither for the sake of epistemic reflexivity nor 
for some narcissist indulgence into one's own work, but because from now on everything is data' (ibid: 
133). The Diary allowed me to preserve a detailed sequence of events related to this 
investigation which facilitated to trace this work's translation moments as I considered it an 
'actant' itself interacting with the slum upgrading instrument.  
 
I created as well a register in which each information about the case was integrated and 
organized by day and source and without distinction about its nature: event, publication, 
contract signature, election day, announcement etc (see Figure 3). This registry supported 
the reconstruction of the sequence of events of slum upgrading instrumentation, allowing 
the identification of the different slum upgrading 'translation' moments: 'problematization', 
'interessement', 'enrolment', 'mobilization' and 'dissidence' (betray and 'controversy').  
 
I enriched this registry through the interviews, specific case analysis, archives and other 
written sources including laws, decrees, evaluations, grey literature, press, biographies, 
books and financial accounts. This register related to the 'gathering information notebook' 
devised by Latour (2005), and was complemented by a registry in which I mapped 
politicians, municipal staff and other actors that emerged from the investigation. I also 
elaborated schemes that allowed to support and facilitate the reconstruction of the 
sequence of events, and thus of the unfolding of the slum upgrading associations and 
dissociations (Figure 4). However, as Latour pointed out 'drawing with a pencil is not the same 
thing as drawing the shape of a pencil' (Latour 2005: 142). I consider that this differentiation 
relates to fact that ANT 'does not wish to add social network to social theory but to rebuild social theory 
out of networks '(Latour 1996: 2). Thus, elaborating maps and schemes was not the objective 
of the analysis but the instrument that allowed to follow the slum upgrading instrument in 
order to unfold its 'translation'. 
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Figure 3 Excel registry screen shot. The registry included three main colons: date, 
information and source. It allowed to include data as the investigation was unfolding. 
Source: Hector Becerril June 2013 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Illustrator CS6 file screen shot. The use of Illustration for elaborating maps and 
schemes allowed to modify them in function of the data collection process.  
Source Hector Becerril Miranda June 2013 
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In addition, I conducted various writing trials during and not just at the end of the 
investigation because as Latour (2005) argued 'the unique adequacy one should strive for in 
deploying complex imbroglios cannot be obtained without continuous sketches and drafts. It is impossible to 
imagine that one would gather the data for a period of time and only then begin to write it down' (ibid: 
134). These trials included attempts to account for the instrument's effects and how it 
influenced Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance evolution and allowed to move 
further the investigation, discarding and selecting new lines of inquiry.  
 
These writing trials became the main support for writing the empirical chapters which 
reconstruct the slum upgrading 'instrumentation'. The main particularity of the empirical 
chapters is that they constitute a chronological 'thick description'. Specifically, the term 
'description' relates to ANT understanding that 'describing or accounting for a network is what an 
explanation or an ex-plication is and has ever been even in so-called hard sciences' (Latour 1996: 12). In 
addition, I chose to organize the 'thick description' in a chronological order with the aim of 
respecting the sequence of the slum upgrading 'translation' process. Therefore, the 
empirical chapter are a chronological 'thick description' which purpose is to deploy slum 
upgrading 'associations' rather than to produce a detailed account of Rio de Janeiro's 
housing policy and governance evolution.  
 
The chronological 'thick description' seeks to reveal slum upgrading instrument's specific 
effects and how they contributed to shape housing policy and governance. It includes the 
evidence that supports this investigation argumentation beyond reasonable doubt, 
following the burden of proof obligation. Therefore, as in the case of a crime investigation 
with the discovery of DNA traces that might challenge judicial judgments (even death 
sentences) years or decades later, the 'description' of the slum upgrading instrumentation 
might be challenged if new relevant and reliable evidence is discovered. 
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the research methods. The first part explored ANT and its linkages 
with the PPI approach. It stressed that ANT understands 'the social' as an heterogeneous 
network of entities called 'actants' created by 'translation' which entails the following 
moments: 'problematization', 'interessement', 'enrolment', 'mobilization' and 'dissidences' 
(betray and controversy). This part noted that 'actants' become strong by 'assembling' more 
'allies' (other 'actants') and can become 'Obligatory Passage Points' (OPP), i.e. indispensable 
in the network. It also observed that ANT understands 'reality' as an emerging process 
produced by actants' association activity, and that it localizes agency in the 'actants'. In 
addition, this part explored ANT linkages with the PPI approach and Foucault's work, and 
responded to the concerns about it use for policy analysis. Lastly, this part highlighted the 
relevance of ANT for this research as its allows to understand that the instrument as an 
'actant' had agency, focus on the interaction of heterogeneous entities involved in Rio's 
policy 'instrumentation' and consider 'how' rather than 'why' questions, supporting the 
research orientation.  
 
The second part described how ANT informed this research. Specifically, this part stated 
that Rio de Janeiro's housing policy was understood as an 'actant' brought into existence by 
the association of different entities including the slum upgrading instrument. The latter was 
also understood as an 'actant'. This second part also highlighted that the research following 
ANT adopted the 'detective work' methods which entailed the tracing and unfolding of the 
slum upgrading 'associations' through a micro processing of data that allowed to establish 
the slum upgrading instrumentation sequence of events. This was used in order to reveal 
the role of the slum upgrading in the housing governance and policy evolution and 
transformation. In particular, this second part described the first investigation steps which 
involved the isolation of the 'actant', i.e. closing artificially the 'actant' for the purpose of 
the research; the realization of a preliminary research, i.e. Rio de Janeiro case 'walk 
through'; and the elaboration of a first account that allowed to redefine the hypotheses.  
 
The third part offered a detailed account of how the investigation was conducted 
afterwards, focusing on the data collection, data analysis and organization, and elaboration 
of writing trials and the final account (empirical chapters). In relation to the data collection 
this part pointed out the relevance of new online data bases for tracing the slum upgrading 
translation moments as the traditional written and oral resources proved limited. In relation 
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to data analysis, this part observed that the investigation entailed the reconstruction of the 
sequence of events of the slum upgrading instrumentation through a micro processing of 
data. This work allowed to unfold the slum upgrading associations (translation moments), 
revealing slum upgrading role in the evolution of Rio's housing policy and governance. 
Therefore, the data analysis did not involve any interpretation or measurement using the 
collected data as this investigation considered that reality is an emerging phenomenon that 
results from the interaction of things rather than being socially constructed or objectively 
given. Then, the third part described how the data was organized through different 
supports. Lastly, this final part pointed out on the one hand, how the elaboration of 
various writing trials aimed to reconstruct this case sequence of events, relating evidence to 
support this research hypotheses beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, it stressed 
that the trials supported the elaboration of the final account that is a chronological 'thick 
description' whose objective is to deploy slum upgrading 'associations' thereby revealing 
how it influenced Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance evolution. 
 
The next chapter introduces in detail the case of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy. Then 
CHAPTER 5, CHAPTER 6, CHAPTER 7 constitute the chronological 'thick description' 
of the choice and use of the slum upgrading instrument.  
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CHAPTER 4 TOWARDS THE URBANIZATION OF RIO DE 
JANEIRO'S FAVELAS 
 
 
 
'Having said this, I feel rather embarrassed in speaking about Rio de Janeiro, which I find off-
putting in spite of its oft-extolled beauty. I don't quite know how to make the point. It seems to me 
that the landscape in which Rio is set is out of proportion to its own dimensions. The Sugar Loaf 
Mountain, the Corcovado and the much-praised natural features appear to the travellers entering 
the bay like stumps sticking up here in a toothless mouth...On the seaward side, the optical illusion 
is the opposite of the one which obtains in New York; here, it is nature which has the appearance 
of an unfinished building-site...The whole scene exists as a unique and global entity. Surrounding 
one overwhelmingly on all sides is not the inexhaustible diversity of beings and things, but a single, 
awe-inspiring presence: the New World' (Lévi Strauss 1992). 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the case of Rio de Janeiro in order to grasp the 
framing conditions of the choice and use of the slum upgrading during the 1990s and first 
decade of the 2000s. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part reviews the 
emergence of housing initiatives at the time when Rio de Janeiro was still a federal district, 
showing it swinging between favelas' urbanization and housing construction (1900s-1950s). 
The second part explores the housing experience when Rio de Janeiro became the city state 
of Guanabara and the dominant approach supported by the military regime was favelas 
razing and housing construction (1960s-1975). Finally, the last part focuses on Rio de 
Janeiro's housing initiatives after it became a municipality in 1975, highlighting the 
consolidation of knowledge, know-how and institutional capacity at the municipal level in 
relation to favelas' urbanization. 
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4.2 HOUSING POLICY IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT CONTEXT 
4.2.1 Housing initiatives in Rio de Janeiro: the origins 
Once upon a time 
Rio de Janeiro, the second largest Brazilian municipality and capital of the regional state of 
the same name, had had a tumultuous politico-administrative history before the 1990s 
when the slum upgrading was adopted as a policy instrument. Discovered by the 
Portuguese in January 1st 1502, Rio was formally founded in March 1565. Its political and 
military importance emerged in 1619 when the city became the capital of the captaincy of 
Rio de Janeiro. The city's urban development was complicated by its topography and 
mangrove swamps which fostered diseases such as malaria and yellow fever (Gilbert 1995). 
Nevertheless, the development of mining promoted Rio's economic and urban 
development; and in 1763 it became the colonial capital and the largest urban centre in 
Brazil with about 50,000 inhabitants (ibid). During this period, Rio attracted public sector 
resources for infrastructure projects such as drainage works and the Lapa aqueduct.  
 
Rio's economy was further boosted by the arrival of the Portuguese royal family in 1808 
(Gilbert 1995). The city became the capital of the Portuguese Empire and the first housing 
crisis emerged because there was a housing shortage due to the arrival of the Portuguese 
Royal Court (ibid). In 1822 Brazil became an empire independent of Portugal and Rio its 
capital. In the following decades the city grew to be Brazil's cultural, commercial and 
industrial centre. Urban problems such as housing deficit and increased poverty also 
emerged at that time. In 1889 when the First Brazilian Republic was instituted Rio became 
a federal district and capital of the republic (ibid). At the beginning of the 20th century, 
when Rio was a federal district the first public sector housing-related actions took place. 
From Passos to Agache 
Francisco Pereira Passos, Mayor of Rio de Janeiro from 1902 to 1906, launched an urban 
reform whose aims were Rio's sanitation, urbanization and beautification. During this 
period a commission was created for elaborating recommendations about social housing 
which was an issue pushed by doctors and engineers concerned with hygiene and 
sanitation. 'Cortiços' (slum tenements), 'hotels', 'pensions', favelas and other social housing 
typologies were studied. The recommendation was their eradication as they were perceived 
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as a pathology that should be eliminated. This position was maintained and developed with 
the increase of favelas across Rio de Janeiro in the followings years. Nevertheless, at that 
time Everardo Backheuser who was a member of the commission set up by Mayor Passos 
already developed the idea of constructing social housing estates named 'Vilas Operarias' 
(Valladares 2006). 
 
By the middle of the 1920s Mattos Pimenta who fostered a campaign against the favelas, 
associating them with leprosy, also proposed as a solution their eradication and the 
construction of housing estates. In 1927, the Federal District administration hired Alfred 
Agache, French architect and sociologist, to develop a master plan for the city. This plan 
aimed at establishing guidelines for Rio de Janeiro's structuring, development and 
beautification. Like Backheuser and Pimenta, Agache's recommendation for social housing 
was the destruction of favelas and the construction of housing units. At that moment Rio 
de Janeiro's housing issues consolidated around the favelas. The Agache's plan was 
approved but it was never implemented because of the 1930 revolution (Valladares 2006). 
4.2.2 Between housing construction and urbanization 
Beginning of state housing initiatives 
The eradication of favelas and the construction of social housing estates as a solution was 
materialized during the presidency of Getúlio Vargas. Vargas who became president in 
1930 and established an authoritarian government in 1937 that lasted until 1945, was 
concerned about hygiene and sanitation, and believed that workers should have access to 
housing and food. During his administration Rio's building law (Código de obras) was 
approved (1937). It established favelas evictions and the construction of housing estates; 
however, it also acknowledged the existence of favelas and proposed their improvement. 
The building law encouraged the construction of housing estates called 'Parques 
proletarios' between 1942 and 1945 in Gavea, Caju and Praia do Pinto. They were the first 
constructed for favela dwellers and housed 8,000 of them.  
 
In spite of their small scale as about 250,000 people were living in favelas at that time, the 
'Parques proletarios' represented a change regarding housing and favelas (Valladares 2006). 
Firstly, they followed Vargas' populist view that for intervening in the urban space the State 
should consider the population. Secondly, the 'Parques proletarios' and favelas' 
urbanization related to electoral interest because carrying out these actions secured popular 
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support for the authoritarian regime. During this period public sector housing solutions 
were not limited to favela dwellers. Social housing estates were developed as well for 
Federal District workers, such as Gavea and Pedregulho designed by Affonso Eduardo 
Reidy, using modern architecture principles (Freire & Oliveira 2002). 
 Housing initiatives by the catholic church 
In addition, during the 1940s and 1950s the Catholic Church developed housing initiatives, 
particularly directed at favela dwellers. Aiming at materially and morally supporting favela 
dwellers, the Federal District associated with the Rio de Janeiro archdioceses created the 
Fundação Leão XIII. Between 1947 and 1954 this institution implemented basic public 
services such as water supply and sewage networks in about 34 favelas. In addition, it 
created and supported social centres in some of the largest favelas such as Rocinha and 
Jacarezinho. In 1955, the Catholic Church created another institution called Cruzada São 
Sebastião which implemented 51 basic services projects in 12 favelas between 1956 and 
1960. The Cruzada also implemented urbanization projects in two favelas, Morro Azul and 
Parque Alegria, and advocated against the removal of 3 favelas: Borel, Esqueleto, and Dona 
Marta. Furthermore, the Cruzada developed a social housing estate in Leblon for Praia do 
Pinto favelas' dwellers (Figure 5). This experience became the first that included favela 
dwellers' relocation in the same area (Burgos 2003). 
 
 
Figure 5 Cruzada housing estate. This complex emerged from an agreement between the 
regional state of Rio de Janeiro and the Catholic Church. Source: Freire & Oliveira 2002  
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
92 
4.3 HOUSING POLICY IN THE CITY STATE CONTEXT 
4.3.1 Towards favelas eviction and razing  
 From federal district to the city state of Guanabara 
During the Presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) the idea of constructing a 
capital that emerged with the instauration of the First Brazilian Republic (1889) 
materialized. Designed by Lucio Costa, Brasilia was inaugurated in 1960 as the new capital 
of the country and Rio de Janeiro became the city state of Guanabara. This status gave the 
Mayor political autonomy and the city financial advantages because it acquired a double tax 
collection, thus, important financial resources. Moreover, the state of Guanabara could take 
advantage of the federal-state revenue sharing system (Gilbert 1995). In this new politico-
administrative landscape Carlos Lacerda was elected Governor of the state of Guanabara. 
During his administration (1961-1964) major urban infrastructures were built such as 
sanitation and road networks and the completion of the Flamengo landfill. 
 
Housing policy during Lacerda's administration took neither a clear position between 
favelas' urbanization nor their eradication. Created in 1956, the Special Recovery Service of 
Anti-hygienic Housing (SERFHA) implemented some urbanization projects between 1961 
and 1962; however, the SERFHA initiatives gradually faded. At that time the social housing 
company (COHAB) was created and aimed at establishing a housing policy for the state of 
Guanabara. In addition to the creation of COHAB, the Fundação Leão XIII became a 
state autarchy. Through these bodies the state of Guanabara carried out some favelas' 
urbanization, and constructed large scale social housing estates such as Vila Kennedy and 
City of God (Figure 6). In addition, it realized several evictions that affected 30,000 people 
by 1965 (Burgos 2003). 
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Figure 6 City of God housing estate funded in partnership with USAID. The housing units 
were organized around squares forming small clusters which were themselves planned 
around a main centre that included services and community equipments.  
Source: Brito n.d. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
94 
Razing Rio's favelas 1965-1975 
In 1964 a military dictatorship was established in Brazil, suppressing presidential elections 
one year later. The first presidents of this regime were Castelo Branco (1964-1967), Costa e 
Silva (1967-1969); and Medici (1969-1974). The regional state elections were maintained. In 
the state of Guanabara elected as Governors were Francisco Negrão de Lima (1965-1970) 
and Chagas Freitas (1970 to 1975). However, the military dictatorship concentrated 
politico-financial power at federal level. For instance, by 1967 tax assets expanded, yet the 
allocation of these resources were concentrated at federal level (Santos & Motta 2003). 
Moreover, the military regime beneficiated from an economic expansion, particularly 
between 1969 and 1973 when the Growth Domestic Product (GDP) grew on average more 
than 10% annually. In this politico-financial landscape the Federal Government controlled 
the design and financing of public policies and blocked initiatives that did not converge 
with the regime's interests. The state of Guanabara that was the unique state governed by 
the opposition lost its autonomy (ibid). 
 
In relation to the housing policy in the city state of Guanabara, at the beginning Francisco 
Negrão de Lima authorized the creation of the Community Development Company 
(CODESO). This body promoted favelas' urbanization and favela dwellers' participation 
during the process. CODESO developed projects in Brás de Pina and Morro União20. 
Nevertheless, this approach was marginalized by the emergence and development of the 
national housing policy with the creation of the SFH and the BNH (see CHAPTER 2: 37). 
The military regime created in 1967 the Greater Rio Area Coordinating Office for social 
housing (CHISAME) to develop a unified housing policy in the states of Guanabara and 
Rio de Janeiro. Under the Federal Interior Ministry and related to the BNH, CHISAME 
promoted favelas razing and the construction of housing estates through the COHABs 
(Burgos 2003). From 1962 to 1974, in the city state of Guanabara 80 favelas were razed 
26,193 shacks were destroyed and 139,218 people were relocated (Figure 7, Figure 8) 
(Valladares 2006). The number of housing units built during this period reached 48,985 
(Fiori et al. 2000).  
 
                                                 
20 For a detailed account of this initiative see Carlos Nelson Ferreira Santos related literature.  
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Figure 7 Field after a favela razing in Leblon, Zona Sul. Source: IPLANRIO 1988  
 
 
Figure 8 People being relocated in housing estates. Source: IPLANRIO 1988 
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4.3.2 Shifting housing policy direction after the fusion 
At national level the military regime continued under Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) and João 
Figueiredo (1979-1985). Right after Geisel's arrival, the merging of the states of Guanabara 
and Rio de Janeiro was approved. The main reasons for merging both states were the need 
to invigorate the city's economy, integrate Rio de Janeiro and greater Rio municipalities, 
and counterbalance the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais growing geopolitical power at 
the centre-south of Brazil (Motta 2001). In 1975 the merger was accomplished and Faria 
Lima was appointed Governor of the more powerful state of Rio de Janeiro. Even if the 
city of Rio de Janeiro remained the capital of the newly created state, it became a simple 
municipality and lost its political autonomy as the state Governor of Rio de Janeiro 
obtained the capacity to appoint Rio's Mayor. In 1979 the state of Rio de Janeiro regained 
some political autonomy with the return as Governor of the regime's opponent Chagas 
Freitas. Nevertheless, all Rio de Janeiro Mayors until 1985 were nominated by the state 
Governor: Tomoio, Klabin, Coutinho, Haddad and Alencar.  
 
Right after this major politico-administrative change, housing policy in Rio de Janeiro 
started to move towards favelas' urbanization. The Federal Government dissolved 
CHISAME in 1975 and the pace of favela evictions decelerated. The end of the decade was 
marked by the crisis of the Financial Housing System (SFH) and greater political openness; 
the Federal Government launched the PROMORAR programme in 1979. This programme 
aimed at urbanizing favelas and the first project was implemented in the Mare complex 
formed by six favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The Federal Government also implemented a 
social interest electricity programme to expand the electricity network to favelas.  
 
At municipal level the Mayor Klabin created the Municipal Social Development Secretariat 
(SMDS) in 1979 whose objective was to work with low-income population (Fiori et al. 
2000). One year later in partnership with UNICEF, the SMDS proposed the 
implementation of public services in favelas through favela dwellers' participation. The 
aims of this initiative were the reduction of infrastructure costs by covering a larger 
population and the development of specific technologies adapted to favelas (Fontes & 
Coelho 1989). The SMDS also started the establishment of a favelas' register in partnership 
with IPLANRIO in 1980 (Figure 9). Its objective was to facilitate the urbanization, land 
regularization, and accessibility and basic sanitation works in favelas (PCRJ 1983), which 
were among the major demands formulated by the favelas' dwellers (Cavallieri 1985). In 
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addition, in 1981 the SMDS launched the Mutirão programme whose objective was to 
improve sanitation and water supply in favelas (Barbosa 2002). In particular, the Mutirão 
programme was conceived by the SMDS as a social work initiative. 
 
 
Figure 9 Favelas registry. Ordered by the SMDS and elaborated by the IPLANRIO. 
 Source: PCRJ 1983 
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4.4 HOUSING POLICY AT THE MUNICIPALITY SINCE 1980S 
4.4.1 Consolidation of the urbanization of favelas 
Housing initiatives initiated by the state of Rio de Janeiro 
The development of favelas' urbanization as a housing policy approach was further 
developed with the arrival of Leonel Brizola at the head of the state of Rio de Janeiro. 
Brizola had a longstanding political career and on his return from exile created the 
Democratic Labour Party (PDT) in 1979. Brizola won the first Rio de Janeiro state 
elections after the merge with a populist style (Goirand 2000). The main priorities of his 
campaign were: land regularization, education, food distribution, combat against social 
inequalities and corruption (ibid). Right after the elections Brizola developed two lines of 
work to fulfil his electoral promises and secure the support of low income groups and 
workers who represented the bulk of his electoral base (Fiori et al. 2000; Goirand 2000). 
These lines of work were an ambitious education policy articulated around the construction 
of Public Education Integrated Centres (CIEPs) and the promotion of favelas' 
urbanization.  
 
In relation to favelas' urbanization, the state of Rio de Janeiro launched a non-conventional 
programme to improve favelas basic infrastructure named PROFACE funded by the 
Federal Government (Verde 2000). Managed and implemented by the Water and Sewage 
State Company (CEDAE), PROFACE covered 74 favelas between 1983 and 1985 which 
beneficiated around 250,000 people (Fiori et al. 2000). Brizola's administration also 
launched the 'Cada familia um lote' programme (Each family One plot). This programme 
of land tenure legalization aimed to regularize 1 million plots in illegal subdivisions and 
favelas and then undertake urbanization works in those areas. However, the programme 
only issued about 23,000 deeds, registered 27,000 claims, and implemented upgrading 
works in two favelas: Pavão Pavãozinho and Rio das Pedras (ibid). During this period the 
Federal Government housing policy started to decline. By 1983, the National Housing 
Bank (BNH) limited the number of mortgages for the development of housing estates' 
programmes in the state of Rio de Janeiro; and the State Housing Company (CEHAB) that 
emerged after the merge focused on financing renovation works in housings estates rather 
than constructing new units (IPLANRIO 1988).  
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Housing actions developed by the municipality of Rio de Janeiro 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the municipality of Rio de Janeiro unlike the state did not 
have political autonomy. Rio de Janeiro State Governor was still responsible for choosing 
the Mayor of Rio de Janeiro. Brizola appointed at the head of the municipal administration 
Jamil Haddad (1983), and then Marcello Alencar (1983- 1986). During both administrations 
favelas' urbanization was further developed through the expansion of the Mutirão 
programme. As mentioned, Mutirão was launched in 1981. During 1982 the programme 
beneficiated about 20,000 people across 7 favelas by implementing sewage network, paving 
roads and providing water supply (Fontes & Coelho 1989). In the following year Mutirão 
was extended to another 20 communities, benefiting about 134,000 people. At its inception 
the selection of projects to be included in the programme was informed by specific 
demands formulated by the communities. Once approved, the favelas' dwellers provided 
voluntarily the work force while the SMDS provided construction materials and technical 
support (ibid).  
 
By the end of 1983 the method changed. The Mutirão shifted from voluntary to a paid 
work force and was articulated with the State government programme PROFACE, 
fostering its development. The agreement between the state and the municipality was as 
follows: SMDS was responsible for the sewage network while CEDAE was responsible for 
the water supply (Fontes & Coelho 1989). Furthermore, this agreement included that the 
CEDAE would provide material constructions such as pipes and be responsible for the 
maintenance of the new networks (Barbosa 2002). Community participation gained 
strength as well during this period. For instance, in April 1984 the programme's evaluation 
and implementation included the participation of 60 community representatives; and in 
December of that year a Mutirão/Rio seminar brought together 150 communities (ibid). 
Besides sanitation infrastructure the Mutirão incorporated other public services. Between 
1984 and 1985, through the programme four school, five crèches, one health centre and 
two sewing centres were constructed (ibid) (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10 Mutirão works: sewage works, public lighting and garbage collection.  
Source: Cavallieri 1985 
 
4.4.2 Convergence towards favelas' urbanization as housing approach 
In 1985 the first municipal elections after the merge took place and Brizola's candidate 
Saturnino Braga became the Mayor of Rio de Janeiro. During the Braga administration the 
urbanization of favelas was consolidated. The 1986 pluriannual work plan included the idea 
of developing a global intervention for urbanising Rio's favelas. Furthermore, it indicated 
the idea of favelas' integration and their transformation into neighbourhoods (Burgos 
2003). Under this perspective at the beginning the new municipal administration sought to 
enhance community participation, develop municipal and state bodies involvement such as 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
101 
the CEDAE and municipal work secretariat (SMO), and secure the maintenance works 
(Barbosa 2002). 
 
During this period, the municipality enhanced its institutional capacity. In 1985 it created 
the first stock centre for construction materials, seeking to improve their management in 
the context of Mutirão projects (Barbosa 2002). A year later, the municipality created the 
Crèche Coordinating Office within the SMDS. In addition, in 1987 the SMDS created a 
commission for indentifying favelas located in risk areas (ibid) and in 1988 it restructured 
the Community Development Coordinating Department into the Community Planning, 
Sanitation and Engineering Office (SESUC) in an attempt to expand the scope of 
interventions. The SMDS also launched the Mutirão Reforestation programme aiming at 
preserving natural reserves, limiting favelas expansion and stabilizing hillsides. Lastly, it 
started to focus and prioritize the construction of sport and leisure equipments (ibid). 
 
Besides the SMDS, other municipal bodies started to intervene in favelas as well. The 
geotechnical municipal company (Geo-Rio) mapped favelas in risk areas, contributing to 
the elaboration of a global intervention plan. The plan included detailed information that 
allowed to determine municipal intervention by type of risk, solution, zone, and the 
municipal body responsible. In addition, due to the 1988 floods the municipal 
administration elaborated a proposal for the World Bank that comprised 7 projects to be 
conducted by the municipal company of urbanism linked to the SMO named RioUrbe to 
benefit 43 communities that were in risk areas and an unhealthy environment. Geo-Rio 
also proposed to the World Bank and to the CAIXA 123 projects in favelas. During the 
resettlement after the mentioned floods, municipal bodies worked together with the SMDS 
on favelas' urbanization. The selected projects were developed by SMDS and RioUrbe. 
Subsequently, the latter detailed projects' design and construction works. This process 
included the participation of residents and other institutional bodies such as Light and 
CEDAE (Barbosa 2002).  
 
At the beginning of Marcello Alencar's administration in 1989 the Mutirão programme 
objective was consolidated around improving the quality of life in the favelas through their 
integration into the urban grid. Specifically, health, reforestation and infrastructure were 
defined as the main Mutirão lines of work (Table 7). In order to materialize the Mutirão 
objectives, the SMDS was restructured around three coordinating offices working in a 
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matrix-based system. These coordinating offices were the SESUC created one year before 
(see page 101), the social assistance office (SAS); and social projects office (SPS) (Freire et 
al. 2009). 
Table 7 Mutirão lines of work in 1989. Source: Barbosa 2002. Elaborated by the author. 
Name Objective 
Infrastructure 
works 
To implement urban infrastructure, sewage, drainage, paving, drainage, 
stairs, small hillside stabilization works.  
To promote the participation of other municipal and State bodies for the 
construction and maintenance of public services, such as SMO, CEDAE 
and COMLRUB. 
Reforestation To promote erosion control. 
To preserve natural water network, fruit trees,  
To foster the development of farming and reforestation projects. 
To limit favelas expansion.  
Health education  To develop a health database. 
To discuss with the community construction works and health.  
To promote environmental education activities.  
 
Furthermore, from 1989 the SMDS started developing a Simplified Urbanization 
Programme for favelas that had some public services and equipments constructed through 
public investments in the past. This approach considered several dimensions for favelas' 
urbanization: physical, environmental, social, political, and cultural (Barbosa 2002). In 
addition, the Simplified Urbanization Programme detailed the different phases of the 
projects. The phases were: preliminary report for capturing resources, elaboration of 
preliminary objectives, guidelines and discussion with the population; elaboration of basic 
plans that included detailed guidelines and objectives, construction work programme, and 
financial architecture; and finally the elaboration of an evaluation report with 
recommendations. The Simplified Urbanization Pogramme was experimented in four 
favelas: Biruti, Congonhas Salgueiro and Formiga (Barbosa 2002). Thus, at the end of the 
1980s the SMDS consolidated within the municipal administration knowledge, know-how 
about favelas and their urbanization mainly through the development of the favelas 
registry, the Mutirão and the Simplified Urbanization programmes. In addition, the SMDS 
gained strength with its restructuring and the making of alliances with the favelas' dwellers, 
and public sector bodies such as Geo-Rio, RioUrbe and CEDAE.  
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The urbanization of favelas as the main municipal housing policy approach strongly related 
to three other processes at national level. Firstly, the Federal Government started to invest 
in the urbanization of favelas through some programmes such as PROMORAR and 
PROFACE. Secondly, the extinction of the BNH in 1986 compromised the construction 
of housing estates as a housing policy approach and undermined federal interference in Rio 
de Janeiro's housing policy. Thirdly, the enactment of the new constitution (see CHAPTER 
2 page 40) gave Rio de Janeiro, as to all Brazilian municipalities, not only political and 
financial autonomy, but also the responsibility for developing public policies. In particular, 
Rio de Janeiro became responsible for its urban and housing policy through the elaboration 
of a Master Plan that was enacted in 1992 ( see CHAPTER 5).  
 
Nevertheless, despite the changes and progress accomplished during the 1980s, the 
problems around poverty and favelas aggravated. The number of people living in poverty 
continued to increase and Rio became the municipality with the highest absolute number 
of poor people, and the highest Gini index in the country (Fiori et al. 2000). In addition, 
the number of people living in favelas continued to rise from about 169 thousand people in 
1950 to 882 thousand in 1991 (Figure 11). Moreover, violence around the favelas sharply 
increased during the 1980s (Fiori et al. 2000). Thus, Rio de Janeiro's favelas and their 
urbanization remained a major concern for the municipality.  
 
 
Figure 11 Evolution of favelas' population in Rio de Janeiro from 1950 to 1980.  
Source: Cavallieri 1985; IPP 2002. Elaborated by the author. 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed Rio de Janeiro's housing policy emergence and evolution until the 
end of the 1980s. After a brief description of Rio de Janeiro's politico-administrative 
evolution, the first part of the chapter explored housing policy when Rio was a federal 
district, and highlighted the swinging approach between urbanization and housing 
construction. The second part of the chapter focused on the housing experiences when Rio 
de Janeiro became the city state of Guanabara, and showed that the favelas eviction and 
housing construction became the dominant approach. This part explained as well that this 
swing related to the politico-administrative centralization process fostered by the military 
regime that lasted from 1965 to 1985. The last part of the chapter describes the housing 
policy evolution since the merger of the states of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro, when the 
city of Rio became a municipality. This part showed how gradually favelas' urbanization as 
housing policy approach was fostered by the three levels of government. In particular, it 
explained how cognitive and normative frames around favelas' urbanization emerged and 
were developed within the municipality through the SMDS initiatives.  
 
Throughout this account this chapter showed that after many swings at the end of the 
1980s the cognitive and normative frames of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy were being 
consolidated around favelas' urbanization. The municipality developed knowledge and 
know-how about favelas and their urbanization, gained institutional capacity and formed 
alliance with various actors involved in the housing sector. It was from and within this 
housing policy landscape that the choice and use of slum upgrading as housing policy 
instrument took place.  
 
The following three chapters constitute the chronological 'thick description' of use of the 
slum upgrading instrument that reveals how it influenced housing policy and governance, 
evolution and transformation. 
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CHAPTER 5 SLUM UPGRADING: HOLDING TOGETHER 
 
 
 
 
 
'This one [an innovation] is in perpetual search of allies. It must be integrated in a network of 
actors who take it again, support it, move it, and this depends very directly on the operated 
technical choices' (Akrich et al. 1988a: 20). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter explores slum upgrading emergence and development as Rio de Janeiro's 
housing policy instrument during the 1990s, seeking to reveal its role for housing policy 
and governance evolution and transformation.  
 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines the instauration of the 
instruments, highlighting the existence of cognitive and normative frames that supported 
the choice of the slum upgrading as main housing policy instruments. The second part 
examines the development of slum upgrading, stressing its role in the development and 
evolution of the policy and governance. The last part explores the main controversies 
surrounding the slum upgrading in the second half of the 1990s, showing how criticism 
and an emerging opposition were destabilized.  
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5.2 THE EMERGENCE OF SLUM UPGRADING 
5.2.1 The cognitive and normative foundations 
Consolidating municipal administration expertise 
At the beginning of the 1990s the Municipal Social Development Secretariat (SMDS) 
continued to develop its programmes and projects in favelas, in particular the Mutirão 
programme, expanding municipal administration knowledge and know-how about the 
favelas and slum upgrading approach. Based on the Mutirão pogramme main lines of work 
established in 1989, the SMDS proposed in 1990 for the Rio-92 Conference three types of 
programmes (reforestation, basic sanitation and health education) for 70 communities in 14 
hills across the city (see Figure 12). In particular, the project in Caricó's hill aspired to 
transform the favela into a neighbourhood and become a model to be replicated in Rio de 
Janeiro (Jornal do Brasil 1992a). The novelty of this intervention was not only the 
participation of the SMDS known as the 'Municipal Secretariat of Favelas' (interview with 
Isabel Tostes), but also the involvement of other municipal bodies and favelas' dwellers for 
its implementation (PCRJ 2003). In addition the SMDS consolidated the guidelines of the 
Simplified Urbanization Programme that emerged in 1989 (see CHAPTER 4: 102).  
 
 
Figure 12 The enviromental capital. UN conference makes municipality invest in poor 
communities. Source: Jornal do Brasil 1990 
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At the same time the SMDS continued to experiment in the field, it fostered debates about 
the urbanization of favelas. In May 1992 the SMDS organized the first workshop named 
'Favelas areas, urbanization and environment'. The conclusion of this event saw the 
establishment of an operational framework for urbanizing favelas that included corrective 
and preventive recommendations. The proposed corrective actions involved water sewage 
and drainage infrastructure, garbage collection, and spatial integration of favelas into the 
urban network through the creation or reordering of accesses. The proposed preventive 
actions included among others land regularization and construction of housing, taking into 
account several factors such as transport, education and the job market. The operational 
framework was also to include the municipalization of public services, the consolidation of 
participatory mechanism and the prioritization of favelas in the municipal agenda. 
Moreover, the methodology indicated the need for collaboration and coordination of the 
municipal secretariats and the integration of favelas' surroundings (neighbourhood and 
administrative region) in each urbanization project (PCRJ 2003). 
Establishing legal and regulatory frames 
In addition, the local Master Plan approved by the Municipal Chamber in June 1992 set up 
housing policy cognitive and normative frames (Complementary Law No.16/1992). The 
Master Plan established four major housing policy objectives (ibid: Art.138):  
-To guarantee access to housing with infrastructure, transport and public services; to 
relocate people living in risk areas. 
-To urbanize and regularize favelas and illegal housing estates. 
-To make available urbanized plots and to construct housing units. 
-To find financial resources to implement housing programmes. 
 
Consequently, the Master Plan prioritized four types of programmes (ibid: 146):  
-Urbanization and land regularization of favelas.  
-Urbanization and land regularization of low income subdivisions. 
-Urbanized plots. 
-Housing construction.  
 
The Master Plan not only established the general objectives of Rio de Janeiro's housing 
policy, but also detailed cognitive and normative frames for implementing the main 
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programmes, including the urbanization and land regularization of favelas. The Master Plan 
defined a favela as:  
'an area predominantly characterized by occupation of the land by low-income population, 
precariousness of urban infrastructure and public services, narrow roads and of irregular alignment, 
lots of irregular size and shape and unlicensed constructions in disagreement with legal standards' 
(Complementary Law No.16/1992: Art. 147). 
The Master Plan also defined three general favelas urbanization guidelines (Complementary 
Law No.16/1992):  
-To maximize public funds and spread the benefits among the population by progressive 
interventions in favelas (Art. 148). 
-To include favelas in the overall city planning and maintenance (Art. 149). 
-To guarantee the stay of families in the favelas (Art. 150).  
 
In addition, the following criteria were indicated for selecting the favelas to be given 
priority: technical viability, benefit-cost ratio, existence of risk area, and proximity to an 
environmental conservation area (ibid: Art. 151). The Master Plan also indicated that these 
principles and methods should be materialized through a land analysis and the elaboration 
of urban projects (ibid: Art 152), which should aim to integrate Rio's favelas into the 
neighbourhood, to preserve their local culture, and to progressively implement basic 
infrastructure and public services. The methodology and items of urban projects were also 
specified: 
'The urbanization will be performed based on urban projects through prioritizing the 
implementation of water supply, sewerage, solid waste removal, and the elimination of risk factors. 
The urbanization shall be complemented by roads treatment, implementation of drainage and 
public lighting, the implementation of alignment reforestation projects, where appropriate. 
Complementary urban equipment for health education and other leisure will be implemented 
obeying the urban scale of the area and its location. The favelas urbanization projects will 
contemplate, where technically possible, solutions that eliminate risk factors for residents. Local 
technical offices will be installed for managing the programme execution, enforcing urban legislation, 
and providing technical and social assistance to the residents' (Art.152 paragraph 2-6). 
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5.2.2 The constitution of the slum upgrading  
Cesar's victory: the new politico-administrative landscape  
The constitution of the municipal housing policy and emergence of the slum upgrading 
instrument coincided with the arrival of Cesar Maia at the head of the municipal 
government. Maia had a political career and experience in public administration. Appointed 
by Leonel Brizola Rio de Janeiro state secretary of treasury from 1983-1987, he also 
became federal deputy in 1986 and was re-elected in 1990. He joined the PMDB in 1991, 
due to political differences with Leonel Brizola and the PDT. Maia decided to participate in 
the third municipal elections since the fusion; however, he had few supporters and was far 
behind Cidinha, the favoured candidate, who was supported by state Governor of Rio de 
Janeiro Leonel Brizola (PDT) (Jornal do Brasil 1992b). During the electoral campaign Maia 
and Benedita da Silva from the Workers Party (PT) grew in the preference polls (Jornal do 
Brasil 1992c), and made it to the second round (Jornal do Brasil 1992d). At the end Cesar 
Maia succeeded in being elected Mayor.  
 
His victory in the 1992 elections without the support of a specific political party enabled 
Maia to start forming his own political group through the creation of a technocrat 
government, and the distribution of power among the different agents in charge of the 
decentralized municipal administration; in particular, among the sub-prefectures (Marques 
2007). As he won the election without the PMDB support, Maia chose with complete 
freedom his municipal secretaries and administrative team, fostering the formation of his 
political group (ibid). Newcomers to the political arena such as Eduardo Paes and Solange 
Amaral were appointed to the five sub-prefectures created by Maia21. Maia gave some 
secretariats to his political allies and politicians who were close to him. For instance, 
municipal councillor Laura Carneiro was appointed at the head of the SMDS. Nevertheless, 
he kept part of the administration out of party interests. Maia appointed professionals 
without party involvement as municipal Secretaries (ibid). Among them Luiz Paulo Conde 
became municipal planning secretary.  
                                                 
21 For a more detailed understanding of Rio de Janeiro's sub-prefectures and politics see Marques 
(2007).  
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Municipal housing policy basis 
Since the beginning of 1993 housing issues were on the new administration agenda. Maia 
engaged in discussions with the State Governor and municipal councillors about Rio de 
Janeiro's housing policy. In particular, he sought to negotiate the construction of houses 
using CAIXA funds (Jornal do Brasil 1993a; Jornal do Brasil 1993b). By August, Maia 
created the Executive Group of Special Programme for Popular Settlements (GEAP). The 
GEAP was commissioned to design and implement until the end of Maia's administration 
housing programmes according to the housing policy guidelines indicated by the Master 
Plan. Even if the SMDS was up to that point the most involved municipal body in favelas 
(Jornal do Brasil 1992e), it was the Municipal Planning Secretariat (SMU) that became 
responsible for the elaboration of the housing policy as this secretariat was designated to 
coordinate the GEAP. This group included the participation of five other municipal 
bodies: the Municipal Attorney General Office (PGM), RioUrbe, IPLANRIO and the 
secretariats of works (SMO) and government (SMG) (Municipal Decree No.12205/1993). 
Sergio Magalhães, who since the arrival of Conde at the head of the SMU worked at the 
irregular housing estate regularization office and IPLANRIO, was appointed to the head of 
the GEAP. Magalhães was an architect who developed the regeneration project in Niteroi 
and already worked in Rio's municipal administration during Saturnino Braga's 
administration (1986-1988).  
 
To elaborate Rio's housing policy the GEAP started a process of mapping all the housing-
related activities and documents spread across the municipal secretariats such as SMU, 
SMO, SMDS and the Municipal Treasury Secretariat (SMF) (A. Freire & Oliveira 2008: 
212). During this process in the year 1993 more municipal bodies officially joined the 
GEAP: the SMDS in September (Municipal Decree No.12296/1993) and the SMF in 
November (Municipal Decree No.12.432/1993). Furthermore, the work of the GEAP was 
not only informed by previous experience and but also by activities and debates that were 
happening at that time. For example, in August 1993 at the same time as the GEAP was 
created, a debate about the municipal housing policy took place at the Municipal Chamber 
organized by municipal councillors Jorge Bittar, Fernado William and Otavio Leite 
(DCMRJ 17/06/1994: 5-7). This event included the participation of different municipal 
staff like Luis Paulo Conde, Municipal Secretary of Urbanism (SMU), and Jorge Rodrigues 
and Lu Petersen staff of the SMDS who were strongly related to the Mutirão programme. 
The debate also involved representatives of different levels of government like Laert Lima 
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de Andrade from the CAIXA, researchers like Ricardo Pereira Lira, specialist in urban law 
at the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) and Adauto Cardoso, specialist in regional 
planning and housing at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). In addition, 
representatives from NGOs and CBOs also took part, namely Franklin Coelho from the 
National Movement for Urban Reform (MNRU). Moreover, important figures in housing 
discussions at national level like Erminia Maricato and Nabil Bonduki from the 
municipality of São Paulo, also participated in the debate. 
 
The debates highlighted the lack of coordination between the different actors involved in 
the housing sector and the inefficiency of previous programmes. They also pointed out that 
the government had a key role because low income groups needed subsidies to access land 
and housing. Moreover, out of the debates emerged the idea of a municipal housing 
secretariat. Finally, the conclusions stated that the housing policy should not only include 
housing construction but other approaches such as self construction, regularization and 
slum upgrading:  
'The housing policy cannot be reduced to the construction of new housing and should include 
rehabilitation of existing housing and slums, self-build programmes, regularization and 
urbanization of slums and illegal housing estates, among others (DCMRJ 17/06/1994: 6). 
Informed by debates and the review of existing initiatives and capacities, at the end of 1993 
the GEAP produced a document that included the bases of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy. 
This proposal was supported by three principles: (i) housing was a right; (ii) housing was 
not just the house, but also the integration with the urban structure (sanitation 
infrastructure, transport, education, health, leisure); and (iii) housing in this extended 
understanding was the responsibility of municipal authorities (Municipal Decree 
No.12994/1994). The proposal included six different programmes from slum upgrading to 
housing construction (see Table 8), which permitted divergent positions to be integrated, 
limiting opposition (interview with Sergio Magalhães). Nevertheless, the basis related to a 
movement away from housing construction as key housing instrument as the bulk of the 
programmes related to favelas' urbanization:  
'I remember Marcio Fortes, who was the secretary of works, asking: "Then we will not build more 
housing? I'm seeing in this proposal that we will not build more housing estates, we'll do something 
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else". Then, Cesar Maia was even very emphatic: "Precisely, we won't build more housing estates, 
we'll do something else' (Sergio Magalhães in A. Freire & Oliveira 2008: 212). 
Table 8 Programmes of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy basis. Source: Municipal Decree 
No.12994/1994. Elaborated by the author. 
Programme Name Objectives 
Lot regularization  To realize urban regularization. 
To construct infrastructure. 
Favela-Bairro To construct main urban structure (sanitation and access).  
To offer the conditions to perceive favela as neighbourhoods by 
introducing urban values of the formal city as signs of 
identification as neighbourhood: roads, squares, infrastructure and 
public services. 
To take advantage of the collective effort already made and 
services and infrastructure already installed.  
To make as few relocations as possible.  
Land regularization and 
titling 
To promote land titling in order to expand legal land use. 
To include irregular buildings in the city's register.  
Novas alternativas To offer land alternative with infrastructure for developers or 
families.  
Morar sem Riscos To eliminate hills erosion and flood risks. 
To relocate the population when the elimination of risk is not 
possible and prevent new occupation in risk areas. 
Morar Carioca To expand land offer in areas with infrastructure for the middle 
class. 
To incentivize the construction of housing by small and medium 
entrepreneurs.  
To promote the creation of housing cooperatives. 
Municipal housing fund To create specific resources for the housing policy implementation  
 
In particular, regarding the slum upgrading the municipal housing bases created the Favela-
Bairro programme, whose objective was the construction of urban infrastructure in favelas 
to allow them to be perceived as popular neighbourhoods of the city:  
'to introduce urban values from the formal city as signs of identification as neighbourhood: roads/ 
squares/infrastructure/public services' (Municipal Decree No.12994/1994).  
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Thus, the Favela-Bairro programme was not only in line with Rio de Janeiro's Master Plan 
and the housing debates that supported the urbanization of favelas, but also with the 
SMDS aspiration as mentioned previously to transform favelas into neighbourhoods, 
integrating them into the city.  
5.2.3 The building of alliances 
The creation of the SeMH 
By January 1994 Sergio Magalhães was appointed municipal housing extraordinary 
secretary; however, the housing secretariat did not exist yet. In the following months, 
Magalhães formed the municipal extraordinary housing secretariat (SeMH) with people 
from other municipal bodies. The formation of the SeMH was facilitated by the departure 
of Marcio Fortes (SMO) and Laura Carneiro (SMDS) who were candidates for the 1994 
elections. They were replaced not by politicians but by Angela Nobrega Fonti, an architect 
who was close to the SMU Secretary; she was appointed at the SMO; and by Wanda Engel, 
a university professor and president of an NGO who was appointed at the SMDS. 
Together with Magalhães' appointment, in 1994 Maia expanded the number of municipal 
secretariats managed by professionals, undermining politico-electoral interest among the 
municipal secretariats. 
 
The SMDS offices involved in urban development were transferred to the SeMH at the 
beginning of 1994, incorporating technical expertise in the urbanization of Rio's favelas 
previously developed through the Mutirão programme. The SMDS staff became interested 
in the slum upgrading instrument and the other SeMH initiatives as they represented an 
opportunity to develop further their work during the 1980s and to scale up the Mutirão 
experience (DCMRJ 09/06/1995: 10-11). In March 1994, the Municipal Decree 
No.12719/1994 rendered official this transfer and established the competency for the 
development of the housing policy to the SeMH. This allowed the new housing body to 
gain some independence from the SMU. Following the SMDS previous functioning (see 
CHAPTER 4: 101), the SeMH started working in a matrix-based system around two types 
of management offices: programme and function. 
 
However, even if this transfer strengthened the emergence of the SeMH, the 
materialization of the municipal housing policy was still uncertain:  
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'Then we headed out looking for a place to establish ourselves; we occupied what was a restaurant 
of the annex building [to the municipality administration main building], which was disused. This 
beginning gave others a certain perception that this new department wouldn't work. I was convinced 
it would work, at least we'd work hard. The annual budget was equivalent to R$8 million. In 
those years, it was more or less what was spent on housing' (Sergio Magalhães, A. Freire & 
Oliveira 2008: 213). 
Developing the housing policy through slum upgrading 
The first programme to be implemented by the SeMH was the slum upgrading programme 
called Favela-Bairro. This choice of the slum upgrading was informed by the experience the 
municipality had in favelas' urbanization through the Mutirão programme. For instance, Lu 
Petersen who had worked on this programme during the 1980s became the Favela-Bairro 
programme manager. In addition, the choice of the slum upgrading was supported by the 
consensus it generated among most of the housing policy actors as an effective and suitable 
instrument for addressing Rio de Janeiro's housing issues. This consensus was crystallized 
in the Master Plan. Lastly, the choice of the slum upgrading was encouraged by the 
municipality as it could afford Favela-Bairro programme launch without financial aid from 
national or international actors.  
 
The first Favela-Bairro project was implemented in Andarai favela. This choice related to a 
decision made by the Mayor in favour of a municipal councillor (Magalhaes & Conde 2004: 
81). In March, at the same time the SeMH was being instituted with the transfer of the 
SMDS staff, the Favela-Bairro programme started to take shape. The municipality 
announced a first investment of URVs$12 million22 for its development. However, taking 
into account that the municipal financial situation was bad and that the municipality could 
not afford alone the implementation of the municipal housing policy, the municipal 
executive sought to engage discussions with the Inter-American Development Bank (BID) 
for contracting a loan to develop Rio de Janeiro's housing policy (Magalhaes & Conde 
2004). In particular, the discussions between the municipality and the BID were around the 
financing of slum upgrading called urbanization programme of popular settlements - 
PUAP/BID (PCRJ 1994a; 1994b). However, at that time a BID loan appeared 
unachievable as the municipality did not have anything to negotiate with:  
                                                 
22 Value real unit, key measure of the Real Plan 
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''Sergio, we do not have anything to show to the BID, we just have a slogan actually we need to do 
something". I worked in the area of fundraising and knew that the BID works on projects and not 
upon ideas, got it? It analyses projects, analyses things more developed. Actually the BID 
delegation had to examine the depollution project of the Guanabara Bay, but it scheduled a 
morning for the favelas. I mean, in a morning what could we present?' (Fernado Cavallieri, Freire 
& Oliveira 2008: 251). 
In order to interest the BID, the municipality elaborated a classification of favelas whose 
objective was to support the use of the slum upgrading by setting a rational frame for 
conducting the urbanization of Rio de Janeiro's favelas (Freire & Oliveira 2008). Named 
the 'classification matrix', this list was produced by a group that included several 
secretariats: SeMH, Geo-Rio, SMO, IPLANRIO and contained information about other 
municipal and Rio's state bodies such as the CEDAE (State Water and Sanitation 
company). Managed by Fernado Cavallieri this group did not have time nor resources, but 
they had an accumulated experience. Among the most relevant for this work was the 
existence of the registry of Rio's favelas developed by the SMDS in the early 1980s (PCRJ 
1983) (CHAPTER 4 page 96). The classification matrix not only served to establish a 
dialogue with the BID but also promoted the development of the slum upgrading 
instrument as it allowed to set up a method of selection for the Favela-Bairro programme.  
Beyond politics: building slum upgrading legitimacy  
The classification matrix considered two main criteria: social and technical viability. The 
former related to the support and participation of residents in the projects' implementation. 
The latter related to the degree of difficulty for urbanizing each favela, considering the 
benefit-cost ratio. These criteria followed the ones established by the Master Plan for 
housing policy and in particular for slum upgrading. The degree of difficulty was assessed 
taking into account different elements: water supply, sewage, drainage, risk situation, road 
access, and benefits to the areas nearby (PCRJ 1994b). For the Favela-Bairro programme, 
the favelas with a small urban degree of difficulty were privileged in order to secure not 
only programme success but also the support of favelas' dwellers and other groups:  
'It was not possible to provide an opportunity for very complex situations with a high risk of 
failure. Could not thwart slum dwellers in their legitimate hope for better conditions for their 
habitat nor the political forces and society favourable to the urbanization as solution for the 
centennial issue of favelas' (Magalhaes & Conde 2004: 81). 
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The other criteria that helped to generate the classification matrix were the size and 
location of the favelas. The consolidated favelas with 500 to 2500 households were 
included in the classification in order to minimize technical problems and remain in a 
comparable experience universe (Magalhaes & Conde 2004). Favelas' location was also 
taken into account because the SeMH was looking to deploy the programme across the 
entire city and to cover the two main favela types: hills and flat areas. For the final selection 
stage the five sub-prefectures were asked to indicate five favelas each; then the SeMH 
selected three from each sub-prefecture, constituting a list of 15 favelas to be included in 
the Favela-Bairro programme. (Freire et al. 2009; Magalhaes & Conde 2004). This allowed 
the introduction of some political discretion that secured sub-prefectures' support; 
nevertheless, the selection method gave technical legitimacy to the instrument's 
instauration, and limited the development of political interest around the slum upgrading 
implementation:  
'Eventual political pressures for the inclusion of particular interests became obsolete as the public 
resources were no longer available according to partisan or electoral logics'(Magalhaes & Conde 
2004: 82). 
In March 1994 the SeMH in partnership with the Brazilian Institute of Architects of Rio de 
Janeiro (IAB-RJ) launched an architectural competition. The objective of this event was the 
selection of 15 practices for developing the slum upgrading projects, associating 
architectural practices to the emerging municipal housing initiative. By May, while the 
architectural contest was taking place, the SeMH launched the first works in Andarai favela, 
showing that the programme was moving forward. One month later, in June the winners of 
the architectural competition were announced, the transfer of the coordination of the 
housing policy from SMU to SeMH was officially enacted (Municipal Decree 
No.12994/1994) and the bases of the municipal housing policy, including the Favela-Bairro 
was officially publicized (ibid). A few months later, in September the municipality without 
external financial aid signed the first contracts with the architectural practices for 
developing four of the selected projects (Caju, Parque Royal, Ilha do Governador and 
Fernão Cardim). Furthermore, at the same time the municipality was implementing slum 
upgrading projects, it elaborated and sent the Municipal Chamber a proposal for the 
creation of a municipal housing secretariat (bill No.757/1994).  
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The development of the slum upgrading instrument through the launch of Favela-Bairro 
projects allowed the municipal executive and municipal housing policy to gain credibility, 
generate interest and build alliances among various actors such as architectural practices, 
favela dwellers and municipal councillors. Regarding the negotiations with the BID, by the 
end of 1994 they progressed towards the possibility of a loan of US$300 million for slum 
upgrading projects. Nevertheless, the slum upgrading was not a foregone conclusion and 
scepticism about the success of the instrument existed even within the municipal 
administration:  
'I called a general meeting with the municipal organs to popularize the Favela-Bairro concepts and 
methodologies. I felt some disbelief among the participants. An SME staff came at me: hey Lu, 
are you crazy? You will not be able to do so ever! [laughs] I said: We are going to do so, Madame! 
Want to bet? The general comment of our technicians who were present: Enough of these stories 
about favela engineers, we are tired of it. In the end it boosted the team' (Lu Petersen, Favela-
Bairro pogramme manager, Freire et al. 2009: 12). 
*** 
This part described how the emergence of the instrument and housing policy entailed the 
'associations' of the following entities: previous experiences (Mutirão programme 
primarily), regulatory frameworks (in particular Rio's Master Plan which favoured favelas' 
urbanization rather than housing construction), people and municipal departments 
(specifically through the GEAP), and ideas and recommendations (as the ones formulated 
during the debate at the municipal Chamber). These 'associations' resulted in the definition 
of the municipal housing policy basis and slum upgrading instrument general lines. The 
process relates the 'problematization' moment of 'translation' (CHAPTER 3 page 60) 
which involves the creation of 'a system of alliances, or associations, between entities, thereby defining 
the identity and what they 'want' (Callon 1986: 8). Furthermore, this part illustrated that the 
emergence of Rio's housing policy ('problematization' moment) entailed the definition of 
the slum upgrading instrument as its central element. This relates to the establishment of 
the slum upgrading instrument as an 'Obligatory Passage Point' (OPP), i.e. an entity 
indispensable to the network under construction (housing policy) (CHAPTER 3 page 60). 
Lascoumes & Le Galès (2007a) observed that policy instruments tend to become OPP as 
they play a central role in the design of public policies.  
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This part also highlighted that the development of the slum upgrading instrument and 
housing policy involved the 'building of alliances' with municipal departments, IAB-RJ, 
architectural practices, favelas' residents and the BID through devices such as the 
classification matrix, architectural competition, agreements and contracts, and strategic 
steps that included the launch of the Favela-Bairro programme, building on the SMDS staff 
expertise and implementation of first slum upgrading projects in relatively easy 
communities which allowed the development of Rio's housing policy without external aid 
of any kind. This process relates in particular to the 'interessement' moment (CHAPTER 3 
page 60) which involves 'the group of actions by which an entity…attempts to impose and stabilize the 
identity of the other actors it defines through its problematization. Different devices are used to implement 
these actions' (Callon 1986: 8), and 'enrolment' moment (CHAPTER 3 page 60) which 
'designates the device by which a set of interrelated roles is defined and attributed to actors who accept them' 
(Callon 1986: 10). 
 
Throughout the 'translation' mechanism the slum upgrading instrument and Rio's housing 
policy developed a legitimacy based on a technical rationality as their constitution entailed 
rational methods for selecting favelas and conducting slum upgrading projects rather than 
political designation and unplanned works. Nevertheless, as mentioned, doubts and 
scepticism about the development and success of the slum upgrading instrument and 
housing policy still existed.  
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5.3 GROWING STRONGER  
5.3.1 Supporting the creation of the Municipal Housing Secretariat 
As mentioned previously by September 1994 while the SeMH was implementing the first 
Favela-Bairro projects and seeking the BID loan, the municipal executive sent to the 
Municipal Chamber bill No. 757/94 that created the Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH). 
The bill confirmed the aspirations and regulatory frames established by the municipal 
housing basis elaborated one year before and the intention of the municipal executive in 
materializing the housing policy through the six programmes, including Favela-Bairro. In 
relation to the SMH organization and functioning, the bill proposed a structure based on a 
matrix system: 6 management offices corresponding to each programme of Rio's housing 
policy bases (see Table 8 page 112) and 3 coordinating offices (land regularization, 
community planning and emergency relocation and actions) that used to be part of the 
SMDS. The bill also considered that the SMH could become a small secretariat whose role 
would be the coordination of the housing policy as the aspiration was to involve and make 
the whole municipal administration responsible for the housing policy. 
'The housing secretariat, as it is proposed does not have the pretension to be the executor of housing 
policy, but the coordinator of the housing policy and the executor of some actions of housing policy. 
It plans and works in this direction to coordinate through and with the various secretariats and 
municipal bodies, all actions in this field ... that makes the question of housing a shared task 
throughout the municipality and not simply an attribution of a sector of the administration. It 
ceases to be a sectorial responsibility and becomes a responsibility shared by the whole government' 
(Sergio Magalhães, DCMR 09/12/1994: 03). 
The work of the SeMH supported the bill of the municipal executive. In particular, the 
implementation of slum upgrading projects showed that the municipal executive was 
committed to do what it planned and that the proposed initiatives were feasible (DCMRJ 
09/12/1994: 01-08).  
 
The bill raised two major concerns at the Municipal Chamber: the housing policy 
orientations and the implementation (DCMRJ 01/12/1994: 25-27, DCMRJ 09/12/1994: 
01-08). The first one related to the secondary role of housing construction in relation to the 
slum upgrading instrument. The second concern was the lack of mechanisms or processes 
for strengthening civil society participation in the development and monitoring of the 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
120 
municipal housing policy. However, the different factions that constituted the legislative 
body supported the creation of the SMH for different reasons and interests. A faction of 
the Municipal Chamber approved the creation of the SMH because even if they did not 
entirely approve the whole project they were in favour of creating the SMH as it was a 
claim made previously by them:  
'The proposal for creating the Municipal Housing Secretariat emerged from a seminar that was 
held in this house, led by councillor Jorge Bittar, Otavio Leite and me [see page 110]. This 
seminar, which took place with the participation of representatives from other cities and other 
institutions, concluded, among other proposals, for the establishment of the Municipal Housing 
Secretariat. So we are entirely in favour and in a sense we strive for it. The project itself came a 
little bit disorganized, full of imperfections, mixing things, adding ultimately propositions to it that 
actually should not be here ... So, in spite of the criticisms I make about these elements included in 
the project, I forward positively the project for with approval of the Amendments 1-18' (Fernando 
William, municipal councillor DCMRJ 01/12/1994: 27). 
Another faction supported the bill because they acknowledged the need to unify the 
municipal housing initiatives that were fragmented across the municipal administration 
bodies:  
'We, from the PSDB group, we inform you as well that we will vote for the bill. We believe this 
matter once settled, will overcome the previous problem of task divisions among various municipal 
bodies, namely, the social development secretariat, works secretariat, RioUrbe, the attorney 
general's office, all dealing with the same subject. From now on, with the advent of this secretariat, 
the unification of all the activities, processes, administrative measures in a single body, a single 
command, this will facilitate the city's housing policy. And it is with the genuine hope that the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat will be an effective housing instrument in our city, directed at the 
population in need, to what is priority in our city, the workers, for those who are less fortunate we 
will vote in favour of this project' (Octavio Leite, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 01/12/1994: 
27). 
The creation of the SMH was approved by the Work Party (PT) because it acknowledged 
the need of such body taking into account the housing deficit in the city:  
'Mr. President, Councillors, I state here on behalf of the PT group our satisfaction with the 
creation of the housing secretariat. A secretariat of huge importance, given the scale of this problem, 
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i.e. the problem of housing in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. Yesterday we had the opportunity 
to have more information about the programmes that are being carried forward presently by the 
current SeMH secretary, future housing secretary, Dr. Sergio Magalhães. We agree with the 
general concerns. We try to enrich the project with the submission of an amendment that creates a 
Management Council of the Housing Fund, so that society representatives, such as communities, 
professionals, sectors' entrepreneurs could participate in the general definition of Rio de Janeiro's 
housing policy' (Jorge Bittar, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 01/12/1994: 27). 
In addition, another group approved the bill because being against was not possible taking 
into account that the creation of the SMH was seen as a sign of concern about the people 
in need in the city:  
'I conclude my remarks here, Mr. President, saying that I will vote in favour of the creation of the 
Secretariat, but I have doubts about whether it will work well, because we must have doubts ... So 
I have many doubts about whether this office will function, if these jobs will be allocated, well 
allocated, if something practical will be done for the less fortunate - from the middle to the lowest 
class - that need homes, and it is not explained here how these homes will be constructed or 
provided. All this is pure theory here: I want to see this in practice. Nevertheless, nobody will say 
that I wanted to be against the creation of a secretariat, nominally intended to solve the housing 
problem in Rio de Janeiro. No, I will not bear this sin, but I will not leave this house without 
stating my doubts and my suspicion that this secretariat will not achieve its goals and is just going 
to provide good jobs to some privileged' (Wilson Leite Passos, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 
01/12/1994: 25). 
Finally, another faction supported the bill because it agreed with the proposed housing 
policy approach, in particular, the shift from housing construction to slum upgrading that 
was being put into practice in the previous months:  
'Mr. President, Mr. councillors, having made, in several opportunities here in this house, 
pronouncements about the priority that should be assigned to this question of housing policy, I want 
to express my satisfaction with the presentation, the routing of this project, the guidelines of which 
coincide entirely with my point of view. I think if the City or the State Government were to pursue 
a policy of housing construction, it is absolutely impossible given the magnitude of the housing 
problem. So that the guidelines forwarded, through a policy of preparation of urban land with the 
infrastructure for the disadvantaged sections of the population most in need of housing, seems 
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entirely appropriate. I want to express agreement on my own behalf, on behalf of councillor Leonel 
Trotta, on behalf of the Brazilian Socialist Party and say that we will vote in favour of the project 
and the amendments that effectively I perfected' (Saturnino Braga, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 
01/12/1994: 27). 
The support that the bill received from the different political factions resulted in the bill 
being almost unanimously approved with twenty votes in favour and one against. In spite 
of critics and different interests and understandings, the creation of the SMH was enacted 
(Municipal Law No.2262/1994). Facilitated by the implementation of the housing policy, 
and in particular the implementation of slum upgrading projects, the creation of the SMH 
strengthened in return the materialization of the housing policy and the municipal 
executive's political and administrative capacities.  
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5.3.2 Adaptations and adoptions 
Constituting slum upgrading experts and regulations 
During the 1980s and up to the beginning of the 1990s, the majority of people with 
knowledge and technical expertise in favelas and their upgrading were mainly part of the 
municipal administration. In particular, these experts belonged to the IPLANRIO which 
had worked on the favelas' register at the beginning of the 1980s, and the SMDS that 
developed among others the Mutirão programme (see CHAPTER 4 page 96). These 
people and some others in the municipal administration continued to develop their 
knowledge and skills on the subject when they were transferred to the SeMH or remained 
involved in the housing policy developed by the Maia administration. This municipal 
administration staff started developing skills for organizing and managing projects and 
programmes, facing legal and regulatory issues such as contracts and tenders, and 
incentivizing and organizing civil society participation. 
 
In addition, the materialization of the housing policy and in particular the slum upgrading 
instrument supported the emergence of new experts on favelas and their urbanization 
outside the municipal administration. Architectural practices that included architects and 
other practitioners such as planners were among these new experts that were being trained. 
The alliance sealed with the architects that started with the architectural competition in 
June 1994 and was followed by the signing of contracts later that year, continued with the 
elaboration of urban projects and first implementations. This fostered architectural 
practices' expertise as they needed to find modes for implementing their proposals. In 
addition, the first slum upgrading implementations contributed to the development of 
know-how among the contractors who did not have any experience in this type of projects. 
 
The materialization of the slum upgrading produced not only new knowledge about favelas 
such as topography, building environment characteristics and functioning, and population 
organization, but also more detailed regulations (Freire et al. 2009). Specifically, the 
municipality issued a document that contained the process and specification for the 
development of urban projects by the architectural practices (PCRJ 1995a). The document 
established and detailed the different stages of slum upgrading projects (diagnosis phases, 
intervention plan, project draft, executive project), which shared similarities with the 
'Simplified Urbanization Pogramme' developed by the SMDS (see CHAPTER 4 page 100). 
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It also standardized all technical specifications such as urban equipment, hillside 
stabilization techniques, and communication templates.  
 
The growth of expertise and experts was further enhanced by the partnership between the 
municipality and the BID. As mentioned previously, the municipality was in negotiation 
with the BID for a loan since 1993. By the end of 1994 the BID mission announced the 
release of US$300 million for the Favela-Bairro programme (Jornal do Brasil 1994), while 
the Federal Government approved the loan contract. The approval of the BID loan was 
secured through the materialization of the slum upgrading (classification matrix, 
architectural competition, contract signing, the development of diagnosis and intervention 
plans) which gave credibility to the municipality and its housing policy (Freire & Oliveira 
2008: 251-252). In order to sign the loan contract the BID and the SMH engaged in the 
definition of the programme. This involved adaptations, exchange of expertise and creation 
or development of skills not only within the municipality but also within the BID 
(interview with Fernando Cavallieri). For instance, the BID developed an in-house know-
how about favelas that was spread across the region (Brakarz et al. 2002). Nevertheless, the 
development of the slum upgrading through the BID contract and the building of expertise 
involved tense negotiations:  
'And so we defined the scope of the programme with the BID , but not without heated discussion. 
It was coordinated by SMH together with the SMDS. I was the coordinator for the methodological 
and conceptual components, which were actually one of the main objects of the contract. I had to 
defend a position about some assumptions, such as land use regulation after the work, indemnity 
forms for the resettlement of families because of works, housing construction as last solution and 
others. In the social area agreements were more difficult. The BID only insisted on the construction 
of childcare centres and change of their participatory management established by the SMDS 
involving the communities by NGOs. We were opposed because of the importance of the social 
programme diversity to build community centres and spaces for sports. No NGOs. These meetings 
were very tiring and tense. But I could tell that their priority was execution of the work' (Lu 
Petersen, Freire et al. 2009: 84). 
Slum upgrading supporting the municipal executive  
The incorporation of the BID into the instrument's development demanded the approval 
of the Municipal Chamber. The support of the municipal councillors was complicated due 
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to a controversy about the importance given by the municipal executive to the Favela-
Bairro programme in relation to 'Rio Cidade' programme. Rio Cidade was an urban 
regeneration programme addressed at neighbourhoods of the 'formal city' and developed 
by the SMU under the command of Luiz Paulo Conde. The debate concentrated on the 
unequal municipal investments earmarked for each programme: Rio Cidade included 
municipal investments of about R$200 million while Favela-Bairro only R$16 million 
(DCMRJ 14/06/1995: 09; DCMRJ 03/07/1995: 11).  
 
Nevertheless, the instrument's objective of improving the lives of the people in need and 
its materialization like the Andarai project contributed not only to destabilize this major 
criticism but also to gain the support of the Municipal Chamber for signing the BID loan. 
A letter of support of the slum upgrading and the need to expand the use of the instrument 
with the BID loan was signed by councillors from different political parties and sent to the 
BID in July 1995 (DCMRJ 04/07/1995: 14). The loan proposal for approval was sent to 
the municipal chamber by the end of August that year (DCMRJ 22/08/1995: 04-019). The 
first round of debates took place some days later (DCMRJ 31/08/1995: 07-11), and at the 
beginning of September the municipal chamber approved the BID loan, with 27 votes in 
favour and 2 against (DCMRJ 08/09/1995: 10-18). The bill became Legislative Decree 
No.129/1995 and included specifications about the general loan terms, the allocations of 
resources, and the list of favelas and subdivision beneficiaries.  
The consolidation of the slum upgrading as a mainly technical instrument 
Maia signed the BID loan contract in Washington at the beginning of December 1995 
(Jornal do Brasil 1995a). Sealing the alliance with the BID secured the instrument's long 
term use (1996-2000) and boosted the new SMH budget with the US$300 million agreed 
for implementing the slum upgrading, increasing the SMH autonomy and importance, and 
housing policy legitimacy and credibility. The negotiations promoted the consolidation of 
specific regulations regarding slum upgrading renamed 'Urbanization Programme of 
Popular Settlements' (PROAP). In particular, the regulations stipulated in the BID contract 
(BID 1995) and the Municipal Decree No.14332/1995 included the list of the favelas that 
would benefit from the programme using the classification matrix, preventing the use of 
the loan for other areas for political or other interests. Furthermore, the guidelines 
regulated the slum upgrading projects' execution as follows. Firstly, the project involved the 
elaboration by the architectural practices of a diagnostic that must include:  
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'(i) locational and historical aspects of the settlement; (ii) assessment of environmental and 
infrastructure conditions, including areas of geological and environmental risk, conditions of 
sanitation, drainage, garbage, street systems, energy supply, etc.; (iii) assessment of social services, 
including health centres, schools, recreation and play areas, and child care and development 
alternatives; (iv) topographic surveying; and (v) land property analysis consisting of land use maps 
which identify individual plots' (BID 1995: 14). 
Based on this study, the second phase included the elaboration of an urban development 
plan named ' Intervention plan' (plano de intervenção), focusing on:  
'an integral solution according to the Program’s goals and include basic services of water supply, 
sewerage, drainage, street system, solid waste collection and disposal, child-care centers, street 
lighting and hillside stabilization, parks and community facilities as needed' (Ibid).  
This phase included the approval of the draft plan by the SMH and its discussion and 
modification with the community through general assemblies and small consultative 
meetings. The agreement of the community on the major lines of the project was 
compulsory for continuing the process. The third phase included the elaboration of 
preliminary drawings and the cost estimations once the SMH and the community had 
agreed to the project (BID 1995). The fourth stage involved the design of the detailed plans 
based on the preliminary drawings once approved by the SMH. This further development 
of the preliminary drawings entailed the following of specific guidelines established by the 
SMH back in 1994 (see page 123) and regulations that emerged during the SMH-BID 
negotiations. The final stage included a technical analysis and approval by the SMH. Then 
only would the project be implemented and the law Special Areas of Social Interest (AEIS) 
prepared. This legal instrument if approved by the municipal chamber aimed at legally 
regularizing and protecting the favelas23. 
 
The slum upgrading regulations assigned also a series of responsibilities to different actors 
and in particular to various public sector bodies (BID 1995):  
-SMH to coordinate the programme and to contract and execute projects.  
-SMDS to support child care facilities design and to operate and maintain them  
                                                 
23 The AEIS were the equivalent in Rio de Janeiro of the ZEIS (see CHAPTER 2 page 49) 
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-Municipal Environmental secretariat named SMAC to assess environmental and 
reforestation projects' aspects. 
-SMU to support the drawing up of urban norms and regulations. 
-SMO to approve drainage projects. 
-IPLANRIO to monitor and evaluate the programme, and to compile, manage and analyse 
the data on the favelas beneficiaries. 
-RioUrbe to execute the contracting and execution of projects and works assigned to the 
SMH if needed. 
-Geo-Rio to execute hillside stabilization. 
-COMLURB to secure garbage collection and street cleaning. 
-RioLuz to approve, operate and maintain street lighting system projects. 
-CEDAE to support, approve, operate and maintain water supply and sewage systems 
projects. 
-PMG to work in land regularization. 
 
The regulations established selection criteria investment sectors and stabilized organization 
and management functioning (Table 9).The regulations also modified processes that existed 
in the first phase from 1994-1995. For instance, the architectural competition was changed 
to public tender process. Furthermore, they reduced municipal executive room for 
manoeuvre because if the procedures and regulations were not followed the disbursement 
of the BID loan would be compromised. Nevertheless, the municipal executive, the 
municipal housing policy and in particular the slum upgrading instrument gained legitimacy 
as the Rio de Janeiro experience was supported by an international organization, and 
involved a series of technical expertise and regulations that consolidated as a 
scientific/technical matter rather than a political one. In other words, the slum upgrading 
instrument, the housing policy and the municipal administration were constituted as being 
beyond the political interests of the Mayor and his allies.  
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Table 9 Overview of slum upgrading operating regulations consolidated with the BID loan 
contract. Source: BID 1995. Elaborated by the author. 
Theme detailed in the regulations Specification 
Programme components: 
 
Urban development of slum areas 
Regularization of subdivisions,  
Sanitary and environmental education,  
Monitoring  
Institutional development. 
Eligible investment sectors Water supply, drainage, street system, garbage 
collection, street lighting, hillside stabilization, 
reforestation, child care centre, community centre, 
parks and sport areas, resettlements, and land titling. 
Selection criteria (pre-eligibility):  Favelas  
Irregular subdivisions 
Technical eligibility criteria that 
the Slum upgrading projects must 
meet 
 
Investments up to US$4000 per household 
To comply with municipal regulations 
A maximum of 5% houses can be relocated 
To include provision for proper operation and 
management 
Land status resolved prior to start of works 
To comply with detailed specifications of investment 
sectors (see above)  
Executing process organization 
and function of participating 
agencies 
Execution of programme's investments 
Execution structure  
Actors' responsibilities 
Coordination during the execution   
Financial and accounting 
administration 
 
General cost table  
Financial administration of resources 
Budgetary control of the programme 
Disbursement  
Accounting and control of the project 
General accounting system of the programme 
Physical and financial follow up  
Monitoring and evaluation system   
External audit   
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5.3.3 Expanding alliances, securing continuity 
From Rio to Istanbul 
During negotiations between the municipality and the BID, the municipality started a 
process of selecting more favelas for the further development of the slum upgrading 
implementation (PCRJ 1995b). The successful completion of the negotiations that led to 
the US$ 300 million loan enabled progress, expanding instrument's implementation across 
the city. By 1996 a more detailed schedule by phases that stretched beyond Maia's 
administration period that was ending that year was established (see Figure 13). Added to 
the BID loan, since 1995 the municipality was seeking to use the instrument in larger 
favelas such as Jacarezinho and Alemão Complex with federal government investments. 
The idea was to secure resources from the 'Comunidade Solidaria' programme established 
in 1995 and supported by President Cardoso's wife, Ruth (Jornal do Brasil 1995b). 
 
 
Figure 13 Favela-Bairro expansion by phases. Source: PCRJ 1996a 
 
The central role of the slum upgrading instrument and housing policy started to be 
consolidated in the municipality. For instance, by 1995 opinion polls showed that the 
housing secretary, Sergio Magalhães, was the most popular municipal Secretary. Moreover, 
by 1996 the Favela-Bairro not only became one of the most important of Maia's 
administration programmes together with Rio Cidade programme and 'Linha Amarela' 
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highway24 (DCMRJ 19/04/1996: 11); but was also the major municipal programme in 
terms of investments (Jornal do Brasil 1996a). The slum upgrading gained more visibility 
and credibility when the first works were inaugurated during 1996 (Jornal do Brasil 1996b; 
Jornal do Brasil 1996c; Jornal do Brasil 1996d; Jornal do Brasil 1996e; Jornal do Brasil 
1996f).  
 
The consolidation of the interessement process went beyond Rio de Janeiro. For instance, 
the preparatory event related to the UN-HABITAT II in 1995 allowed the Favela-Bairro 
programme to be presented (Jornal do Brasil 1995c). One year later in Istanbul even if the 
Favela-Bairro was not selected for representing Brazilian best practices on housing, it was 
showcased by the Rio de Janeiro delegation which was the largest one from Brazil at the 
conference (Folha de S. Paulo 1996). This was because the municipal administration was 
seeking financial allies for developing its policies, including the housing policy. In addition, 
during the conference the municipality signed the agreement for creating and hosting the 
UN-HABITAT regional office (Jornal do Brasil 1996g). This agreement contributed to 
support the convergence in Rio de Janeiro of debates and research about Latin America 
human settlements, including slum upgrading approaches.  
 
At that time the materialization of the slum upgrading also started to reshape the 
relationship between favela dwellers' associations and the municipality that evolved with 
the creation of 'Guarda 16' (G-16). This group was formed by the 16 community 
associations included in the first phase of the Favela-Bairro, and aimed at facilitating State 
civil society relations around the instrument's implementation (DCMRJ 22/10/2001: 11). 
In addition, following the Mutirão experience in the 1980s, women in the community were 
trained and hired by the municipality as community agents of the housing policy. Their 
work involved the follow up in the field of the projects and the training in health and 
sanitation in the favelas (interview with Isabel Tostes).  
 
The know-how and knowledge around the instrument were being further developed 
through municipal government publications (PCRJ 1995b; PCRJ 1996a), academic works 
like the book organized by researchers at Rio de Janeiro Federal University (UFRJ) about 
the 1994 architectural competition (Duarte et al. 1996), and events such as the course 
                                                 
24 The highway included in Doxiades' plan for Rio de Janeiro elaborated in the 1960 materialized 
during Maia's administration under the supervision of the SMU Secretary Luiz Paulo Conde. 
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organized by the municipality in partnership with the International Housing and Urban 
Development studies (IHS) on planning and management of urban projects in informal 
settlements (PCRJ 1996b).  
Conde is Cesar: Cesar is Conde 
The impossibility of the Mayor’s re-election at that time made Cesar Maia develop the 
following strategy: to re-elect the government instead of the Mayor (Maia 1997). The 
problem was to choose a candidate from the municipal secretaries. The principal pre-
candidates were the SMH Secretary Magalhães known for the Favela-Bairro programme, 
SMU Secretary Conde known for Rio Cidade programme and Linha Amarela project; and 
the secretary of the treasury Maria Silva Bastos Marques, known as the 'one million dollar 
woman' for her successful work on the municipality's financial recovery25. The competition 
among them was shortened because Magalhães did not want to become a member of any 
political party and Maia's favourite candidate Maria Silva Bastos Marques decided to join 
the private sector. Thus, Luiz Paulo Conde became Maia's candidate, the 'continuation' 
candidate:  
'Right after the beginning we changed the campaign, after listening to a lady in the favela of Mare 
tell Conde, "you will be the continuation." I asked: "Will be what?" - "Continuation". I called 
the people and said, "Stop everything! Conde come here. You will tell him that he will be ..." I 
said, "Did you hear, isn't it? It's not continuity, it is continuation." I had already heard it once 
and heard it again there. We changed from continuity to continuation, we adapted in the light of 
what we heard on the street. Continuation was the right word' (Cesar Maia, in Maia 1997: 89). 
For the 1996 election Conde was fighting against the following major candidates: Sergio 
Cabral (PSDB), Miro Teixera (PDT) and Chico Alencar (PT). The opinion polls in June 
showed Conde with 2% behind Cabral and Alencar with 18%. However, in the following 
months this situation changed sharply. By the end of August and prior to the first round 
Conde led the polls with about 30% followed by Cabral with about 22% (Jornal do Brasil 
1996h). Both passed the first round and disputed against each other the Mayor's office. For 
Cabral this represented a progress as he had disputed the 1992 elections without success. In 
the end, Cabral was defeated in the second round and Conde became the new Rio de 
Janeiro's Mayor.  
                                                 
25 Maria Silvia's nickname came from the fact that when she left the Municipal Treasury Secretariat 
(SMF) the municipality had one million dollars in its coffers. 
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During the electoral campaign the slum upgrading instrument played an important role. On 
the one hand it contributed to the weakening of criticism about the fact that Maia's 
administration prioritized the 'Zona Sul' (one of the wealthiest part of the city) with 
projects such as Rio Cidade programme. On the other, the instrument contributed to gain 
favela dwellers' support. Favela-Bairro programme was being implemented and favela 
dwellers aimed at the further development and completion of works, which meant voting 
in Maia's candidate (Jornal do Brasil 1996i) (Figure 14). Thus, the slum upgrading 
instrument secured most of the votes in the favelas:  
'We won the 96 election by a small difference, but we won in all the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 
except in Mangueira...In spite of all Mangueira leaders being for Conde, we lost there. In the 
elections period, I was sought by favelas' leaders, Serrinha - around there ... In Serrinha they said: 
"Mayor, PT, PDT, ex big party, this and that, we are with Conde." I said: "Feel free. You're 
not thinking I'm a mediocre to the point of interrupting the Favela-Bairro because you are not 
going to vote with me. Vote as you like, I don't have any problem", "no, we are with Conde, it is 
in the interest of our community. We want this and that, we vote and we will win [get it]. "This 
happened in various favelas' ( Cesar Maia, in Maia 1997: 98-99). 
 
 
Figure 14 Conde seeks hills' vote (favelas' vote). First Favela-Bairro [project] inauguration 
in Serrinha marks new phase in the PFL campaign, in opposition to Rio Cidade.  
Source: Jornal do Brasil 1996i 
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Favela-Bairro at the centre of the housing policy 
Right after the elections Conde announced that Favela-Bairro was going to be his priority 
(Jornal do Brasil 1996j). The instrument was further developed by the launch of 'Grandes 
Favelas' and 'Bairrinho' programmes directed at larger and small favelas respectively. 
Grandes Favelas programme emerged with the successful negotiations between the 
municipality and the Federal Government that started back in 1995. By May 1997, Conde 
signed with the CAIXA an agreement of R$17 million for implementing the first Grandes 
Favelas project in Jacarezinho that was expected to start in 1998 (Jornal do Brasil 1997a) 
and other projects through Bairrinho programme emerged with the association of the 
European Union. In 1997 the municipality signed an agreement with an Italian NGO 
funded by the European Union for implementing slum upgrading projects in Vila Canoas 
and Pedra Bonita (Magalhaes & Conde 2004) (Figure 15). In both cases the implementation 
of the Favela-Bairro fostered municipal credibility, permitting the completion of the 
agreements. 
 
In addition, the slum upgrading instrument grew stronger with the creation of the first 
Urban and Social Orientation Office (POUSO) at Parque Royal. Created at the end of 
Maia's administration and instituted by Municipal Decree No.15.259/1996, the POUSO 
sought to create urban regulations in favelas and control their built environment and land 
use. (PCRJ 2008). Other projects and ideas were also developed and linked to the 
instrument like the educational project 'A escola e o Favela-Bairro' (The school and the 
Favela-Bairro) implemented by the Municipal Education Secretariat (SME) (PCRJ 2000); 
the proposal of a cable car in Vidigal (Jornal do Brasil 1997b); and several agreements with 
universities, CBOs NGOs and other organizations (Magalhaes & Conde 2004).  
 
The interest and visibility of the instrument also grew with the visits of different 
organizations and countries' delegations that were coming to Rio de Janeiro to learn more 
about the Favela-Bairro programme (Magalhaes & Conde 2004). The slum upgrading 
started to consolidate as the municipal administration flagship, while the other programmes 
of the municipal housing policy were put in the background. 
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Figure 15 The city arrives to the 'hills' (favelas). With guaranteed money until 2002, the 
municipality promises to implement the Favela-Bairro in 150 communities which would 
benefit 600 thousand people. Source: Jornal do Brasil 1997c 
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*** 
This part described how the further development of the slum upgrading instrument 
entailed the building of more 'alliances' by seeking to 'interest', 'enrol', and 'mobilize' 
through various actions: the creation of the SMH, the implementation of more slum 
upgrading projects, the creation of POUSOs, the signature of the BID loan, the 
participation in housing debates (conference in Istanbul) and the establishment of UN-
HABITAT regional office in the city. The processes of 'interessement', 'enrolment' and 
'mobilization' also involved the creation of publications, organization of seminars about 
Rio's slum upgrading and field visits to Favela-Bairro projects, the set up of partnerships 
with the federal government (CAIXA) and NGOs for expanding the use of the instrument 
to larger and small favelas (Grandes Favelas and Bairrinho programmes), and various 
agreements with other municipal bodies such as the SME. 
 
In particular, this section observed the 'enrolment' and 'mobilization' of architectural 
practices, BID (Favela-Bairro programme), CAXIA (Grandes Favelas programme), Italian 
NGO (Bairrinho programme), legislative branch (for voting the creation of the SMH and 
BID and CAIXA loans), UN-HABITAT, communities (G-16), municipal and regional 
state secretariats and bodies (such as CEDAE IPLANRIO, SMO and SME) and national 
and international academia (UFRJ and HIS). Moreover, it illustrated as Callon (1986) 
observed that 'translation' is a linking process that entails displacement and transformation, 
as it described how the building of alliances transformed the slum upgrading instrument. In 
particular, the association with the BID strongly reshaped the Favela-Bairro programme 
and resulted in the creation of the PROAP-RIO.  
 
Throughout these 'translation' moments, this part illustrated that the slum upgrading 
instrument remained the 'Obligatory Passage Point' of the housing policy, consolidating a 
new constellation of housing policy actors and reshaping existing dynamics. Specifically, it 
showed that the housing policy involved not only the SMDS as in the 1980s, but also the 
newly created SMH, other municipal and state secretariats, departments and structures like 
the POUSO, architectural practices, construction companies, BID, CAIXA, NGOs and 
favelas' resident associations. 
 
In addition, this part noted that the use of the instrument created new knowledge about the 
favelas (favelas' diagnosis and publications), and know-how (slum upgrading programme 
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and projects' operational frameworks, contracts and regulations). Both increased SMH 
managing skills and capacities, and architectural practices and construction companies' 
expertise on implementing projects in favelas. This developed slum upgrading technical 
legitimacy, consolidating a shift as Rio's previous housing experience related more to ad 
hoc solutions and political interest such as the Mutirão programme which at its inception 
emanated from dwellers' association demands and political will (see CHAPTER 4 page 99). 
The development of Rio's slum upgrading in this manner relates to 'De Jure de Facto and 
Best Practices' instrument's typology whose legitimacy, according to Lascoumes & Le 
Galès (2004) includes a mix of scientific/technical and democratic rationalities (see 
CHAPTER 1 page 29).  
 
As the slum upgrading instrument gained strength through the 'enrolment' and 
'mobilization' of more allies, it contributed to the consolidation of the municipal housing 
policy and the increase of the municipal administration power. This was because the 
instrument enhanced municipal administration legitimacy in the city and beyond and it 
contributed to the expansion of its technical and electoral capacities.  
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5.4 HOLDING TOGETHER 
5.4.1 Complicated implementation 
Fragile collaboration and financial instability 
The use of the slum upgrading instrument as constituted during the 1990s required the 
close collaboration of several actors, including diverse municipal bodies. This integration 
contrasted with the previous urbanization of favelas realized by the municipality through 
the Mutirão programme in the 1980s which was entirely performed by the SMDS. 
Nevertheless, since the instauration and during the development of the slum upgrading 
instrument, several issues emerged around the participation of the different municipal 
bodies. Among the most important was the lack of coordination among the municipal 
administration even if Sergio Magalhães was close to Conde and could lobby for the 
prioritization of slum upgrading-related activities.  
 
The expansion and development of the instrument included the association of more actors 
for its financing, implementation and maintenance. However, in spite of the fact that the 
roles were assigned to every actor through contracts, agreements and regulations around 
the instrument, coordination problems started to emerge. By the end of 1996 an 
institutional evaluation conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration 
(IBAM) highlighted the lack of municipal bodies' involvement. The instrument's 
implementation relied on informal relations, leading to an institutional articulation but not 
integration. The report pointed out that the municipal bodies that were more involved in 
the housing policy were the ones that had previously worked in favelas like Geo-Rio, 
SMDS, and COMLURB. However, other municipal bodies such as SMO and the company 
of public lighting of Rio de Janeiro (RioLuz) were not performing their role as it was 
expected. The evaluation argued that these municipal bodies had almost never worked with 
favelas, thus, they did not have the technical expertise. Moreover, they had other priorities 
and did not have the capacity to face the increased workload due to the instrument's 
development (IBAM 1996).  
 
There was also a lack of coordination among the municipal bodies for slum upgrading 
work supervision (DCMRJ 23/06/1998: 6), and maintenance. For instance, the SMH 
established short term contracts after the work was done with the objective that gradually 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
138 
the municipal bodies would take over the maintenance works (DCMRJ 03/12/2001: 34). 
Nevertheless, this was not happening:  
'I do not know if it showed, I do not know the name of this, it is misappropriating public resource, 
but they decided to make a swimming pool on the hill, to do a cycle path in the upper part of the 
hill. But all those works that are therein, the kiosks, the space that they built for the cycle path 
were literally abandoned... So one of the questions we are asking to the City is what is the 
motivation in spending all that money and then leave: broken kiosk, also the cycle path is 
breaking' (Giberto Palmares, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 17). 
There was a change in the SMH management structure with the arrival of three advisors 
because the instrument's implementation demanded new forms of organization due to its 
expansion (interview with Sergio Magalhães). This undermined the decentralized 
organization and matrix management (Freire et al. 2009). Furthermore it complicated 
SMH's internal work as the team stopped having easy and direct access to the Secretary 
(interview with Antonio Augusto Verissimo; Lu Petersen).  
 
Financially, the municipality had economic problems that delayed and slowed down 
instrument' implementation (Maia 1997; Jornal do Brasil 1998a). Even if Conde prioritized 
the slum upgrading instrument, the municipal administration suffered from the tequila and 
Asian crisis that badly hit the Brazilian economy. The municipal debt sharply grew, from 
R$ 2.3 billion in 1996 to R$ 4.1 billion by 2000, compromising municipal investments that 
fell from 67.4% in comparison with Rio's revenue in 1996 to 6.7% in 2000 (Jornal do Brasil 
2000a).  
Water and sanitation problems 
Major slum upgrading implementation issues emerged also around water supply and 
sanitation works. In order to expand the social programmes the SMH tried to find ways of 
saving money. Thus, the SMH planned slum upgrading investments taking into account 
that water and sanitation systems would be completed by the CEDAE (State Water Supply 
and Sewage Company) through the federal programme PROSANEAR. Supported by the 
World Bank, the PROSANEAR was launched in 1992 and aimed to expand water and 
sanitation services in Brazil. The favelas included in the PROSANEAR programme were 
prioritized by the SMH, becoming an important share of the communities included in the 
BID contract. The construction or completion of water supply and sanitation networks 
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were dependent on CEDAE investments that were expected to follow a similar schedule as 
the Municipality's investments in the favelas. However, this did not happen because the 
PROSANEAR was interrupted, destabilizing slum upgrading finances, schedules, and 
social programmes development (DCMRJ 19/05/1997: 04 -17).  
 
The problems of water supply and sanitation were exacerbated by the disarticulation 
between the SMH and CEDAE even if the municipal government appointed three people 
to work closely with the CEDAE (PCRJ 2010b):  
'Why to install water in places which they [the public authorities] don't even know if they will be 
demolished. Like for example, my home, it was condemned by Civil Defence and by the Favela-
Bairro...They never approached us again to give any information. And then comes the 
PROSANEAR and connects [the house] to the water system. To connect water for what purpose, 
if the house is going to be demolished... I mean, the Favela-Bairro is very pretty. The stairs 
[outside] of my house are a beauty, I do not fall over. They are beautiful but my house is falling 
down, my neighbour's house is falling. When it rains my husband most to unblock, in the early 
morning, the ditch so we don't need to run away from the house with my daughter and even take 
care of my next door neighbour...Why to install water and a meter if the house does not offer [good] 
living conditions. I think what they should do to save is to take us away from there. I think they 
are more lost than a chick trying to get out from inside the house' (Rosangela resident at the Borel 
community, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 09). 
In addition to the financial gap due to the interruption of PROSANEAR and the lack of 
coordination between the CEDAE and the Municipality, a problem emerged related to the 
sharing of responsibilities. The BID contract established that the municipality was going to 
construct the water and sewage networks within the favelas. In exchange the CEDAE was 
going to provide water and connect the sewerage to the city. However, the CEDAE did 
not respect the agreement arguing that it was not their responsibility. At the beginning the 
municipality did these works such as in the case of Ladeira dos Funcionarios because it 
wanted to secure the BID loan (DCMRJ 19/05/1997: 9). However, after the loan was 
granted the municipality did not cover the cost of these works because these works were in 
the 'formal city' where CEDAE was responsible for sanitation infrastructure. The rationale 
was that the municipality could not afford to pay twice for this service as it would implicate 
using municipal property taxes (IPTU) to pay for sanitation works and at the same time 
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transfer taxes to the CEDAE for water and sewage infrastructure and services (DCMRJ 
19/05/1997: 04-17). 
 
Other major issues around basic sanitation works related to the poor state of Rio's 
sanitation network and BID loan regulations. The classification criteria used for selecting 
the favelas led to a concentration of slum upgrading projects in Rio de Janeiro planning 
zone 3 (AP3) where the water and sewage networks were already saturated or did not exist. 
The absence of water supply and sewage network in the city complicated the instrument's 
implementation. For example, the SMH decided to link favelas' sewage to the city's 
drainage as was current in the 'formal neighbourhoods'. In addition, the slum upgrading 
regulations established the elaboration of an environmental impact assessment, the 
construction of sewage treatment plants and the formal approval of all the sanitation works 
by CEDAE. These requirements increased the cost of the instrument's implementation and 
fostered works' delays (DCMRJ 19/05/1997: 04 -17).  
Participation and drug trafficking 
In addition, the use of the slum upgrading raise issues about favela dwellers' participation 
and drug trafficking. The aspiration of including civil society participation in the process of 
the materialization of the housing policy was stated at the very beginning not only by the 
Master Plan, but also by Maia's administration guidelines (Municipal Decree No. 
12205/1993). SMH staff acknowledged the importance of the participation of favela 
dwellers in the materialization of the housing policy and, in particular, in the 
implementation of the slum upgrading (interview with Lu Petersen). Nevertheless, the 
design of the slum upgrading at policy and programme level did not involve favela dwellers 
or civil society's direct participation. The absence of civil society participation resulted from 
the fact that their main claim was the urbanization of favelas, which was already addressed 
as slum upgrading was selected as its main instrument. As mentioned before, the municipal 
executive had developed knowledge about favelas and their needs through the SMDS 
during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s (interview with Lu Petersen). Thus, the 
design of the slum upgrading at policy and programme level primarily entailed finding the 
modes for implementing slum upgrading projects and addressing those needs, rather than 
debating or negotiating alternative solutions.  
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Unlike at policy and programme level, the slum upgrading guidelines imposed and 
regulated community participation at project level (Municipal Decree No. 14332/1995). As 
mentioned previously, the slum upgrading project stipulated the moments and modes of 
participation such as general assemblies (see page 125). In many projects community 
participation was successful, generating discussions and negotiations (interview with Lu 
Petersen). However, in many other projects, the participation process did not generate the 
desired outcome. In particular, community participation became an informative rather than 
a negotiation process and little room was left for civil society interference because the slum 
upgrading instrument became highly regulated. Furthermore, even if the community's 
approval was compulsory; in particular at the beginning of each project, the municipality 
retained more capacity for modifying projects because the municipality through the SMH 
and to some extent the architectural practices were key entities in the network that 
constituted the slum upgrading instrument as they were the bearers and guarantors of the 
technical aspects and regulations. This allowed the municipality and the architectural 
practices to control and heavily influence the materialization of the slum upgrading, 
undermining favela dwellers' participation.  
 
In addition, a problem related to the representation and representativeness of residents' 
associations surfaced. The slum upgrading guidelines that were established by the BID 
contract stated that the residents' associations would be the principal channel of 
communication between the municipality and the favela (BID 1995). However, the 
residents' associations did not always represent the favela dwellers:  
'So, for example, there is a community in the area of Leopoldina, a group of black women, when 
they get together, one hundred and fifty, two hundred women discuss every month at the 
neighbourhood community centre. And the residents' association has a president without anything 
to call his own! But it is with him that the municipality discusses, that is, with people who do not 
have any representation... So, in terms of popular participation, it is zero! It is zero, why? Because 
where you have effective popular participation, people advocate, but participation does not occur in 
most communities, it is a minority unfortunately' (Josinaldo Aleixo, researcher, DCMRJ 
14/09/1998: 16). 
Drug trafficking was also a problem, not only because drug trafficking interfered in 
participation, but also because its combat created delays (Figure 16): 
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'The Favela-Bairro has everything to go right, but there are discrepancies that do not let us walk 
forward. In my community, what has trouble as well is the question of the incursion of the 
auxiliary forces, which has no time nor place. When they are in our community works stop, if there 
are deaths there are two days of mourning and this incites violence because violence begets violence. 
So if a cop kills a bandit there are three more to replace him and our community is, in these terms, 
abandoned' (Junior, representative Andarai community association DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 7). 
 
 
Figure 16 Drug trafficking paralyses Favela-Bairro. Source: Jornal do Brasil 1999a 
 
Quality of works, delays and interruptions 
The lack of works' quality was also an issue. This was not only due to the difficulty of 
working in favela areas which led to review projects' costs and thus their quality or the 
inexistence of supervision during the execution of the works, but also because the public 
tender regulations stated that the least expensive bid should be selected. This major 
selection criterion relegated quality to a second plan. The price criterion related to a federal 
law in public tender. Thus, this problem included besides the works in favelas all the works 
commanded by the public sector. Quality was thereby compromised and the works tended 
to be botched as they followed the electoral calendar and the investments allocated to each 
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project tended to be insufficient. Furthermore, contractors tended to subcontract to other 
enterprises, fostering a lack of supervision (DCMRJ 23/06/2008: 02-14). Finally the 
inexperience and financial weakness of some contractors led to the abandonment of works 
(Figure 17), creating major issues during the instrument's implementation:  
 
 
Figure 17 Abandonment threatens Favela-Bairro programme; Secretary blames contractors; 
Hell in Borel. Source Jornal do Brasil 1998b 
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'Now, when they began the Favela-Bairro, they went there and broke everything we had. There is 
a lot of mud, a lot of holes. It is bad to live here, to walk through. When it rains, too much water 
enters our homes. We have to watch our shacks not to fall, our furniture, and children from falling 
into holes. It became worse than it was. We want a solution now from our Secretary. The 
contractor left in November, he said he would come back in January, but he hasn't returned. They 
removed the "trailers", machines, took everything away. We are waiting for a response from him. If 
he cannot continue the Favela-Bairro works, he should return it to how it was: our stairs and our 
paths because we need to go up and down better' (Mariana Adelaide, Encontro hill resident, 
DCMRJ 08/05/1998: 20). 
Relocations 
There were also problems around the relocation processes (DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 06-20). 
One of the major problems relating to relocations was the degradation of living conditions 
due to the relocation process delays and interruptions. These relocations were not included 
in the Favela-Bairro programme financial frame and were funded by the municipality. 
However, because of the bad financial situation of the municipality the relocation processes 
were delayed or interrupted, affecting residents' living conditions as the residents whose 
houses were indicated to be demolished were asked not to invest in them anymore:  
'We want to do anything to prevent an infiltration as in my house, but it turns out we have to stay 
in the water until resolved. And for about a year and a bit, they told us, do not do anything 
because we'll get here tomorrow. So we didn't do, and so far they haven't come here. I do not know 
what to do, I just know that if it rains my house is under water and I stay floating like the 
Niteroi ferry [this ferry links Rio de Janeiro to the city of Niteroi located on the other side of the 
Guanabara bay]. Somebody has to do something for us and we, of course, we thank in advance' 
(Ana Rosa, Borel hill resident, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 09). 
5.4.2 Undermining critics and opposition  
Dismantling criticisms and generation adhesion  
The mentioned implementation problems contributed to the emergence of controversies 
and debates about the slum upgrading instrument (DCMRJ 08/05/1998: 19-21; DCMRJ 
23/06/1998 P02- 14; DCMRJ 14/09/1998 P06-11; DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 12-20). These 
controversies and debates not only focused on specific implementation issues but also on 
the instrument's nature, municipal housing policy scope and municipal executive actions, 
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leading to the development of an opposition against the Favela-Bairro programme. 
However, the expansion of this opposition was limited for the slum upgrading was 
supported by a number of elements and dynamics that strengthened it.  
 
Despite the problems around its implementation, the slum upgrading was still supported as 
it consolidated consensus on the need of improving the lives of favela dwellers: 
'I say again, what we all want is that the Favela-Bairro prosper. These problems do not frighten 
us because, of course, in steep areas, in difficult areas of the city, any urban intervention is more 
complex, is more difficult, but even so it has to be done, because after all they are human beings, all 
have a right to a place in the sun' ( Otavio Leite, Municipal councillor, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 
11). 
In particular, the instrument was still supported by favela dwellers. Even if in some cases 
living conditions worsened, in some other the instrument's implementation produced 
satisfaction among the residents such as in Parque Royal (see Figure 18) and Fernão 
Cardim:  
'What we obtained: we were lucky, our works are finished and became a neighbourhood. It does 
not seem anymore like a favela. I hope you will have the same luck' (Amaro, representative of 
Fernão Cardim community association DCMRJ 28/11/1997: 10). 
 
Figure 18 Parque Royal favela before and after the Favela-Bairro project. This intervention 
mainly improved favela's road system, public spaces and its relation with the Guanabara 
Bay. Source: PCRJ 2003 
 
Thus, the favela dwellers were still interested in the instrument's implementation as it could 
bring them benefits and they were still ready to do anything in order to be selected: 
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'We want, we need this programme, the Favela-Bairro. We need it in our communities. Then go, 
make the design, do everything, we are eager. We want it, we really want it. It's not a joke how 
much we have gone through, how much we have.. I don't know... participated in events, things' 
(Maria da Luz, Urubu favela resident, DCMRJ 08/05/1998: 20). 
This interest on the instrument reinforced the adhesion to the municipal executive:  
'And just wanted to make a comment, because favela dwellers, favelados' adhesion, seems to me 
that the adhesion to the [Favela-Bairro] programme occurs precisely because of the work that is 
done in your community and it brings some benefits, there is no doubt. This is an adhesion, the 
favelados defend, must defend and some other people also must defend this programme because of 
this. It is an adhesion to the Municipal Government by the community because the government is 
bringing progress to a place where any a work was performed ever. Suddenly the Municipality 
appears there doing something, and that certainly wins favelados' trust' (Silverio, leader of the 
Regional Council of Engineering and Agronomy - CREA, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 18). 
Calling into question the nature of the opposition 
The use of the slum upgrading not only limited favela dwellers' direct opposition to the 
municipal executive and fostered their adhesion to it, but also destabilized an emerging 
opposition because it was complicated to oppose investments directed at the poor:  
'And then to end, the question about whether or not we support [the Favela-Bairro], that's a big 
problem because the project is positive, we are investing in the favela, we are making an investment 
for the poor, thus we cannot really make that discussion, it's too complicated' (Jorge, architect, 
DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 20). 
The slum upgrading also destabilized the opposition because of its expansion and growing 
financial significance not only through the Favela-Bairro but also Grandes Favelas and 
Bairrinho programmes:  
'We don't have the habit and sometimes we are not even competent to do so. And we are putting 
ourselves on the defensive. This is how I feel when we talk about the Favela-Bairro, without 
knowing where we stand with respect to this great project .... We cannot say that the Favela-Bairro 
is not a housing policy... CAIXA is investing heavily in Rio de Janeiro. Cleber and I went there 
on Wednesday. They have a lot of projects to finance, Jacarezinho urbanization [Grandes Favelas 
project], the Bairrinho programme. They have a lot of things. They are putting money in here. 
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Then, it's complicated to confront this project' (Adauto Cardoso, researcher Federal University of 
Rio de Janeiro, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 14, 19). 
Furthermore, the slum upgrading destabilized the social movement that had consolidated 
through the fight against evictions that occurred during the 20th century and, in particular, 
during the military dictatorship (see CHAPTER 4 page 94), The slum upgrading 
destabilized this movement because it fulfilled the demand about favelas' urbanization 
rather than their eviction and it gained the support of several actors that used to be part of 
that movement. This forced the members to re-evaluate the nature of the movement since 
the instrument wiped out its raison d'être and diminished its supporters: 
'We cannot deny, It is true. How are you going to hit the Favela-Bairro when the perspective of the 
movement struggle was about evictions? When the historic fight was about evictions?. Now the guys 
come, urbanize, improve accesses. And now? I think it's complicated, I think we have to move 
forward. It [the social movement]has to move forward. And it has to move forward so as to build a 
City Project. Perhaps it is the most difficult place because here the Conservative government is 
much more efficient. And here we have complicated problems to carry out this discussion. Here our 
disarticulation is huge because the conservative project was co-opting groups of traditionally 
professional critics, including us architects, who were largely co-opted if not at least seduced' 
(Adauto Cardoso, researcher at the Rio de Janeiro Federal University, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 
19). 
Calling into question the nature and purpose of the group formed around the evictions was 
not limited to Rio de Janeiro as across Brazil several municipalities introduced and used 
slum upgrading as their housing policy instrument. 
'We gathered three hundred and more people here together with various representatives of this 
Municipal Chamber and one of the proposals advocated was this: the integrated urbanization of 
favelas. So we cannot hammer on this proposal which to be challenged today, we must have much 
more data, a political framework and information, and therefore we need to have - what Adauto 
spoke - another proposal. I followed, I came close to Nabil[Bonduki who had been a prominent 
figure in the debate about housing and favelas], a companion responsible for the urbanization of 
favelas in São Paulo, which was a programme based on the Pavão, Pavãozinho e Cantagalo and 
in turn the São Paulo programme gave the basis for the one in Rio de Janeiro. And he said, 
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"Kelson, but that was what we were defending." And there is no more' (Kelson, member of the 
Federal Union of Architects, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 18). 
Thus, the use of the slum upgrading called into question previous associations and ideas 
and ultimately the role and nature of the groups fighting for urbanizing favelas. 
5.4.3 Approaching the new millennium: expanding the alliances 
During the second half of Conde's administration not only were the criticisms and the 
emergence of an opposition group against the instrument contained but also the interest 
around the instrument continued to increase. For instance, during this period the Favela-
Bairro became a major demand formulated by the favelas' dwellers due to factors such as 
the creation of new dynamics in the favelas:  
'The communities who were out of the programme wanted to be included due to the success of the 
interventions; a growing number of activities and partnerships in communities have emerged after 
the implementation of the programme. So, this was undoubtedly the greatest demand that we had 
in relation to the community' (Andrea Cardoso, adviser Favela-Bairro pogramme, DCMRJ 
03/12/2001: 36). 
The instrument became central to other interventions carried out by the municipal 
administration:  
'The example I gave, the secretariat of work that has already begun like this: "Where am I going 
to act? Within the Favela-Bairro of course, we'll converge, we'll focus, we'll maximize the 
interventions'' (Fernando Cavallieri, advisor to the municipal administration, Freire & Oliveira 
2008: 255). 
The instrument also consolidated as the unifying element of initiatives conducted by other 
actors and organizations. For instance the regional state of Rio de Janeiro was associated 
with the instruments as in the case of Dona Marta favela upgrading (Jornal do Brasil 
1999b); the Catholic Church participated in the Campinho project by donating land for 
constructing sport facilities (Jornal do Brasil 1999c); football player Ronaldinho financially 
supported social and sportive projects linked to the instrument's implementation (Jornal do 
Brasil 1999d; Jornal do Brasil 1998c); and Felipe Fontes, a business man, was interested in 
constructing cinemas in the favelas included in the Favela-Bairro programme (Jornal do 
Brasil 1998d).  
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These new associations expanded and consolidated the slum upgrading beyond Rio de 
Janeiro. The instrument internationally aroused interest and gained the support and 
recognition of various organizations. For instance, besides the visit of several delegations 
from around the world (Magalhaes & Conde 2004), the use of the instrument was 
supported and encouraged by the BID (Jornal do Brasil 1998e; Jornal do Brasil 1999e). 
Moreover, the Favela-Bairro programme was selected for the 2000 world fair in Hanover; 
and its architectural design was recognized: the architectural practice led by Jorge Mario 
Jáuregui was awarded a Harvard urban design prize for its interventions within the Favela-
Bairro programme such as Favela-Bairro project in Vidigal favela (see Figure 19). 
 
 
Figure 19 Favela-Bairro project in Vidigal favela. The construction of the sport facilities 
initiated in April 1998. Source: Jorge Mario Jáuregui 
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The instrument's capacity to gather together actions and people increased with the 
materialization of two other major financial agreements besides the BID and CAIXA loans 
that enabled the SMH budget to be tripled and maintained (see Figure 20), and aroused 
even more interest in the instrument than before. The first financial agreement for R$ 16 
million was signed with the European Union for the instrument's implementation in small 
favelas through the Bairrinho pogramme (Jornal do Brasil 1999f). The second one was the 
approval of a second BID loan for R$ 520 million that was negotiated from 1998 (Jornal 
do Brasil 1999g). The major difference between the first and this second contract was the 
investment in social programmes. This adaptation resulted from the instrument's 
implementation and included the development of employment creation and income 
generation programmes and social projects directed at children and youth (Jornal do Brasil 
1999g). 
 
 
Figure 20 SMH budget from 1995 to 2000. From R$ 18 million in 1995 the SMH budget 
increased to an average of R$ 140.6 million during Conde's administration (1997-2000) 
Source: CGMRJ n.d. Elaborated by the author. 
 
In addition, the various associations generated by the use of the instrument contributed to 
the consolidation of different actors' capacity and expertise. For example, through the 
association with the BID the SMH was expanded and consolidated as Secretariat with the 
creation of a managerial professional structure and systematic procedures (Freire et al. 
2009).  
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*** 
This part described how the use of slum upgrading entailed and generated several 
problems. In particular, it illustrated the issues related to fragile collaboration among actors, 
financial instability, water and sanitation problems, lack of participation, drug trafficking, 
bad quality of works, delays, interruptions and relocations. All these problems contributed 
to call into question the slum upgrading instrument, the municipal housing policy and the 
municipal government actions. This process relates to the development of a 'controversy' 
conceptualized, as mentioned in CHAPTER 3 (see page 60), as 'all the manifestations by which 
the representativity of the spokesman is questioned, discussed, negotiated, rejected, etc.' (Callon 1986: 15). 
Nevertheless, this part described that the 'controversy' did not result in the rejection of the 
slum upgrading instrument or housing policy as they continued to be supported by their 
network of 'allies', undermining 'dissidence'. This shows how 'the enrolment is transformed into 
active support' (ibid). Moreover, it noted that the slum upgrading instrument called into 
question the nature of the group that campaigned for the urbanization of favelas as it 
wiped out their raison d'être. This illustrates that identities are constantly negotiated during 
'translation', 'not only does the state of beliefs fluctuate with a controversy but the identity and 
characteristics of the implicated actors change as well'(ibid: 16).  
 
This part also described that at the end of the 1990s despite the 'controversy' slum 
upgrading remained Rio's housing policy 'Obligatory Passage Point' (OPP) as it continued 
to be indispensable. Moreover, it illustrated that the instrument and its 'allies' were 
performing as a unified entity, fostering housing policy and SMH visibility and legitimacy 
within the municipality and beyond. This relates to the consolidation of a 'mobilization' 
moment that involves 'forming alliances and acting as a unit of force' (Callon 1986: 14). This 
section ended by pointing out that new alliances were sealed with the CAIXA and the 
European Union and other were in negotiations (second BID loan), contributing to the 
strength of the slum upgrading instrument and enhancing SMH, architectural practices and 
construction companies' expertise for intervening in small and larger favelas and 
developing social projects and employment creation and income generation programmes.  
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigated the choice and use of slum upgrading as the municipal housing 
policy instrument during the 1990s by deploying the network of 'associations' that were 
constituted. The first part described how the emergence of the instrument and housing 
policy involved a 'problematization' moment during which heterogeneous entities were 
'associated': the Mutirão experience, Rio's Master Plan, people and municipal departments 
mainly through the GEAP, and ideas and recommendations such as the ones formulated 
during the debate at the Municipal Chamber. This 'problematization' moment resulted in 
the definition of the municipal housing policy basis that entailed the establishment of the 
slum upgrading instrument as the 'Obligatory Passage Point' (OPP), i.e. an 'actant' 
indispensable for the constitution of the housing policy.  
 
The first part also highlighted that the development of the slum upgrading and housing 
policy entailed the 'building of alliances' with municipal departments, IAB-RJ, architectural 
practices, favelas' residents and the BID through devices such as the classification matrix, 
architectural competition, agreements and contracts, and strategic steps that included the 
launch of the Favela-Bairro programme, building on the SMDS staff expertise and 
implementation of first slum upgrading projects which allowed the development of Rio's 
housing policy without external aid. Throughout the 'interessement' and 'enrolment' 
moments the slum upgrading instrument and Rio's housing policy developed a legitimacy 
based on a scientific/technical rationality which entailed rational methods and not political 
designation and unplanned works.  
 
The second part explored the further development of the slum upgrading and housing 
policy, showing that it entailed the creation of more 'alliances' through various actions and 
in particular, the creation of the SMH, the implementation of more slum upgrading 
projects, and the signature of the BID loan. The building of more 'associations' also 
involved the creation of publications, organization of seminars and field visits, and the set 
up of new partnerships for expanding the use of the instrument. Specifically, this part 
observed the 'enrolment' and 'mobilization' of architectural practices, BID (Favela-Bairro 
programme), CAXIA (Grandes Favelas programme), Italian NGO (Bairrinho programme), 
legislative branch (for voting the creation of the SMH and BID and CAIXA loans), UN-
HABITAT, communities (G-16), municipal and regional state secretariats and bodies (such 
as CEDAE IPLANRIO, SMO and SME) and national and international academia (UFRJ 
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and HIS). This section illustrated how the building of these alliances transformed the slum 
upgrading instrument and resulted in the creation of the PROAP-RIO. Moreover, it 
confirmed that the slum upgrading instrument remained the 'Obligatory Passage Point', and 
expanded the number of actors involved in housing policy: the newly created SMH, other 
municipal and regional state secretariats, departments and bodies, architectural practices, 
construction companies, BID, CAIXA, NGOs and favelas' resident associations. 
 
In addition, the second part noted that the use of the instrument created new knowledge 
about the favelas through slum upgrading diagnosis and publications, and know-how 
through slum upgrading programme and projects' contracts, regulations and operational 
frameworks. This enhanced primarily SMH managing skills and architectural practices and 
construction companies expertise on implementing projects in favelas. Furthermore, the 
development of this know-how and knowledge developed slum upgrading technical 
legitimacy, consolidating a shift as Rio's previous housing experience which related more to 
ad hoc solutions and political interests. It observed that the constitution of Rio's slum 
upgrading instrument related to 'De Jure de Facto and Best Practices' instrument's typology 
whose legitimacy includes a mix of scientific/technical and democratic rationalities (see 
CHAPTER 1 page 29). As the slum upgrading instrument gained strength through the 
'interessement', 'enrolment' and 'mobilization' of more allies, it contributed to the 
consolidation of the municipal housing policy and increased the municipal administration 
power as the instrument enhanced its legitimacy in the city and beyond and helped to 
expand its technical and electoral capacities.  
 
The third part of this chapter observed that the development of the instrument carried with 
it several problems such as water and sanitation issues, lack of collaboration and 
community participation, and delays. These problems fuelled a 'controversy' about the 
instrument and Rio's housing policy; however, it also noted that the 'controversy' did not 
caused their rejection. The instrument and the municipal housing policy continued to be 
supported by their network of 'associations', limiting 'dissidence'. Moreover, this part 
illustrated how identities are always fluctuating during 'translation' as it described how the 
'controversy' about the instrument destabilized the group that campaigned for the 
urbanization of favelas by undermining its raison d'être.  
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This section also observed that despite the 'controversy', the instrument continued to be 
Rio's housing policy 'Obligatory Passage Point' (OPP), and its network of alliances were 
performing as a unified entity, consolidating 'mobilization'. More 'associations' were 
achieved (CAIXA and the European Union) while others were in negotiations (second 
BID loan). This contributed to strength the slum upgrading instrument and increase the 
know-how of the SMH, architectural practices and construction companies for upgrading 
small and larger favelas and implementing social and income generation programmes  
 
Based on this, the chapter supports hypothesis 1 that argues that the choice use of the slum 
upgrading influenced the development of Rio's housing policy. It illustrated that the 
instrument was constituted as the corner stone of Rio's housing policy and as such it 
supported and fostered the development of the municipal housing policy and this despite 
generating several issues that produce a 'controversy' about it use. The chapter noted that 
the use of the slum upgrading instrument influenced the shaping of the municipal housing 
policy by building alliances with a wide range of entities through a vast range of actions.  
 
The chapter also supports hypothesis 2 that argues that the slum upgrading contributed to 
modify Rio's housing governance. The use of the instrument modified the housing policy 
constellation of actors to include the SMH, other municipal and regional state bodies (in 
particular IPLANRIO, CEDAE, Geo-Rio, SMO), architectural practices, construction 
companies, BID, CAIXA, European Union, residents' associations and other 
actors/groups/institutions such as Footballer Ronaldinho and the Catholic Church that 
participated in ad hoc basis. However, the chapter shows that despite the inclusion of new 
actors the slum upgrading contributed to secure and even foster municipal executive 
power. It described that despite the diversification of actors involved, the choice and use of 
the slum upgrading instrument enhanced municipal executive power within the housing 
sector as it put it at the centre of the housing policy and developed its knowledge and 
know-how. Moreover, through the constitution of the slum upgrading instrument, the 
municipal government gained legitimacy and credibility and could neutralize or limit 
criticism and opposition over Rio's housing policy, other municipal administration 
initiatives and the 1996 elections. 
 
Finally, the chapter substantiates hypothesis 3 that argue that the slum upgrading supported 
Rio's housing policy depoliticization. This chapter described how the use of slum 
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upgrading instrument developed different actors' expertise such as BID, architectural 
practices, construction companies and consolidated the skills of the SMH and other 
municipal bodies such as IPLANRIO. The chapter also stressed that the development the 
various regulation, procedures and standards (the classification matrix, public tenders, 
contracts, SMH's functioning, programme's management, projects' elaboration and 
implementation regulations) weakened political regulation and contributed to the 
development of technical legitimacy of the instrument and Rio's housing policy.  
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CHAPTER 6 ABANDONING THE SLUM UPGRADING 
 
 
 
 
 
'Dissidence plays a different role since it brings into question some of the gains of the previous 
stages. The displacements and the spokesmen are challenged or refused. The actors implicated do 
not acknowledge their roles in this story nor the slow drift in which they had participated, in their 
opinion, wholeheartedly. As the aphorism says, traduttore-traditore, from translation to treason 
there is only a short step' (Callon 1986: 19). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the use of slum upgrading during most of the first decade of the 
2000s, aiming to reveal the role of the instrument for housing policy and governance 
transformation.  
 
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores the politico-administrative 
change at the beginning of the first decade of the 2000s and its effects on the instrument’s 
implementation. The second part examines the use of the slum upgrading during Maia's 
second administration. The third investigates the use of the slum upgrading during Maia's 
third administration. 
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6.2 THE BEGINNING OF THE SLUM UPGRADING DECLINE 
6.2.1 The dislocation of the slum upgrading political support 
The rivalry between Maia and Conde  
Since Cesar Maia left the municipal administration at the end of 1996, he started preparing 
his candidacy for the State Government elections of 1998. During this period Maia 
remained close to the Mayor Paulo Conde and the municipal administration. As both men 
were close allies, Maia's candidacy was supported by the municipal administration 
initiatives, including the Favela-Bairro programme (Jornal do Brasil 1998c; Jornal do Brasil 
1998f; Jornal do Brasil 1998g; Jornal do Brasil 1998h; Jornal do Brasil 1998i). Nevertheless, 
Maia lost the elections and Antony Garotinho became the Governor of the state of Rio de 
Janeiro (1999-2002). After Maia's defeat he intended to return to the head of the 
municipality of Rio de Janeiro and decided to run for the Mayor's position in the 2000 
elections. However, Conde did not step down and decided to run for his own re-election. 
At the end of 1998 the Liberal Front Party (PFL) endorsed Conde instead of Maia as the 
official candidate. Maia did not renounce the elections; he broke up his relationship with 
Conde, creating a split within the PFL. The PFL municipal councillors Paulo Cerri, Ruy 
Cesar, Alexander Cerruti Indio da Costa and Eduardo Paes supported Maia instead of 
Conde who was the official PFL candidate (Marques 2007). The break up between Maia 
and Conde dislocated the slum upgrading instrument political support. Maia's allies started 
questioning the use of the instrument during Conde's administration:  
'The courage of a political suicide is natural for a government that ends its last year without having 
done anything of what was promised. Of the twenty something Rio Cidade projects, we have here 
three halfway. Of the Favela-Bairro projects the government said it would do, none was done 
despite what the municipality says and publicizes, the Favela-Bairro projects that are shown, are 
the ones built during Cesar Maia's administration' (Indio Da Costa, municipal councillor, 
DCMRJ 01/12/1999: 21). 
At the end of 1999 Conde's administration sent to the Municipal Chamber bill 
No.238/1999 to obtain the agreement for signing a second BID loan. The rivalry between 
Maia and Conde was put aside as this loan would benefit the next Mayor. The bill was 
unanimously approved (DCMRJ 16/12/1999: 46). Nevertheless, the truce did not last long. 
Once the Federal Senate and the BID gave the final go-ahead to the municipality for 
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contracting the loan in March 2000, a controversy emerged about whether Conde should 
go or not to the USA to sign the contract. The opposition argued that the trip would 
become an electoral event that would illegally benefit Conde's candidacy. Despite this 
controversy, Conde went to New Orleans to sign the BID contract. Furthermore, he was 
accompanied by Tito, the president of the Federation of Favelas of the state of Rio de 
Janeiro (FAFERJ). His attendance not only reinforced the idea that slum upgrading was 
supported by the favela dwellers, but also indicated that the FAFERJ was close to Conde at 
the eve of the municipal elections.  
 
Right after Conde's trip, the opposition became stronger, using slum upgrading as the 
means (DCMRJ 03/03/2000: 88-89). Maia's allies started to question the development of 
the Favela-Bairro and the Rio Cidade, the other municipality's flagship, arguing about their 
use for political interests and a change in the slum upgrading objectives. According to them 
the objective of providing basic infrastructure was outshone by a focus on aesthetics and 
the objective of integration was replaced by the objective of a simple urbanization of 
favelas (DCMRJ 30/03/2000: 89). By contrast, Conde's allies praised the investments in 
the favelas through the instrument and the transformation of favelas into neighbourhoods. 
They started attributing the instrument's fatherhood to Conde as they stressed that the 
emergence of the slum upgrading was initiated and supported by Conde when he was at 
the head of SMU from 1993 to 1996 (DCMRJ 31/03/2000: 21). 
 
In the following months, the use of slum upgrading for the electoral campaign was 
intensified. Conde's re-election campaign strategy involved as in 1996 the capitalization of 
the housing policy for gaining voters' support. Conde wandered across the city supervising 
and launching Favela-Bairro projects together with municipal councillors, seeking their 
support by sharing Favela-Bairro's electoral capital (DCMRJ 17/05/2000: 12). Cesar Maia 
did not stand there with his arms crossed. He and his allies used the slum upgrading against 
Conde by denouncing Favela-Bairro multiple design and implementation problems. For 
instance, regarding Favela-Bairro in Borel, Maia's allies criticized the scale of the project 
(too small), the design of public spaces (soccer field too small to be used), the lack of 
public services (lack of garbage collection) and the delays of works (about a year) (ibid: 13). 
Furthermore, they continued to associate the slum upgrading to Maia's administration and 
denounced the change in the slum upgrading objective. As mentioned before, Maia's allies 
highlighted that the Favela-Bairro had moved away from its initial aim of integrating the 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
159 
favelas into the city towards a mere urbanization programme (ibid). For them, the use of 
projects such as Femão Cardim and Ladeira dos Funcionários, both implemented during 
Maia's administration for publicizing municipal housing policy prominently illustrated that 
projects during Conde's administration did not reach the same quality.  
Slum upgrading and the campaign  
By May 2000 together with Conde and Maia supported by the PFL and the Brazilian 
Labour Party (PTB) respectively, also running for Mayor were Sergio Cabral from the 
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and Benedita da Silva from the Workers' 
Party (PT). One month later, prior to the beginning of the official electoral campaign, 
Cabral decided to support Conde in exchange for his support for the 2002 candidacy for 
the Senate. In addition, Conde chose as running mate Sergio Magalhães who did not have 
any political experience and was not affiliated to the PFL. Conde was able to do so as the 
PFL believed in his possibilities for being re-elected (Jornal do Brasil 2000b). The direct 
involvement of the SMH Secretary consolidated the central role of the slum upgrading 
instrument in the campaign (Figure 21).  
 
 
Figure 21 Elections 2000. Luis Paulo Conde, State deputy Sergio Cabral and Sergio 
Magalhaes, wearing Favela-Bairro baseball caps. Source: Jornal do Brasil 2000c 
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At the SMH most of the staff closed ranks in favour of the Conde-Magalhães ticket. 
Nevertheless, some dissidence emerged. In particular, the Favela-Bairro programme 
manager, Lu Petersen, did not support the Conde-Magalhães ticket because she did not 
agree with the way the slum upgrading was lately being implemented. She agreed with the 
opposition criticisms that the Favela-Bairro was becoming a mere urbanization and 
architecture programme (interview Lu Petersen). Furthermore, she also disagreed with the 
way the SMH was being managed by Sergio Magalhães (Freire et al. 2009). Thus, Petersen 
stepped down from her position and announced her candidacy to the municipal chamber 
under Maia's party, fighting for the 25% of votes that Rio's favelas represented (Jornal do 
Brasil 2000d).  
 
During the official campaign started in July 2000, the Favela-Bairro was used as an electoral 
asset by both candidates (Jornal do Brasil 2000e; Jornal do Brasil 2000f; Jornal do Brasil 
2000g; Jornal do Brasil 2000h; Jornal do Brasil 2000d). In addition, a World Bank report 
argued that although the Favela-Bairro was urbanizing it was not alleviating poverty (Jornal 
do Brasil 2000i). The report also criticized the slum upgrading instrument for favouring 
aesthetics' aspects. Thus, overexposed by the electoral fight between Maia and Conde and 
the growing criticisms, the instrument was weakened and torn apart.  
  
Conde was favourite during the entire campaign that ran from July to September, while 
Maia and Benedita da Silva from the PT were fighting for the second place. Maia was 
supported by national political figures, different parties and the Universal Church (Marques 
2007: 104-105). For the first round Conde obtained 34.6% of votes followed by Maia with 
23% (TSE n.d.). For second round Maia obtained the support of the evangelic religion 
groups that previously supported PT's candidate, defeating Conde (Marques 2007).  
From technocrats to politicians  
In his second mandate as Mayor of Rio de Janeiro Maia primarily sought to create alliances 
with other parties and consolidate his political group that had been in formation since 1993 
(Marques 2007). To his political party allies, Maia gave different positions within the 
municipal administration, and the control of several municipal secretariats: health, labour, 
economic development, social development, culture, transport, and urban planning. To 
develop his group, Maia placed, as in 1993, the newcomers to the political scene in the sub-
prefectures. However, for running the municipal secretariats, instead of technocrats this 
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time Maia chose people with more consolidated and active electoral careers (Marques 2007: 
107-108). In particular, the state deputy Eider Dantas was designated to run the Public 
Works Secretariat (SMO), and federal deputy Eduardo Paes was appointed at the head of 
the Sport and Environment Secretariat (SMAS).  
 
The choice of the municipal housing Secretary followed Maia's new political interests and 
objectives. He appointed Solange Amaral who unlike Sergio Magalhães had a political 
career; she was state Secretary for Social Action at the end of Moreia Franco's 
administration, head of the sub-prefecture of the 'Zona Sul/Tijuca' during Maia's first 
administration and state deputy since 1994 for the Green Party (PV), and was re-elected in 
1998 for the PFL party. The arrival of Amaral at the head of the SMH was not the only 
change at the SMH after Maia's victory. As mentioned earlier, during the campaign most of 
the SMH staff supported Conde's candidacy. After the election several of them left the 
municipal administration or transferred to other municipal bodies. New staff coming 
primarily from the SMO arrived at the SMH. Among them, Jozé Candido Sampaio was 
appointed as manager of the SMH Projects' Office and Bruno Sebastião as manager of the 
SMH Works' Office. 
6.2.2 Slum upgrading losing credibility  
Essential vs. unnecessary  
The use of the slum upgrading in the first year of Maia's administration was marked by 
serious delays and interruptions. This led the slum upgrading to receive another blow. 
Sergio Magalhães denounced these slum upgrading implementation problems, arguing a 
shift of the instrument's objective (O Globo 2001a). This allegation fuelled a controversy 
about the slum upgrading instrument. In response Solange Amaral denounced that the 
implementation problems such as the ones related to water and sanitation infrastructure 
and the bad quality of works were a heritage of the previous administration (DCMRJ 
16/10/2001: 3-11). Furthermore, building on the aesthetic drift criticism, she opposed 
essential infrastructure works to unnecessary architectural design:  
'What we stand for are the essential works, quality, and not works as occur in Borel, in Dique, in 
Sapé, made by the professors [Conde and Magalhães], but actually we are having to run, 
maintain, put other teams in order to secure the infrastructure constructed in these communities. I 
totally agree with what your Excellency said and that's the nature of our concern. The population 
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must have water, sewage, sewage treatment plant functioning, hillsides stabilization, social work, 
concern with youth welfare, commitment to income generation programmes. The rest are dazzling 
aesthetic concerns, with which we have no familiarity. Our familiarity is mainly with the service of 
population needs...What the Favela-Bairro needs to do is to resume its concern with the essentials, 
with the whole, with the quality; it needs to correct its aesthetic or dazzling deviations, its 
excesses... So, the Favela-Bairro continues and coherently follows its origins, seeking to correct these 
excesses...' (Solange Amaral, Housing Secretary, DCMRJ 16/10/2001: 11). 
Nevertheless, Amaral and the new SMH staff had little room for introducing substantial 
changes into the slum upgrading (DCMRJ 27/12/2001: 9-11). The bulk of funds were tied 
with the second BID loan. This loan contract included not only the standards to be met by 
the programme and the items projects should embrace, but also an implementation 
methodology (BID 2000). The little capacity that the new administration had for changing 
existed because at the beginning of Maia's second administration the instrument was 
financially more diversified than at its inception. It relied on matching funds between the 
municipality and Federal Government through the Pro-Moradia programme in larger 
favelas: Rio das Pedras and Fazenda Coqueiro do Jacarezinho; and between the 
municipality and other institutions such as the European Union in the case of the Bairrinho 
programme for smaller favelas. Despite the little capacity to introduce substantial changes 
the controversy weakened even more the instrument. 
Growing slum upgrading discredit 
Magalhães' allegation served as the basis of a municipal Parliamentary Commission of 
Inquiry (CPI) named CPI of the Favela-Bairro (DCMRJ 16/10/2001: 2). The CPI of the 
Favela-Bairro revealed some practices of clientelism around the slum upgrading. Some 
projects in favelas that supported the Conde-Magalhães ticket were interrupted, delayed, or 
denied, and favela dwellers that supported Conde had difficulty in relating to other 
municipal secretariats: 
'Uniquely some people supported Luiz Paulo Conde for the simple fact that the government that 
preceded which was Cesar Maia's... He [Maia] called the G-16 group [see CHAPTER 5 page 
130] and told the G-16: that Conde was Cesar and Cesar was Conde, for folks support and like 
Conde. And something very amazing and fantastic happened and it is a statement that I make 
with emotion because I learned to like and respect him ... And we ended up liking him. But who 
told us to like him was Cesar Maia ... Because it was the Mayor who taught us to like Luiz 
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Paulo Conde. Not that we choose this option or did something because it happened ... So I would 
like this to be recorded and for the party's municipal councillor, if he could speak with Solange 
Amaral [SMH], could speak with the Secretary Eider Dantas [SMO], with the Secretary of 
Sports and Leisure [Eduardo Paes], because our communities are ignored completely' (Hercules 
Ferreira Mendes, president NGO G-16, DCMRJ 22/10/2001: 12). 
In addition, in some cases in order to beneficiate from the slum upgrading, favela dwellers 
needed the support of politicians related to Maia's political group:  
'-Just started having information about the project after a colleague, a community leader, told me: 
"Why do you not call the office of the politician X? You might have success". I called, an adviser 
answered me and asked me what I wanted, I said I want help. I have a project, I explained, a 
Favela-Bairro Project... 
- Could you say who is this politician? 
-Yes: Rodrigo Maia.[Cesar Maia's son] When I called to his office, the adviser said, "Give me 
some time, call me back next week." Then, the following week, I called again. 
-The name of the adviser is?  
-Washington. I called him and he said ... It seems that was him that called me. Yes, he called me 
and said, "Call the Housing Secretariat" I said, will I be served? Because I am not usually served 
in the Housing Secretariat. It was then that I called and was very well attended in the Housing 
Secretariat, by phone. And since then, I started to be better served in the Housing Secretariat, 
including also the Sub-prefecture of Campo Grande' (Dialogue between Municipal councillor 
Rodrigo Bethlem and Valnice de Castro Coutinho, president of Jardim Moriçaba residents' 
association, DCMRJ 22/10/2001: 15). 
By being the mediators between favela dwellers and the municipal administration, these 
politicians sought to consolidate dwellers allegiance and support for the next elections 
(DCMRJ 22/10/2001: 10-18, DCMRJ 27/12/2001: 12). These practices contributed to the 
emergence of the instrument's discredit.  
 
Nevertheless, these practices were limited mainly because the implementation of the slum 
upgrading was financially and technically constrained by the association with the BID. 
Specifically, the contract established the list of favelas to benefit from the programme and 
the bulk of projects developed by the SMH related to the BID. Furthermore, most of the 
SMH budget was tied to the BID contract. Thus, even if the SMH had some capacity to 
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delay, or interrupt a project, it did not have the capacity to include or exclude any project 
unless it was outside the BID contract.  
Inexperience  
The politico-administrative change weakened the instrument because it destabilized the 
SMH capacity building. The SMH knowledge and know-how was consolidated over more 
than ten years because many SMH staff worked for the SMDS in the 1980s designing and 
implementing the Mutirão programme, and then joined the SMH during the 1990s, 
developing the slum upgrading instrument. In addition, SMH managers emerged within 
this group of people, enabling team cohesion and consolidation of expertise (DCMRJ 
03/12/2001: 39). The politico-administrative change compromised these dynamics even if 
not everybody in the SMH left and several actors remained involved such as architectural 
practices and construction companies that had gained expertise (DCMRJ 03/12/2001: 39). 
 
Furthermore, the politico-administrative change compromised the use of the slum 
upgrading. Although the instrument was highly regulated and new SMH staff were familiar 
with the municipal administration, their inexperience about specific SMH administrative 
processes generated mistakes in the public tender publication and contracts, resulting in 
programme and project delays (DCMRJ 03/12/2001: 38). Furthermore, their lack of 
knowledge about the instrument's complex coordination created problems in the field. 
Specifically, since the arrival of the new administration, the Attorney Municipal Office 
(PGM) that was involved in slum removals and relocation, was left out of the instrument's 
management. This heavily affected the progress of projects and became a key factor in the 
Favela-Bairro projects interruptions and delays (DCMRJ 11/03/2001: 5-6). Finally, the new 
SMH staff was inexperienced in interactions with the favela dwellers and their leaders. The 
SMH kept them away from decision-making processes or left them without information, 
producing tensions during the instrument's implementation (DCMRJ 22/10/2001: 13-14).  
 
Additionally, other issues emerged fostered by the arrival of a new municipal 
administration. Even if the new SMH could not make substantial changes to the slum 
upgrading, they decided to re-evaluate all the projects. The aim of this process was to 
understand the instrument and get familiar with the procedures and items that it entailed, 
adding to the problem of delays:  
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'What hurt perhaps the pace of works and everything else was really ignorance. Because there are 
many projects, there were many works. And as we have been saying from the beginning, a 
community like that has 250 of these boards for you can look and learn. You have water, sewage, 
drainage, lighting, architecture, structure, road ... It is huge, it is impossible. I can't tell you now 
that I know all, no, I know a large sample, but I have a team that knows. So really, I would have 
been frivolous if I would have said within a week that everything was ok I had to know' ( Jozé 
Candido Sampaio, head of the SMH project's office DCMRJ 27/12/2001: 11). 
The re-evaluation sought also to redirect project investments towards basic infrastructure 
(water and sanitation networks) perceived as the instrument's essential item and pedestrian 
pathways instead of roads that were seen as incentives for illegal settlements' development 
(DCMRJ 27/12/2001: 7). The re-evaluation of slum upgrading projects delayed and 
disrupted the instrument's implementation because modifications needed to be approved 
by the BID, making the delay even longer (DCMRJ 27/12/2001: 8).  
Other complications  
Issues related to the complexity of the instrument and other dynamics also emerged. The 
beginning of a new fiscal year destabilized the pace of municipal financial expenditures, 
producing delays. This delay was amplified in 2001 by the fact that Conde's administration 
started several projects at the same time that would have been managed without problems 
if an administrative change had not happened (DCMRJ 03/12/2001: 34 and 27/12/2001: 
11). Secondly, the instrument's implementation suffered from delays because the system of 
Municipal Budget and Works Cost (Sistema de Custos de Orçamento e de Obras - SCO) 
was modified. Thus, public tender documents and contracts needed to be reviewed 
(DCMRJ 27/12/2001: 8-9). Thirdly, problems with the CEDAE continued to exist and 
amplified as the SMH activities proceeded (DCMRJ 16/10/2001: 10). Finally, in addition 
to the BID approval for any modification, the BID contract only allowed the use of public 
tender as a way to hire architectural practices and contractors. This resulted in further 
delays because of the official timing and more demanding procedures that public tenders 
entailed (DCMRJ 16/10/2001: 8). Moreover, this public contracting system did not allow 
the SMH to control the participation of some contractors, leading to major issues:  
'First let me clarify that all contracts are made through competitive bidding, and as a public 
bidding process, the Secretariat and none of us can prevent a company participate in bidding... In 
relation to the SCEG [a private construction company], I had identified the works it started. It 
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started some works with the first BID loan and these works were going well until the financial 
problem the company faced. And I think that was a mistake of the company, before ending the 
contracts it was already running - and the contracts had about 15% to 10% of the works left - it 
went into many other bids already for the second funding [Favela-Bairro II]. And, unfortunately, 
it had accumulated, if I'm not mistaken, three old contracts from the first BID loan, and won four 
more new contracts in the second loan. Therefore it had amassed seven contracts with the Housing 
Secretariat. And unfortunately [the contractor] had problems ...' (Davi Bezerra Lessa, ex chief of 
SMH works office, DCMRJ 03/12/2001: 35). 
*** 
This part described that the 2000 elections destabilized the instrument's network of 
'associations'. The alliance between Maia and Conde was undone, and their fight for 
winning the 2000 elections generated a 'controversy' about the instrument's efficiency and 
effectiveness, and a shift of the instrument's main objective of integrating favelas into the 
city towards their simple urbanization during Conde's administration (1997-2000). This 
'controversy' weakened both the slum upgrading instrument and Rio's housing policy.  
 
This part also illustrated that at the beginning of Maia's second administration the 
instrument continued to be challenged as Magalhães and Amaral fuelled the mentioned 
'controversy'. Amaral criticized the increase in importance of architectural and urban design 
to the detriment of basic infrastructure implementation (unnecessary vs. essential works) 
while Magalhães denounced the implementation problems and delays as well as a change of 
the instrument. However, it was noted that the instrument was highly regulated, limiting 
changes in its objectives or components. In addition, it pointed out how the 'controversy' 
was also made worse by slum upgrading implementation problems fostered by the 
instrument's regulatory frameworks, the politico-administrative change, the inexperience of 
the new SMH staff, and practices of clientelism. In relation to the latter, this part showed 
how the slum upgrading regulations limited their expansion. The development of this 
'controversy' weakened even more the instrument and the housing policy as it damaged 
further its network of 'alliances'. 
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6.3 THE WEAKENING OF THE SLUM UPGRADING  
6.3.1 Administrative fragmentation & politico-electoral disinterest  
SMH functioning fragmentation 
At the end of 2002 Amaral announced the creation of the 'Favela-Bairro Executive Office' 
for overseeing the slum upgrading implementation that included staff from the SMH, the 
SMDS and the Municipal Labour and Employment Secretariat (SMTE) (O Dia 2002). 
Managed by Aderbal Curvelo and Claudia Esquerdo, this Executive Office moved out 
from the SMH headquarters in the Municipality's annex building at Cidade Nova to a 
building in Praça Pio X at Candelária. The creation and transfer of this Office outside the 
SMH headquarters isolated the slum upgrading and diminished its role in the evolution of 
the SMH institutional development and housing policy. Furthermore, within the SMH 
three main groups emerged each of them linked to a particular SMH office: the Favela-
Bairro Executive Office, the Project's Office and the Work's Office, respectively. These 
groups tended to duplicate or even triple the SMH structure. For instance, three project 
sectors were working simultaneously at that time, fragmenting SMH actions including slum 
upgrading implementation (interview with Augusto Verissimo). In addition, the SMH lost 
the control of the Social and Urban Orientation Office (POUSO) that was one of the key 
elements of the slum upgrading instrument. Their management was transferred to the SMU 
in 2003 by Municipal Decree No.22982/2003.  
 
During the following years the SMH developed several yet isolated actions. In 2001 it 
launched e-solo programme implemented in partnership with UN-habitat that focused on 
regularization. Another isolated initiative was a reflexion about the Favela-Bairro and how 
to intervene in Rio largest favelas developed by the Projects' Office (interview with Jozé 
Candido Sampaio). This office organized a public tender which was won by Jorge Mario 
Jáuregui whose architectural practice had managed several Favela-Bairro projects. This 
exploration resulted in the elaboration of a master plan for Alemão Complex that included 
a diagnostic study and several urban development proposals (Figure 22). In addition, the 
Projects' Office also commanded Jáuregui to elaborate a proposal for Manguinhos 
Complex. However, none of them were implemented.  
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Figure 22 Urban development plan of the Alemão Complex. The plan included a diagnostic 
of the Alemão Complex and several urban development proposals. Source: SMH 2004 
 
The SMH also developed the housing construction. The rise of municipal housing 
construction related to the articulation of the interest put forward by Maia at the beginning 
of his second administration together with the reactivation of federal funding directed at 
this specific housing approach. When Cesar Maia came back to power in 2001, he brought 
back to the forefront the construction of housing (Jornal do Brasil 2000j). This trend 
continued in the following years (DCMRJ 25/11/2004: 5-9; DCMRJ 01/12/2005: 21-27). 
In particular, 'Novas Alternativas' took an important role within the SMH. This 
programme created in 1994 together with the Favela-Bairro aimed at producing housing 
units across the city and using different approaches (see CHAPTER 5, Table 8 page 112). 
Since Maia's second administration, the Novas Alternativas moved towards the 
rehabilitation, restoration and construction of buildings in the centre of Rio de Janeiro 
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where urban infrastructure already existed. The aim was the creation of mixed spaces 
including housing and commercials activities in the centre that was mainly for office use 
(SMH n.d.). 
 
Thus, the slum upgrading was not anymore at the centre of the housing policy nor at the 
heart of the SMH functioning and instead of being supported, the instrument started to be 
isolated within the SMH.  
From collaboration to cutthroat competition  
Maia's objectives to consolidate political alliances and strength his political group created 
competition among the different secretariats. Like Solange Amaral who fought 
unsuccessfully for the state government of Rio de Janeiro in the 2002 elections other 
municipal Secretaries continued to develop their political career. For instance, the Public 
Works Secretary Eider Dantas was re-elected State deputy in 2002 and the Labour 
Secretary Carlos Dias continued to be State deputy until 2003. Moreover, personal tension 
among Secretaries also emerged. In particular between Solange Amaral and Marcelo Garcia 
who after a short period at the head of the SMTE became in 2003 SMDS Secretary 
(interview with Lu Petersen). Municipal Secretaries with politico-electoral interests and 
personal incompatibilities fragmented municipal public policies.  
 
In this politico-administrative landscape the slum upgrading instrument was penalized as its 
functioning depended on different secretariats such as the SMH for the urban project, the 
SMDS for kids and youth programmes, the SMTE for employment and income-generating 
initiatives and the SMU for implementing and managing the POUSOs. Furthermore, slum 
upgrading implementation and maintenance included more secretariats and institutions: the 
Municipal Treasury Secretariat (SMF), Municipal Public works (SMO), Municipal 
Environment Secretariat (SMAC), Municipal Education Secretariat (SME), Municipal Sport 
and Leisure Secretariat (SMEL), Municipal Attorney Office (PGM), Municipal Urban 
Institute (IPP) and the Park and Squares foundation (Municipal Decree No.18667/2000). 
These Secretariats and municipal bodies tended to work for their own politico-electoral 
objectives with no interest in collaboration, isolating the instrument and compromising its 
implementation and maintenance. 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
170 
The lack of collaboration among the municipal Secretariats was accompanied by a 
fragmentation of slum upgrading-related activities across the municipal administration. In 
particular, the Urban Cell office created in 2001 within Maia's cabinet focused on the 
evolution of the instrument. Managed by Lu Petersen who was the former Favela-Bairro 
programme manager, this office sought to foster a post-Favela-Bairro era (Freire et al. 
2009: 98) by using the cell evolution processes as a conceptual anchor. Specifically, Lu 
Petersen, together with an architect (Dietmar Starket) proposed to create micro-
interventions that could contribute to foster the endogenous urban, social, political, 
economic and environmental development of favelas:  
'The cell concept is the following: from some structural lines deployed, it will consolidate to the 
extent that the functions are being constructed in an interactive process of urban relations' (Lu 
Petersen, Urban Cell pogramme manager, in Costa & Andrade 2004). 
The urban cell interventions aimed at triggering the integration process of favelas; thus, 
they were planned at medium and long term : 
'The first requirement to be satisfied is to find other alternative social policies in areas of poverty, 
beyond municipal institutional programmes. You have to understand that the Favela-Bairro is not 
an end in itself, but the beginning of the sustainable integration of slums into the city. The Urban 
Cell is a proposal that may enable induction channels of integrated development. To create 
attractiveness for private sector is a target to be met' (Lu Petersen, Urban Cell programme 
manager, in Costa & Andrade 2004).  
The Urban Cell concept was first developed in Jacarezinho in a collaboration with the 
Bauhaus School. Its implementation was financed through the SMO and it was not linked 
with the Favela-Bairro developed by the SMH in that area. The open air museum at 
Providência was the second intervention developed by the Urban Cell Office from 2001 
(PCRJ 2003). The proposal emerged after a visit to the Morro da Providência organized as 
part of an exchange with the Architectural Association and PROUB-UFRJ (Freire et al. 
2009). The idea of the Museum was later associated with the construction of a 
Guggenheim Museum designed by Jean Nouvel (idem) and which never left the drawing 
board. Unlike Jacarezinho, the project was financed by the SMH and linked to the Favela-
Bairro programme. However, the SMH project developed by Fernanda Salles was 
secondary as it was modified in function to the Urban Cell Office's proposal (Figure 23).  
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In addition, Eider Dantas at the head of the SMO launched in 2001 the Rio Comunidade 
programme aimed at the redevelopment of Zona Norte and Zona Oeste communities by 
constructing basic sanitation infrastructure: sewage and drainage network, paving, public 
spaces, gutters and sidewalks (SMO n.d.). This programme included about 80 projects and 
R$ 100 million in investments from 2001 to 2008 (Figure 24). Thus, the SMO not only was 
involved in the SMH slum upgrading by controlling conservation works and public works 
such as water, light, roads and hill side works; but it also directly competed against the 
SMH activities, in particular, against its slum upgrading instrument.  
 
 
Figure 23 Providência open air museum. Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011 
 
 
Figure 24 Rio Comunidade in New Delhi community before and after. Source: SMO n.d. 
 
Competition with the state of Rio de Janeiro  
The relation between Cesar Maia and Rio de Janeiro's State Governor Antony Garotinho 
that was tense after the 1998 State elections deteriorated even more during the 2000 
municipal elections when Maia made alliances with Garotinho's political enemies Marcello 
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Alencar and Leonel Brizola (Jornal do Brasil 2001). Garotinho once in power came close to 
Conde and appointed him State Secretary of Governmental Coordination from 1998 to 
2002. Furthermore, right after the municipal elections of 2000, Garotinho and Conde 
reached a political agreement that led to the inclusion of PFL party members into the State 
government (Jornal do Brasil 2000k). Among them Sergio Magalhães, former SMH 
Secretary was appointed as the State Secretary of Special Projects.  
 
With the arrival of Conde and Magalhães at the Garotinho administration, the State 
Government of Rio de Janeiro started to emerge as an actor in relation to programmes and 
projects directed at Rio de Janeiro's favelas, challenging the municipal administration. For 
instance, in 2001 the municipality and the state of Rio de Janeiro developed in parallel a 
slum upgrading project in Cantagalo which was included in the second BID loan through 
the SMH and State Secretariat of Environment and Urban Development respectively (O 
Globo 2001b) (Municipal Decree No.18667/2000). The direct competition against the 
SMH actions weakened the instrument, the SMH and overall Maia's administration because 
it bypassed the municipal administration: 
'When I got there I was called and told that the municipality had no intention of keeping this 
project [Favela-Bairro community maintenance project] and I was asked to sign the termination of 
this contract ... Moreover, since we were without services, we needed to find a solution for the 
community. What did we do? We sought the State Government. Former Housing Secretary, the 
State Government Secretary of Special Projects today [Sergio Magalhães]. As he was a person 
who knew all the communities that worked together, we looked for him and also made this 
proposal. The Secretary met with us, took us to Governor Garotinho and the Governor liked the 
proposal. And today, we are telling first to the municipal councillors that CEDAE is taking over 
39 communities, providing maintenance of water and sewage. And, the surprises is that the G-16 
NGO will manage it all' (Hercules Ferreira Mendes, Guarda-16 NGO DCMRJ 
12/10/2001: 13). 
Thus, in addition to the problems that the slum upgrading implementation faced with the 
state of Rio through the CEDAE due to sanitation infrastructure problems (DCMRJ 
22/12/2003: 26), the instrument faced further challenges and dislocation by the emergence 
of the state of Rio de Janeiro as a new actor around slum upgrading activities.  
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In 2002 State elections Solange Amaral, Cesar's candidate and SMH secretary, was defeated 
by Antony Garotinho' s wife, Rosinha. Luiz Paulo Conde became vice-Governor and State 
Secretary of Environment and Urban Development, and Sergio Magalhães Deputy 
Secretary of the same State department. Through this Secretariat that incorporated SMH 
staff who worked in the Favela-Bairro during the 1990s such as former SMH project 
manager Helio Aleixo and former Favela-Bairro programme manager Andrea Cardoso, the 
state of Rio de Janeiro continued to challenge the SMH and its instrument.  
 
The state of Rio resumed the slum upgrading project in Dona Marta agreed by the 
municipality when Conde was Mayor but which was interrupted after his defeat (Jornal do 
Brasil 2000l). In 2004 the regional state commissioned the Brazilian Institute of Architects 
of Rio de Janeiro (IAB-RJ) to organize an architectural contest (similar to the Favela-
Bairro's in 1994) which was won by the architect Fernanda Sales (Jornal do Brasil 2004a). 
Furthermore, the state developed several initiatives in Rocinha such as the development of 
a hotel school (Jornal do Brasil 2004b), and a debate about environmental solutions for the 
favela (Jornal do Brasil 2004c). Then, at the end of 2005 the State commissioned an 
architectural competition for elaborating a slum upgrading proposal for Rocinha (IPHAN 
2006). Thus, during the first half of the first decade of the 2000s, the government of the 
state of Rio de Janeiro consolidated itself as a key player around slum upgrading 
implementation (Figure 25). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25 State of Rio de Janeiro's interventions. Left: Dona Marta project. Source 
Fernanda Sales. Right: Rocinha contest poster. Source: Vogel n.d. 
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Federal interference and absence  
The emergence of Federal Government funds directed towards housing construction grew 
during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's second administration (1999-2002). In 1999 the 
Federal Government created the Residential Leasehold Programme (PAR) (Federal 
Provisional Measure No.1823/1999) which was strengthened by Federal Law 
No.10188/2001. Targeted at people earning between 2 and 6 minimum wages, the PAR 
included residential leasehold with buying option. The programme was regulated and 
managed by the Ministry of Urban Development and the CAIXA until 2003 when the 
Ministry of Cities took over these responsibilities (Menezes 2008). The Federal 
Government investments in housing construction channelled through the PAR 
strengthened Rio de Janeiro's housing construction approach, including the municipal 
housing programmes such as Novas alternativas, diverting the focus of the municipal 
housing policy that had been using the slum upgrading as its main instrument:  
'There are nearly 3000 units being built through the PAR programme in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro with the resources of the CAIXA and with the approval of the Municipality... There are 
now in the process of expropriation 257 properties in the City Centre; these are vacant lots, areas 
available in the process of expropriation, so that the City can offer them to the CAIXA for 
housing construction' (Solange Amaral, Municipal Housing Secretary, DCMRJ 25/11/2004: 
6). 
There was also discontinuity of federal support that weakened the slum upgrading. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter the slum upgrading in large favelas was financed by the 
municipality together with the Federal Government (see CHAPTER 5 page 133). The 
municipality and the CAIXA signed, in 1998, a contract for implementing through the Pro-
Moradia and Pro-Sanear programmes slum upgrading projects in several favelas, including 
large ones such as Rio das Pedras (DCMRJ 18/02/1998: 03). Nevertheless, this partnership 
was not repeated as the CAIXA went through financial problems. In 2001 the creation of 
the Asset Management Company (EMGEA) allowed the bank to restructure its housing 
sector (EMEGEA n.d.). However, Rio de Janeiro did not sign any Pro-Moradia contract 
until 2008 (see CHAPTER 7 page 200). In addition, the restructuring of the national 
housing sector and emergence of a federal housing policy during Lula's first administration 
(2003-2006) (see CHAPTER 2 page 42) did not immediately invigorate and support slum 
upgrading. In particular, the negotiation for transferring the land owned by the Federal 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
175 
Government to the municipality in order to regularize favelas, which involved several cases 
as the city used to be Brazil's capital, did not progress. For example, the Federal 
Government did not approve the transfer of land for the regularization of Parque Royal 
that was one of the first slum upgrading projects developed by the municipality during the 
1990s (DCMRJ 22/12/2003: 28):  
'For example, councillor Rose Fernandes, councillor Romualdo Bonaventure, Rubens Andrade, 
here, Ruy Cezar, councillor Luiz Humberto, we did not have available municipal or private 
property to implement the Favela-Bairro project in Arara. What was there was an INSS 
[National Institute of Social Security] plot in Matupiri St, if I'm not mistaken that's the name, 
the Municipality will build housing units. But we had to pay R$ 440,000 to the INSS to be able 
to do this. We could not, for political reasons, make the INSS donate that land .... to the poor 
people who live on top of the pipeline in Arara favela.  
The buildings of the Federal Government on Venezuela Ave, I repeat, Sacadura Cabral St, 
Santana St, not to mention Rio Branco Ave, Presidente Vargas Ave, and the abandoned 
buildings in the harbour, the building of the IBGE [Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics] in Mangueira. We cannot progress. The Municipality sends projects, the SMH develops 
proposals, defines studies. It's very difficult, very tangled, and very complicated' (Solange Amaral, 
Municipal Housing Secretary, DCMRJ 25/11/2004: 8). 
 
6.3.2  Growing disinterest  
Complicated implementation  
During this period of fragmentation and increased competition, the use of slum upgrading 
instrument became complicated. Its implementation was mainly financed through the 
second BID loan. This contract, as the previous one, established slum upgrading 
implementation regulations, including the actors involved and their role (BID 2000), and 
Municipal Decree No.18667/2000 established the instrument's operational framework. 
Consequently, the slum upgrading implementation was rigid and lengthy in comparison to 
the other SMH instruments. For instance, each project needed to be approved by the BID 
and required CEDAE's approval of sanitation systems. This requirement established by the 
BID contract delayed public tenders, paralysing projects (DCMRJ 12/11/2002: 14). In 
addition, the instrument also generated implementation problems because it included 
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synergies with the third sector and private actors. For example, association with 
architectural practices contributed to the lengthening of the implementation process:  
'It's unbelievable! Six hundred days for the architectural practice! Then comes the municipality's 
team to analyse the work that was done by the hired office. So, there is no time, the population 
cannot remain waiting two years for a project... Favela-Bairro, because it has international 
funding, must meet strict and serious rules in its implementation, but we have other programmes 
with which we can provide this service because - as you know - the need often cannot wait. For 
implementing Bairrinho, Grandes Favelas, Morar sem Riscos, the Municipality has a slightly 
higher speed '(Solange Amaral, Municipal Housing Secretary, DCMRJ 12/11/2001: 14-15). 
In addition, the BID contract included the list of the favelas to be integrated into the 
Favela-Bairro. The list was established using the classification matrix that was elaborated in 
the 1990s that ranked Rio the Janeiro favelas from the easiest to be urbanized to the most 
difficult. Therefore, during the first decade of the 2000s the slum upgrading projects 
implemented were more complicated than the one's realized during Conde's administration. 
For example, the favelas considered in the second BID contract had more risk areas, which 
involved more relocations and construction of houses, and demanded heavier 
infrastructure such as river canalization works. Thus, even if the SMH budget increased at 
that time, several Favela-Bairro projects remained unfinished. Indeed, after a fall in 2001 in 
relation to the previous year, the SMH budgets were R$ 205, R$ 174 and R$ 200 million in 
the following years, increasing SMH budget from R$ 586 million during Conde's 
administration (1997-2000) to R$703 million during Maia's second administration (2001-
2004) (Figure 26). Thus, the slum upgrading instrument was also weakened as the way it 
was constituted continued to generate several problems. 
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Figure 26 SHM Budget from 1997 to 2004. Source: CGMRJ n.d. 
 
Moreover, at that time and contrary to the 1990s a debate started about housing policy and 
policy instruments that continued over the following years; it included, experts in the 
housing sector, researchers, politicians, municipal staff from different Secretariats and civil 
society representatives (O Globo 2002a; O Globo 2002b; O Globo 2002c; O Globo 2003a; 
O Globo 2004a; O Globo 2004b). Together with this debate stronger criticisms of the 
slum upgrading were voiced and the instrument's efficiency and effectiveness were 
discredited due to several implementation issues: the bad quality of works, interruptions 
and delays, drug trafficking problems and the lack of improvement in the favela dwellers 
economic situation (O Globo 2003b; O Globo 2003c; O Globo 2004c) (Figure 27).  
 
In addition, the slum upgrading was questioned by a series of publications. For instance, 
Bernstein Jacques called into question Rio de Janeiro's slum upgrading architectural and 
urban planning approach (Jacques 2001); Conde and Magalhães published a book that 
ignored the development of Favela-Bairro after 2000 (Magalhaes & Conde 2004); several 
academic journal articles and theses also questioned slum upgrading implementation and its 
outcomes (Broudehoux 2001; Randolph 2004; Silva 2006; Bahia 2000). Thus, the 
complicated implementation of the instrument together with the emergence of the debate 
about the instrument's efficiency and effectiveness contributed to its isolation as actors 
started to be reluctant or doubtful about its use. The slum upgrading was losing more allies.  
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By 2004 even the theme of evictions returned into the debate about housing policy (Figure 
28). This destabilized slum upgrading legitimacy and fostered housing sector actors' 
reluctance to support it. 
 
 
Figure 27 Various problems surround the Favela-Bairro programme. A good example in the 
Vidigal Hill. More funds for a new phase. Source: O Globo 2003b 
 
 
Figure 28 Eviction policy comebacks in the debate. Specialists observe mistakes in past 
initiatives, but they find that relocations can be a solution. Source: O Globo 2004d 
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Nevertheless, the instrument was still supported by some actors that recognized some 
value in the use of the instrument:  
'So it is up there, at Alto da boa vista, by the Maracai. You pass by the house of dr. Celso and 
see that the sewage of those houses is still thrown there. And the pillars of the houses are in the 
river. Therefore, you develop the Favela-Bairro for what? Some things get better, nobody is 
speaking evil of the Favela-Bairro project, but that it exists with consistency' (Chico Aguiar, 
municipal councillor, DCMRJ 12/12/2003: 14) . 
During this period, slum upgrading critics coexisted with supporters of the housing policy 
instrument:  
'What happens is that the Municipality has done a good job with Formiga and Borel communities, 
which are on two slopes. It managed through the Favela-Bairro to remove people who were invading 
the forest, relocating them in the area already dense and could reforest the other area. It was a 
beautiful reforestation work done on these slopes near the Formiga and Borel hills. I have 
personally seen that these communities are greatly accepting this work, they are even satisfied with it 
because they are gaining in quality of life' (Gilberto França, AMU association, DCMRJ 
15/12/2003: 14). 
Problematic politico-electoral objectives 
As mentioned earlier (see page 160) the political objectives of Maia's second administration 
were the development of political alliances and the consolidation of his political group 
through the distribution of municipal administrative positions such as the municipal 
secretariats and support of political allies using the municipal machine:  
'The order of Mayor Cesar Maia is no discrimination. It is obvious that the machine is heavy. The 
order I give to my Secretariat is no discrimination. I will not be a liar, saying that the fact of no 
discrimination, does not mean that the municipal councillors who support the Government are not 
given priority. This is the norm in any government, the PT [Workers' Party] does it, PFL 
[Liberal Front Party] does it, PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Parity] does it, everyone 
does it. I will not be a liar' (Solange Amaral, Municipal Housing Secretary, DCMRJ 
22/12/2003: 23).  
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The municipal councillors who were allies of or close to the municipal executive 
beneficiated from the slum upgrading in order to consolidate their legitimacy and win the 
support of favela dwellers. 
'Let me also say to you all that Marcelino [municipal councillor] has truly been a great friend, not 
only of one community, but of all the communities of the West Zone [of the municipality]. We were 
with the Favela-Bairro Project buried there and did not start ... And I sought our municipal 
councillor, I talked to him, and the project was started immediately. The Favela-Bairro project was 
initiated. We are all there with the streets paved, just missing a little something still to finish. But 
we want to thank God for the life of our councillor and ask God to continue to bless his life, 
renewing his forces, so he can continue this battle. I know it's hard, is very hard and also 
community leadership' (Estelita Gomes da Serra, favela do Jacare, DCMRJ 15/08/2003: 
750). 
The instrument also contributed to manage political opposition, consolidating the 
municipal executive control over the municipal legislative body as in the 1990s. The 
instrument was used not only to secure political support, undermining any opposition (in a 
steamrolling effect), but also to share with the opposition the instrument's electoral capital, 
eliminating political reluctance. However, the instrument was problematic as a politico-
electoral weapon for the SMH and overall the municipal executive. Among the other 
municipal housing instruments, the slum upgrading was the most regulated due to the BID 
contract. Thus, the municipal executive could not freely mobilize it for politico-electoral 
purposes.  
 
Its use by municipal councillors for political interests was problematic too. From the first 
decade of the 2000s municipal councillors tended to elaborate a large number of bills and 
recommendations about the implementation of Favela-Bairro projects in specific locations. 
For instance bill No.1037/2002 proposed by the municipal councillor Monterio de Castro 
sought to:  
'authorize the executive to implement the Favela-Bairro or Bairrinho in the mentioned 
area'(DCMRJ 04/04/2003: 21). 
The municipal executive rarely approved them. This is because on the one hand a bill on 
the implementation of a programme was illegal as it did not relate to legislative 
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competencies. On the other, the municipal executive rarely followed the instrument's 
implementation recommendations not only because the BID contract included the list of 
favelas to be beneficiaries, but also because the implementation of a slum upgrading 
outside the BID partnership included complex implementation processes, important 
financial investments and time. Therefore, the instrument was not that useful for achieving 
politico-electoral objectives. Other instruments such as the Mutirão programme were more 
suitable, becoming more important to the detriment of slum upgrading:  
'Mutirão project is an area, is a programme of work, which is more possible and probable where 
amendments could be made; Councillor, I think this is important to reckon because it is not 
regulated by the BID, it has no conceptual or fixed set of rules. Therefore, it is a programme of 
work that can be amended because it involves cheaper works and we can implement them more 
easily. I know how important it is for the legislative and for the renewal of the mandates of all 
councillors' (Solange Amaral Municipal Housing Secretary DCMRJ 22/12/2003: 26). 
*** 
This part described how the instrument was further weakened by its isolation from the rest 
of the SMH, and the increasing importance of the construction of houses (Novas 
Alternativas programme and PAR). It observed that the slum upgrading instrument was 
challenged by initiatives that directly competed against it and were conducted by other 
municipal bodies (Rio Comunidade and Urban Cell projects), the regional state of Rio de 
Janeiro (Cantagalo, Dona Marta and Rocinha projects) and the federal government which 
was supporting housing construction (PAR programme) rather than slum upgrading 
projects. In addition, the instrument was questioned as its implementation was generating 
several issues (delays, interruptions, lack of quality) and its regulations were complicating its 
use: (i) the slum normative frame made the slum upgrading difficult to put into operation 
in the context of the growing municipal fragmentation, (ii) the selection method chosen in 
the 1990s became problematic as the projects that were developed during the first decade 
of the 2000s were more difficult, and (iii) the slum upgrading regulations made the 
instrument more difficult to be used for politico-electoral interests.  
 
The processes of instrument's isolation, emergence of other slum upgrading experiences at 
municipal and regional state level, and the increase of housing construction importance 
relate to the emergence of a 'dissidence' moment (CHAPTER 3 page 60): 'the actors 
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implicated do not acknowledge their roles in this story nor the slow drift in which they had participated, in 
their opinion, wholeheartedly… New displacements take the place of the previous ones but these divert the 
actors from the obligatory passage points [OPP] that had been imposed upon them' (Callon 1986: 19). 
The 'dissidence' moment was supported by the development of the instrument's 
'problematization' and the instrument's 'controversy'. The 'problematization' moment 
developed mainly within the SMH and not only as other bodies such as the Urban Cell 
office was seeking to move beyond the Favela-Bairro experience. It did not result in the 
rejection of the instrument but it favoured the construction of houses as the approach. The 
'controversy' about the instrument was primarily fuelled by the implementation and 
regulation issues it entailed. The 'dissidence' moment produced new 'translation' 
mechanisms that resulted in the constitution of new 'actants' in which the instrument 
played a secondary role or was cut off, weakening its network of 'allies' and its OPP role in 
Rio's housing policy.  
 
In addition, this part observed that despite its weakening, the slum upgrading instrument 
was not only preserving but also still creating knowledge, know-how and building experts' 
capacities, in particular through the Urban Cell experience, the Master Plans for the 
Alemão Complex and Manguinhos Complex, and Rocinha, Cantagalo and Dona Marta 
projects. All these initiatives were directly linked to the expertise and experts that were 
constituted during the choice and use of the slum upgrading in the 1990s, in particular, 
architectural practices and municipal staff.  
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6.4 THE SLUM UPGRADING FALL  
6.4.1 Losing financial support  
Fall of the SMH budget  
In 2004 municipal elections were held. Cesar Maia (PFL) ran for his re-election, being the 
favourite candidate (Jornal do Brasil 2004d; Jornal do Brasil 2004e). His major rivals were 
Marcelo Crivella (PL), Jorge Bittar (PT), Jandira Feghali (PCDOB) and Luiz Paulo Conde 
(PMDB). Throughout the 2004 campaign, the Favela-Bairro was criticized, yet it was also 
cited as an approach to be extended and developed (Jornal do Brasil 2004f; Jornal do Brasil 
2004g; Jornal do Brasil 2004h; Jornal do Brasil 2004i; Jornal do Brasil 2004j). Maia won the 
elections in the first round with 50.1% of votes. (TSE n.d.).  
 
During the third Maia administration municipal finances degraded. The transfer of federal 
hospitals to the municipal administration translated into more expenses. In addition, the 
economic crisis of 2001-2002 that hit Brazil and for which it received a loan from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF 2007) impacted on municipal tax collection, affecting 
the SMH activities, including slum upgrading projects. For instance, in 2003 Mutirão 
projects were abandoned or interrupted (DCMRJ 22/12/2003: 26). Moreover, the Brazilian 
economic crises indirectly affected the slum upgrading implementation: 
'The company worked for the state [of Rio de Janeiro]- I repeat what I heard - it worked for the 
state, it did Maracanã, it did Batalhão, it did not receive [payment] with the crisis that the state 
government faces, it did not receive [any money] and was unable to honour Rio das Pedras 
contract. So, the Municipality sought alternatives during several months. Three months ago we 
found an alternative for transferring the contract, and now the company is up there already 
working strongly' (Solange Amaral Municipal Housing Secretary DCMRJ 22/12/2003: 27). 
The absence of a formal agreement for a third BID loan also compromised the use of the 
instrument in the following years. The third loan of US$ 400 million was in consideration 
since 2003 (Jornal do Brasil 2003a). However, its materialization was delayed mainly 
because the Federal Government limited municipal and regional state borrowing capacity 
(DCMRJ 01/12/2005: 22). The investments of the second BID loan that were supposed to 
end in 2004 were extended until 2006. However, without the BID financial support the 
SMH budget decreased during Maia's third administration: from R$ 200 million in 2004, it 
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fell to 150 million in 2005, then to R$ 69 million in 2006 and one year later to R$ 49 
million, the second lowest SMH budget since its creation in 1995 (Figure 29). Overall the 
SMH budget decreased from R$ 703 million during Maia's second administration to R$ 423 
million during Maia's third administration (CGMRJ n.d.).  
 
 
Figure 29 SMH Budget 1995-2008. The increase in 2008 was due to the launch of the 
Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) (see CHAPTER 7).  
Source: CGMRJ n.d. Elaborated by the author. 
 
Slum upgrading & Pan American Games 
The 2007 Pan American Games (Pan-2007) limited the use of the instrument and created 
instrumentation problems. Rio de Janeiro won the Pan-2007 bid in August 2002 and 
forecasted investments of about R$ 551 million divided as follows: Municipal Government 
R$ 233 million, Federal Government R$ 134 million, State Government R$ 30 million, and 
ticket sales and broadcasting rights R$ 153 million (Jornal do Brasil 2002). Then, Brazil 
decided to become a candidate for the 2012 Olympic Games (Jornal do Brasil 2003b) and 
again for the 2016 Olympic Games officially in September 2007. This increased the amount 
of investments for the Pan-2007 as several infrastructures changed from regional to 
Olympic Games standards. The total cost of the Pan-2007 was estimated at R$ 3 billion. 
The municipality never stated officially how much of this amount it provided. 
Nevertheless, it was estimated that Rio de Janeiro spent much more than expected. For 
instance, the municipality forecast R$ 400 million for the construction of all venues, yet just 
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the construction of the Joao Havelange stadium cost around R$ 170 million (Carta Maior 
2007).  
 
The organization of the Pan-2007 reduced the municipality's capacity for investment, 
undermining furthermore the SMH budget. The fall in SMH budget generated major 
management problems because the BID contract needed to be respected, leading to the re-
evaluation and interruption of other projects such as the Babilônia project (DCMRJ 
13/06/2007: 11-24). The slum upgrading and SMH activities were also indirectly 
destabilized by the Pan-2007 because in order to complete the games' infrastructure the 
Municipality reduced Rio de Janeiro's maintenance investments (RJTV n.d.). Thus, the 
slum upgrading implementation was not only complicated by the lack of direct 
investments, but also by the reduction of Rio's maintenance funding.  
 
Without money the instrument's implementation was abandoned, interrupted, or delayed. 
Thus, despite municipal government continuity, the slum upgrading was further weakened 
by the degradation in municipal finances.  
6.4.2 Opposition and collective abandon 
Instrument's rejection 
Since the beginning of Maia's third administration the debates about the slum effectiveness 
and efficiency were consolidated. From within the municipal administration severe 
criticism about the instrument emerged. In particular, in 2004 the Municipal Court of 
Auditors (TCMRJ) decided to audit the slum upgrading for being the most representative 
of the SMH activities. In that year TCMRJ audited the Bairrinho programme (TCMRJ 
2005), and in 2005 the Favela-Bairro programme (TCMRJ 2006). Besides listing the slum 
upgrading implementation problems, the TCMRJ called into question the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the instrument, highlighting for instance that the programme did not even 
reach 20% of Rio de Janeiro's favelas, and that the number of informal settlements had 
increased. The TCMRJ condemned the choice of the slum upgrading because it 
represented a threat to the city's development due to its poor results: 
'The option over the decade to prioritize the urbanization of deprived communities at the expense of 
other housing policies in the municipality constitutes a dangerous heritage left to the current and 
future generations' (TCMRJ 2006: 56). 
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Based on this criticism, the audit proposed a move toward a new housing policy, 
abandoning the slum upgrading as housing policy instrument: 
'Finally, it is to consider the adoption of other policies and settlement forms, taking into account 
that some of these communities would hardly adopt characteristics of a neighbourhood and be 
integrated into the formal city. To reduce effectively the municipality housing deficit the following 
should be taken into account: the control of the occupation, the removal of settlements located in 
areas of environmental protection and above the limits set for the slopes, the construction of new 
housing units, the implementation of an efficient public transport system and of good quality, and 
improvement of the existing railways and subway networks' (TCMRJ 2006: 56). 
 Furthermore, since 2005 slum upgrading faced upfront critics from municipal councillors:  
'The Mayor in his first term created the so called Favela-Bairro. Actually. we saw many Bairros 
[neighbourhood] turn into favela during this decade of PFL hegemony over the municipality of Rio 
de Janeiro. There is the Favela-Bairro and the Bairro-Favela. I think the Bairro-Favela grew 
more than the Favela-Bairro' (Edson Santos, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 30/09/2005: 9).  
'This Favela-Bairro is a bait take the first Favela-Bairro project, convene the councillors and 
check if what was planned was executed, a third of what was planned was done, when we go to the 
communities, the Favela-Bairro is all destroyed, the sewage network has been constructed on the 
surface, why did they not build it below the road and channel it? The sewerage is flowing on to the 
street, and the debris thrown away, and the rain that comes and destroys everything' (S. Farras, 
municipal councillor, DCMRJ 14/10/2005: 14). 
The debate also included discussions about favelas' eviction and demolition which were at 
the opposite of the slum upgrading objectives and the municipal housing policy (O Globo 
2005a; O Globo 2005b; O Globo 2005c; O Globo 2005d; O Globo 2005e; O Globo 
2005f; O Globo 2005g; O Globo 2005h; O Globo 2005i; O Globo 2005j; O Globo 2005k) 
(Figure 30). They involved a vast range of actors from different sectors: municipal 
administration, legislative body, favela dwellers, scholars and experts in the field. These 
discussions raised an unprecedented opposition against municipal housing policy, in 
particular, against the slum upgrading instrument (interview with Fernando Cavallieri): 
'Topic projects do not have a chance of success anymore: Favela-Bairros, eco-limits, deforestation 
control. It is like treating cancer with an aspirin' (O Globo 2005j). 
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Figure 30 Debate about favelas and the eviction policy in 2005. From top to bottom and left 
to right. Postcard of a divided city (O Globo 2005l). Even the Favela-Bairro is contested (O 
Globo 2005f). Residents state that the expansion [of favelas] is inevitable (O Globo 2005e). 
Realizable project [housing construction] (O Globo 2005i). Alternatives for the urban poor 
(O Globo 2005k). Mayor creates a council for studying the housing crisis (O Globo 2005h). 
Favelization: the target of the Chamber (O Globo 2005c), Favelaphobia, a social venom (O 
Globo 2005m). Mayor and the Chamber step back (O Globo 2005d). Favelas, a housing 
solution?(Jornal do Brasil 2005).  
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In the following year the debate continued (O Globo 2006a; O Globo 2006b; O Globo 
2006c; O Estado de S.Paulo 2006a; O Estado de S.Paulo 2006b). It was fuelled among 
others by the enactment of the National Social Housing System (SNHIS) (O Globo 2006d) 
and the increase of the world urban population and slums across the globe (O Globo 
2006e; O Globo 2006f; Diario do Nordeste 2006). Several issues that emerged from the use 
of the slum upgrading contributed to foster and consolidate a movement of opposition 
that involved different actors, directly or indirectly involved in the housing policy. They 
were more and more reluctant to support the slum upgrading and its use for addressing Rio 
de Janeiro's housing policy. For instance, in August 2006 a public hearing about Favela-
Bairro implementation problems was held at the Municipal Chamber (DCMRJ 
07/08/2006: 14-26). The event was an initiative of Federation of Favelas Association of 
the state of Rio de Janeiro (FAFERJ) that previously that year elaborated a video about 
several instrument's implementation problems (interview with Zezinho da Torre Branca).  
 
The initiative involved 8 communities included in the video and the support of another 
37communities. During the public hearing several organizations participated and supported 
this initiative and the claims of the favelas' leaders and residents. They also expressed their 
concerns about the use of slum upgrading and the issues it had generated. Several 
organizations and institutions attended the public hearing. Among them were the 
Federation of Favelas' Associations of the state of Rio de Janeiro (FAFERJ), the 
Federation of Residents' Association of the state of Rio de Janeiro (FAMERJ), the 
Federation of Residents' Association of Rio de Janeiro (FAMRIO), the Federation of 
Favelas' Associations of Rio de Janeiro (FAFRIO), the Institute of Research and Urban 
Planning of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (IPPUR-UFRJ), the Municipal 
Institute of Urbanism Pereira Passos (IPP), the Regional Council of Engineering and 
Agronomy (CREA), the Observatory of Favelas; the Brazilian Institute of Social and 
Economic Analysis (IBASE), the Bento Rubião Foundation, the state Forum of Urban 
Reform, and the Pastoral de Favelas (DCMRJ 07/08/2006: 24). The initiative was 
supported by various councillors such as Brizola Neto who organized the public hearing at 
the Municipal Chamber. The debate focused on the delays, interruptions, bad quality of 
works, lack of maintenance and water and sanitation problems. These issues called into 
question once again the instrument's relevance, contributing to lose several allies that once 
supported it such as many of the organizations mentioned above and the favela dwellers 
and leaders (Figure 31). 
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Figure 31 FAFERJ's video shots. Favela leaders and dwellers explaining the various issues 
related to the use of the slum upgrading in their communities. Source: FAFERJ 2006. 
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The debate about the slum upgrading implementation and maintenance issues continued:  
'Because the Court of Auditors report points out and criticizes what has been done, "it is not 
because the Favela-Bairro is bad, but because during the inspection made in 2005, it was noted 
the abandon"... Folks, that's a community in which the municipality's money was invested ... the 
entrance to the sports court and play area are in total abandonment. It is not used and is 
abandoned, bleachers without maintenance, unused. Only one of the four showers exists, the others 
do not exist anymore. That's the situation of the shower drain. Look at the abandonment of the 
area that should be a leisure community area. Children living together with garbage in this 
recreation area, rain channels also in the same area ... I mean, Favela-Bairro is far from becoming 
true' ( Andrea Gouvêa Vieira, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 14/11/2006: 8). 
The debate was nourished by the inability of the municipality and in particular the SMH to 
overcome slum upgrading problems such as the lack of involvement of municipal bodies 
exacerbated by the fragmentation of the administration and growing isolation of the 
instrument. 
'We do not have to exclude the favelas. We have to treat favelas as a formal city. Therefore, the 
SMO - through its departments of conservation, RioLuz, Geo-Rio, Rio-Aguas - should provide 
maintenance services to these communities. These services should not be in the charge of the SMH 
or other department with resources to provide them. So this is a discussion that has been addressed 
in the Secretariat together with the other departments. The Mayor issued a decree in which he 
announced the creation of some working groups so that we could develop these discussions with other 
Secretariats. So, this work is in progress. I hope that in 2007 we would reach the agreement that 
communities would receive conservation and maintenance services every day through the municipal 
bodies' (Luiz Humberto, Municipal Housing Secretary DCMRJ 14/11/2006: 11). 
During 2007 the weakening of the instrument continued, mainly fostered by the ongoing 
debate about the expansion of favelas, specifically, by their vertical growth (Figure 32). This 
led to the collapse of the slum upgrading as it had lost several allies, and its use, instead of 
generating alliances, was building a growing opposition.  
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Figure 32 Newspaper articles 2007. From top to bottom and left to right: Park besieged. 
Hills grow and threaten the Tijuca Massif, surrounded by 48 favelas (O Globo 2007a). Not 
even the municipality takes care. Squares and public schools are built on river banks and in 
slums (O Globo 2007b). The multiplication of the storeys. Building up to ten floors grow at 
a high speed in Rio das Pedras (O Globo 2007c). A favela of buildings (O Globo 2007d) 
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Rio de Janeiro's housing construction  
The rise of housing construction also isolated the slum upgrading and contributed to its 
abandonment as constructing houses was not only desirable but also a possible approach 
through the emergence of federal investments towards this housing policy solution (Figure 
33). By 2006 the state of Rio de Janeiro was one of the states that received the most of 
investments for implementing the Residential Leasehold Programme (PAR) (Roesler et al. 
2007). By 2009 Rio de Janeiro's municipality had delivered 8303 houses and 5344 more 
were expected to be finished that year (SMH n.d.).  
 
 
Figure 33 PAR projects. Left: 'Amondoeiras' condominium (Cosmos). Right: Mont Blanc 
condominium (Paciencia). Source SMH (n.d.) 
 
The emergence of housing construction as an important housing policy instrument carried 
with it different implementation problems. Overall housing construction related to an 
approach that could not be handled only by the municipality because it did not have the 
financial resources:  
'When it comes to housing, construction and production of houses, in fact, it is a task shared by the 
municipality, the state and Union. Here, technically speaking, the Municipality has not - the city 
of Rio, the municipality does not have - the conditions to absorb all the housing demand. It needs 
state resources and primarily federal funds' (Paulo Andre Figueira da Silva, Municipal Housing 
under secretary (DCMRJ 15/12/2005: 27).  
Thus, one of the major problems for municipal housing construction was attracting federal 
investments:  
'Our daily struggle is with the Federal Government, so it supplies resources in the City of Rio de 
Janeiro, for implementing our programmes. We had some progress in the last year, but because it is 
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a city of the size of Rio de Janeiro, seventeen million from the Federal Government come to be 
nothing ... To give you an idea: it has created now a social housing fund [FNHIS]and was 
promised two hundred million Real. If you divide it by five thousand municipalities, or population, 
this will give very little for each municipality. Of these two hundred million Real - we had forecast 
that they would be liberated - only 50 million were given and only benefited the local governments 
aligned with the Federal Government ... We hardly obtained fourteen thousand units of high 
quality. This is the question' (Paulo Andre Figueira da Silva, Municipal Housing under 
secretary, DCMRJ 12/06/2006: 21). 
In addition, the housing construction was limited by the tax regime. Aiming to tackle this 
problem, the municipal chamber authorized the exemption of Service Tax (ISS) and Real 
Property Transfer Tax (ITBI) for the construction of social housing, fostering PAR 
investments in the municipality. Legal restrictions also limited the scale up of the 
construction of houses in the municipality. The Municipal Complementary Law 
No.40/1999 limited to 200 housing units per real estate, restraining large scale projects 
(DCMRJ 25/11/2004: 06-09). This law was modified by Municipal Complementary Law 
N75/2005 that increased the limit to 300 housing per real estate. Moreover, land prices 
increased even in the Zona Oeste (West Area) neighbourhoods, limiting the development 
of social housing units (DCMRJ 15/12/2005: 27). Finally, the housing offer largely 
financed through the PAR, did not match Rio Janeiro's population. The majority of PAR 
projects targeted people with at least 4 minimum wages when the bulk of the municipality 
housing deficit included people under that threshold. Even if people had the resources, 
usually they did not have the documents to support it (DCMRJ 01/12/2005: 22). In 
relation to the development of the Novas Alternativas programme, the projects were 
complicated by: 
'Complex land tenure, undocumented federal and state-owned building, restrictive legislation for 
insertion of new buildings in historic sites, slow judiciary processes, operating in real estate already 
inhabited, regulations for intervening in properties owned by religious organizations, private sector 
participation (owners/builders/architects), debts with public services companies, difficulties in 
registries for land dismemberment and division, the actual footage of the land which does not 
coincide with the documents, recent appreciation of real estate in the central area' (PMHIS, 
Regional meetings AP1, 07/10/2011).  
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***  
This part described the fall of the slum upgrading instrument during Maia's third 
administration. It noted that it related to the loss of most of its financial support as the 
SMH budget from which it depended was undermined by the Brazilian economic crisis, the 
municipal finance crisis, the organization of Pan-2007 and the unsuccessful negotiations for 
signing a third BID loan. This part illustrated that the slum upgrading instrument's fall was 
also related to the consolidation of the 'controversy' about its efficiency and effectiveness 
fuelled by its implementation. The 'controversy' consolidated 'dissidence' as several 'allies' 
stopped supporting it, in particular favela dwellers, favelas' organizations, NGOs, scholars, 
legislative branch and various municipal bodies such as the TCMRJ.  
 
Furthermore, this part noted that the 'controversy' involved the questioning not only of the 
slum upgrading instrument but also of Rio's housing policy as shown by the audit of the 
TCMJ which openly criticized and rejected municipal housing policy and proposed other 
approaches, and the debate organized by the FAFERJ at the Municipal Chamber. This 
relates to the emergence of a 'problematization' moment during which where debated and 
considered the instrument and its limitations, favelas' increase and expansion (horizontally 
and vertically). Out of this 'problematization' moment, housing construction re-emerged as 
possible and suitable approaches for solving the municipality's housing deficit, undermining 
the slum upgrading instrument and Rio's housing policy.  
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6.5 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has investigated the slum upgrading instrumentation during Maia's second and 
third administrations that lasted from 2001 to 2008, with the aim of showing how the 
instrument influenced housing policy and governance evolution and transformation. The 
first part described how the 2000 elections destabilized and weakened the instrument's 
network of 'associations' and housing policy. Specifically, the elections undermined Maia 
and Conde alliance and generated a 'controversy' about the instrument's efficiency and 
effectiveness, and a change of its objective of integrating favelas into the city towards their 
simple urbanization. The instrument's 'controversy' continued during the first years of 
Maia's second administration. In particular, Amaral questioned the instrument's essential 
vs. unnecessary objectives, while Magalhães condemned the implementation problems and 
a change of the instrument. However, this part highlighted how the instrument's regulatory 
frameworks limited any objective or component change. In addition, it noted that in the 
following years the instrument's regulations, the politico-administrative shift, the 
inexperience of the new SMH staff, and practices of clientelism generated more 
implementation problems that contributed to the continuing questioning of the instrument 
and the housing policy. The development of the 'controversy' about the instrument and the 
housing policy weakened further their network of 'associations'.  
 
The second part described that the instrument's isolation from the rest of the SMH and the 
increasing importance of the construction of houses, weakened its OPP role in the 
development of Rio's housing policy during the following years. It also highlighted that the 
instrument was destabilized by the emergence of initiatives that directly competed against 
it, in particular by Rio Comunidade and Urban Cell programmes conducted by other 
municipal bodies, slum upgrading projects carried out by the regional state of Rio de 
Janeiro (Cantagalo, Dona Marta and Rocinha projects) and the federal housing 
construction programme PAR. In addition, this part pointed out that the instrument was 
questioned as its implementation continued to entail delays, interruptions and lack of 
quality, and its regulations kept on complicating its use: (i) collaborative work difficult to 
carry out in the context of the growing municipal fragmentation, (ii) a selection method 
that resulted in more difficult project than in the 1990s and (iii) politico-electoral interests 
limited by the instrument's regulations. The processes of isolation, emergence of other 
slum upgrading experiences, and the increase of housing construction relate to the 
development of a 'dissidence' moment fostered by the instrument's 'problematization' and 
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instrument's 'controversy'. The 'problematization' moment developed mainly within in the 
SMH did not result in the rejection of the instrument but it strengthened the construction 
of houses as main approach. The instrument's 'controversy' was fostered by its 
implementation and regulation issues. The 'dissidence' moment entailed the building of 
new entities such as the Novas Alternativas and Urban Cell projects in which the 
instrument played a secondary role or was cut off, weakening its network of 'allies', and its 
OPP role in Rio's housing policy. Lastly, the second part also observed that despite the 
destabilization of the slum upgrading instrument, through the Urban Cell experience, the 
Master Plans for the Alemão Complex and Manguinhos Complex, and Rocinha, Cantagalo 
and Dona Marta projects, knowledge and know-how were developed. Furthermore, this 
part noted that the experts that developed them were constituted during the use of the 
slum upgrading instrument in the 1990s, in particular, architectural practices and municipal 
staff.  
 
The third part pointed out that the fall of the slum upgrading instrument during Maia's 
third administration related to the loss of its financial support and the consolidation of the 
instrument's 'controversy' about its efficiency and effectiveness. The 'controversy' 
consolidated the 'dissidence' of instrument's 'allies' such as favela dwellers and 
organizations, NGOs and academia, municipal administration and councillors. This part 
also highlighted that the 'controversy' involved the municipal housing policy itself resulting 
in the emergence of a 'problematization' moment during which where debated among 
others the instrument's limitations and favelas' increase and expansion. The 
problematization resulted in the rejection of the slum upgrading instrument and Rio's 
housing policy and the re-emergence of housing construction as possible and suitable 
approaches for addressing Rio's housing issues and the favelas' problem.  
 
The tracing of the upgrading instrument translation moments during Maia's second and 
third administrations supports the following considerations regarding the research 
hypotheses. Firstly, the chapter described that during Maia's second and third 
administrations the use of the slum upgrading instrument generated a series of 
'controversies' that contributed to the isolation of the instrument ('dissidence') and re-
'problematization' of the municipal housing policy, which undermined the instrument's 
central role and Rio's housing policy of the 1990s. Thus, the politico-administrative change 
in 2001 was important as it contributed to foster the 'controversies', and 'dissidence' and 
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'problematization' movements but was not determinant in the abandonment of the 
instrument and fall of the housing policy. Consequently, the chapter reveals new elements 
that substantiates hypothesis 1 as it shows that the fall of the policy during the first decade 
of the 2000s related to the outcomes and dynamics that the slum upgrading fostered in this 
period and was not only due to the political change with the return of Cesar Maia at the 
head of the Municipal administration from 2001.  
 
Secondly, despite the abandonment of the slum upgrading, this chapter illustrates that new 
actors emerged, in particular, the regional state of Rio de Janeiro and the Urban Cell office, 
while others consolidated their involvement in Rio's housing policy: SMH, architectural 
practices, IAB-RJ, construction companies, and BID. Furthermore, the chapter described 
how in spite of the fall of the housing policy and politico-administrative fragmentation the 
municipal government continued to enhance its power thanks to the further development 
of its knowledge and know-how about the favelas and their urbanization, in particular 
through development of Alemão and Manguinhos master plans and Urban Cell projects in 
Providência and Jacarezinho. These new elements support hypothesis 2 that argues that the 
slum upgrading contributed to modify housing governance as it supported the creation a 
new constellation of actors which produced new dynamics within the housing sector. The 
chapter also shows that the use of slum upgrading continue to secure and even foster 
municipal executive power.  
 
Lastly, the chapter described how despite the fragmentation of the housing initiatives, 
various experts continued to enhance their skill through the various slum upgrading-related 
initiatives, in particular, architectural practices and municipal and regional state 
administrations. It observed the development and consolidation of knowledge and 
expertise through the various initiatives within the municipality (Urban Cell projects and 
Alemão and Manguinhos Complex master plans) and at the regional state level (Dona 
Marta, Rocinha, and Cantagalo). Furthermore, the chapter illustrated the use of the slum 
upgrading during Maia's second and third administrations as involving practices of 
clientelism, yet these were difficult to put into practice or limited by the slum upgrading 
regulatory frameworks. Thus, the chapter brings new elements to support hypotheses 3 
that argue that the instrument contributed to the depoliticization of Rio's housing policy. 
Specifically, the chapter illustrates that the weakening of political regulation was 
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underpinned by the development of favelas' experts and development of knowledge and 
know-how about favelas and their urbanization.  
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CHAPTER 7 SLUM UPGRADING: RISING FROM THE ASHES 
 
 
 
 
 
'New displacements take the place of the previous ones but these divert the actors from the 
obligatory passage points that had been imposed upon them. New spokesmen are heard that deny 
the representativity of the previous ones. Translation continues but the equilibrium has been 
modified' (Callon 1986: 19). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the use of the slum upgrading instrument from the end of the first 
decade of the 2000s up to 2012, seeking to reveal its role for housing policy and 
governance evolution.  
 
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores how the slum upgrading 
instrument re-emerged from 2007. The second part analyses its development during the 
first half of the Paes administration (2009-2010) while the third part during the second half 
(2010-2011).  
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7.2 NEW LEASE OF LIFE 
7.2.1 Waking up 
Slum upgrading gaining financial support  
CHAPTER 6 described that the slum upgrading instrument was gradually isolated and 
collectively abandoned throughout Maia's second and third administrations (2001-2008). In 
particular, it lost its main financial support as the BID loan ended in 2006 (see page 183). 
The possibility of a third BID contract was undermined by the municipality's deteriorating 
financial situation and the Federal Government's reluctance to approve loans with external 
institutions. The SMH budget fell from R$ 170 million on average per year from 2001 to 
2005 to R$ 69 million in 2006 (CGMRJ n.d.). Nevertheless, this situation started to change 
from 2007. In March of that year, the Federal Government launched the Growth 
Accelerated Programme (PAC) (see CHAPTER 2 page 44), strengthening its presence in 
the municipal housing sector after an increase of investments and the creation of the 
National Social Housing System (SNHIS) during Lula's first administration (see 
CHAPTER 2 page 42). The PAC earmarked R$106.3 billion for sanitation works and 
housing initiatives that included housing construction and slum upgrading (PAC 2007b). 
The South-East region of Brazil formed by the states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas 
Gerais and Espiritu Santo was expected to attract R$ 23.9 billion, out of which R$ 19.1 
billion would be for housing construction and R$ 4.8 billion for slum upgrading projects. 
 
The municipality of Rio de Janeiro benefited from PAC investments. In June 2007, the 
SMH secured R$ 220 million (PAC 2010c), but these investments did not boost financially 
immediately the SMH that had in 2007 its second lowest budget since its creation: R$ 49 
million (see Figure 29 page 184). During 2008 other projects submitted by the municipality 
were selected by the PAC commission, invigorating SMH actions (PAC 2010c). The 
Federal Governmental also revived other programmes such as Pro-Moradia, invigorating 
SMH initiatives. Rio de Janeiro's municipality obtained R$160 million through this 
programme, an event that had not occurred since 1998 (DCMRJ 09/06/2008: 26). These 
contracts together with the PAC investments increased SMH's budget, bringing it up to R$ 
155 million in 2008.  
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The rise of the state government  
While the SMH was gaining strength the state of Rio de Janeiro emerged as an actor in the 
housing sector. In 2006, Sergio Cabral became candidate for the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement Party (PMDB) in the state election. Cabral had a long political career and was a 
political enemy of Maia. He was elected Rio de Janeiro's state deputy from 1990 to 2002 
and senator from 2003 to 2006. Cabral was also involved in the Carioca's political life 
disputing unsuccessfully Rio de Janeiro's municipal elections in 1992, 1996 and 2000 (see 
CHAPTER 5 page 131 and CHAPTER 6 page 159). Supported by the outgoing State 
Governor Rosinha Garotinho and her husband the ex-Governor Anthony (1999-2002), he 
was first in the first round with 41.4% of votes, followed by Maia's favourite candidate 
Denise Frossard with 23.78% (TSE n.d.). Marcelo Crivella, supported by President Lula 
and with second place in the polls (G1 Globo, 2006c), arrived in third position with 
18.53% of votes, being frozen out of the electoral process. Right after the first round 
Cabral sealed an alliance with the PT and Lula who could not avoid the second ballot at the 
national elections (G1 Globo 2006b; G1 Globo 2006c). He also consolidated alliances with 
other Carioca's politicians such as Eduardo Paes (G1 Globo 2006d). Supported by these 
alliances, Cabral won the elections, securing an unprecedented alignment between the state 
of Rio de Janeiro and the Federal Government. With the arrival in 2007 of Sergio Cabral as 
Governor, the state of Rio de Janeiro was well placed for attracting Federal Government 
investments not only because Cabral was an ally of Lula but also because the state of Rio 
de Janeiro could attract more PAC investments than the municipality as it had a greater 
debt capacity and a better financial situation.  
 
At the beginning of 2007 the state of Rio de Janeiro obtained R$ 240 million from the 
Federal Government for refurbishing Maracanã stadium and upgrading Rocinha favela 
(EMOP 2007a). In particular, for upgrading Rocinha, the state of Rio de Janeiro hired Luiz 
Carlos Toledo who had won the architectural competition that it commissioned at the end 
of 2005 (IPHAN 2006). As mentioned previously, this contest was organized by the IAB-
RJ (Brazilian Institute of Architects - department Rio de Janeiro), following the same 
methodological pattern created in 1994 with the Favela-Bairro programme and reproduced 
in 2004 for upgrading the Dona Marta favela (see CHAPTER 6 page 171).  
 
As soon as the PAC was launched, the State Secretariat of Public Works (SEOB) led by 
Vice-Governor Luis Fernando de Sousa known as Pezão and the State Construction 
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Company (EMOP) directed by Ícaro Moreno Júnior, focused on preparing slum upgrading 
proposals that could be financed through the programme. Ícaro Moreno had experience on 
slum upgrading as he directed RioUrbe that conducted some Favela-Bairro projects during 
the 1990s as the SMH was unable to cope with all the work (DCMRJ 11/03/2002: 04-08). 
However, besides the Rocinha project, the state of Rio de Janeiro did not have other 
projects to submit to the Federal Government. The state of Rio de Janeiro contacted the 
SMH and found out the existence of two urban development plans for the Alemão and 
Manguinhos complex (interview with Jozé Candido Sampaio, ex SMH Projects' Office 
Coordinator). As mentioned previously, these master plans were commissioned by the 
SMH during Maia's second administration (2001-2004) (see CHAPTER 6 page 167). The 
objective of these plans was to reflect on larger favelas and develop a methodology for this 
type of settlements as Favela-Bairro involved medium size favelas. The plans included 
social and spatial diagnosis of the mentioned areas and possible scenarios for their urban 
development (SMH, 2004). 
 
Developed by Jorge Mario Jáuregui who gained expertise in slum upgrading through 
several Favela-Bairro projects, they never left the drawing board because of the lack of 
investments. With the PAC these projects had a chance to be materialized and they were 
suitable for the PAC because of their scale. In the middle of March the state of Rio de 
Janeiro proposed slum upgrading projects in Manguinhos, Alemão, Rocinha and City of 
God to the Federal Government. The final selection of projects was decided during a 
meeting between President Lula and State Governor Cabral (interview with Jorge Mario 
Jáuregui) and by the end of March, the Ministry of Cities officially announced PAC 
investments for the Alemão and Manguinhos favela complex. The amount of investment 
was for R$ 960 million, and involved slum upgrading and housing construction (EMOP 
2007b). This amount was substantial for implementing slum upgrading projects in the 
municipality as it represented almost two thirds of the SMH budget from 1993 to 2006, i.e. 
R$1.5 billion (CGMRJ n.d.). By June 2007 the EMOP started to define the different 
projects and one year later, in March 2008, the projects were launched in the presence of 
Cabral and President Lula. 
 
The state involvement in the municipal housing increased not only thanks to the PAC but 
also thanks to the creation and expansion of Health Emergency Units (UPA) and Pacifying 
Police Units (UPP). In 2007 the state of Rio de Janeiro constructed the first UPA which 
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was opened 24 hours in Mare favela in order to provide health care, deal with emergencies 
and contribute to the health care plan by monitoring low income neighbourhoods and 
favelas' health-related indicators. In 2008 the state government created the Pacifying Police 
Units (UPPs) aiming to regain the control of areas, in particular, favelas ruled by gangs and 
drug dealers. The UPPs differed from previous projects because the police force presence 
aimed at being permanent (UPP n.d.). Moreover, they aimed at dissociating the two 
dimensions of the security policy: State presence and the fight against crime (FGV Projetos 
2012). Rio de Janeiro State Public Security Secretariat (SESEG) inaugurated the first UPP 
in December 2008 and during 2009 other four UPPs were opened (Cano 2012).  
Slum upgrading adaptations 
PAC slum upgrading projects aimed at improving the quality of life not only through the 
construction of sanitation infrastructure, but also through the creation of public spaces and 
expansion of public services such as employment agencies, childcare centres and schools 
(EMOP 2007c). These aims were the same as the ones of the Favela-Bairro programme in 
the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. Nevertheless, the PAC financial support 
widened the instrument's scope. In particular, the slum upgrading included the 
construction of housing units and transport systems such as the cable car constructed in 
Alemão complex and informed by the Medellin case (EMOP 2007d). Furthermore, PAC 
modified to some extent the slum upgrading investment model.  
 
PAC financial support also modified the type of actors involved in the slum upgrading. 
Besides the inclusion of the state of Rio de Janeiro as an actor, the large scale interventions 
and important investments generated the interest of bigger construction companies. 
International and well-established companies entered in competition with medium size 
companies involved in housing policy during the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. 
For instance, the consortium 'Rio Melhor' (Better Rio) won the public tender for 
implementing the upgrading of the Alemão complex. The consortium was formed by three 
of the largest construction companies in Brazil: Odebrecht, OAS and Delta. 
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7.2.2 Slum upgrading at municipal level: new wind  
Politico-administrative renewal 
In 2009, a politico-administrative renewal at municipal level occurred with the election of 
Eduardo Paes as Mayor of Rio de Janeiro. Paes entered politics in 1993 when Maia 
appointed him at the head of Barra da Tijuca sub-prefecture. Some years later he became 
deputy for the state of Rio de Janeiro. When Maia returned to the municipal administration 
in 2001 Paes was appointed Secretary of Sport and Environment; however, some time later 
he broke up with Maia. Paes fought in the 2006 elections to become Governor of Rio de 
Janeiro and even though he did not win he consolidated an alliance with the elected 
Governor Sergio Cabral and became Rio State Secretary of Sports and Tourism. At the end 
of 2007 Paes was appointed PMDB candidate in the municipality elections. His major rivals 
were Marcelo Crivella (PT) and Fernando Gabiera (alliance PSDB and PPS). Paes and 
Gabiera made it to the second round. With the defeat of the PT candidate President Lula 
supported Paes. This support was rather surprising as a Paes had been one of the major 
critics of Lula's government corruption scandal (Mensalão scandal in 2005) by explicitly 
stating that President Lula was involved in this corruption scheme (see footnote 14 page 
43). Paes won in the second round of elections. His victory represented a change of 
administration that brought a new era after 16 years of Maia's administration as the Conde 
administration was perceived as a continuity (similar renewal when Maia arrived in 1993). 
Not only because of the change itself, but also because it represented for the first time a 
political alignment of the three levels of government: Paes, Cabral, Lula.  
 
Paes appointed Jorge Bittar as Secretary of the Municipal Housing Department. Bittar was 
a PT member who has a long career in politics. He was involved in the urban reform 
movement of the 1980s. Then, he became municipal councillor from 1992 to 1999 and 
federal deputy from 1999 to 2001, and participated in debates about Rio's housing policy 
(see page 110) and the creation of the SMH (see page 121). Bittar brought some of the staff 
who had moved away since 2001 from the SMH. For example, Adriana Cardoso, Augusto 
Verissimo and Isabel Tostes who were part of the SMH staff when Sergio Magalhães was 
head of that department. The integration of this staff allowed the municipality to integrate 
past expertise.  
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Slum upgrading: limited development as policy instrument  
Despite the politico-administrative renewal and the integration of old SMH staff, the slum 
upgrading instrument was no longer seen as the solution for Rio de Janeiro's housing 
problems. The instrument continued to be considered as an ineffective solution while 
housing construction gained strength as suitable strategy:  
'In recent years, the city pumped US$ 600 million (R$ 1.034 billion) into the Favela-Bairro in 
168 favelas, but at the same time, another 250 rose up in the City. Dayse [President of the IAB-
RJ] adds that despite some improvement in infrastructure, the municipality could not incorporate 
these favelas that benefited from the programme into the formal city. To the President of the IAB, 
it is possible to think of indemnities [as solution] for small and new communities, but it is also 
important to incentivize the construction of popular housing in areas with infrastructure and at the 
same time to facilitate credit to the residents for buying the houses' (O Globo 2009a). 
In addition, in the first days of his administration, Paes launched what he called 'shock of 
order' against the urban disorder (Estadão 2009). This electoral promise involved primarily 
the repression of street vendors and illegal constructions. During 2010 several evictions 
were planned (O Globo 2010a; O Globo 2010b; O Globo 2010c; O Globo 2010d; O 
Globo 2010e; O Globo 2010f). Thus, Paes' shock of order supported evictions and 
housing construction rather than slum upgrading:  
'To stigmatize eviction is irresponsible ... There is not a plan for evicting [all] favela dwellers. 
Those favelas which have already been consolidated need initiatives that improve the quality of life 
of those who live there, and they will be implemented. But there are situations where the alternative 
of eviction can and must be discussed ... Nowadays there are 1000 favelas in the city . The vast 
majority of them are very small and in this universe, there are indeed cases where eviction is a 
solution. Wherever it [eviction] is possible, people will stand to gain in housing. And also the city 
because it will prevent favela growth, reaching a size impossible to administer ... The ideal would 
be to form small housing clusters distributed across the city instead of sending people to massive 
housing estates, very distant and without infrastructure. In the past, eviction meant the creation of 
Vila Kennedy and City of God, two bad examples of large scale housing developments arising from 
evictions - which eventually became favelas with high crime rates. I will not throw anyone into such 
places. There are areas within the city that offer good alternatives' (Eduardo Paes, Mayor of Rio 
de Janeiro, Veja 2009). 
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Paes' shock of order fuelled a debate that involved a wide range of actors about the 
increase and expansion of favelas that called into question municipal housing and urban 
policy efficiency and effectiveness (O Globo 2009b; O Globo 2009c; O Globo 2009d; O 
Globo 2009e; O Globo 2009f; O Globo 2009g; Jornal do Brasil 2009a; O Globo 2010g; O 
Globo 2010d). This debate on the one hand weakened the re-emergence of the instrument 
as it exposed slum upgrading limitations in relation to its objective of solving favelas' 
problems by transforming them into neighbourhood, and on the other it supported 
evictions, urban control and housing construction as a suitable solution.  
 
Furthermore, even if the PAC financially supported the instrument re-emergence, the SMH 
was financially weak as the bulk of work and investments for slum upgrading were 
conducted by the state of Rio through EMOP (PAC 2010c). The SMH projects mainly 
involved small interventions started by the previous administration.  
 
Lastly, the Federal Government investments weakened the use of the slum upgrading as 
they supported housing construction rather than slum upgrading:  
'-[Interviewer] You arrive at the housing secretariat at a time when the Federal Government is 
having discussion over an important share of FGTS resources for PlanHab, concentrating its 
resources for capital grants aimed at low-income population. There is also the CAIXA ...  
- [Bittar]It all sounds like music to my ears. There is a large amount of resources for that very 
large area. I make no exaggeration if I say, paraphrasing President Lula (laughs) ''that never 
before in the history of this country ''there was a so intense programme of federal public resources 
for urban development .  
-Where will you start in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, where there is a housing deficit of at 
least 250,000 dwellings? 
- We intend, in four years, to deliver 100,000 affordable housing ... It is the only way we have to 
end with the favelização [growing of favelas] in the city ... 
-President Lula determined that the Union will open handed as regards all its unused properties 
which may serve for the production of social housing. As Rio de Janeiro was the federal capital, it 
has a lot of federal properties [at the beginning of the 2000s the SMH sought the transfer of these 
properties to regularize favelas rather than for housing construction (see CHAPTER 6 page 
175]. We are also identifying the INSS [National Institute of Social Security] properties in the 
city for an evaluation' (Jorge Bittar, SMH Secretary, Jornal do Brasil 2009b). 
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Slum upgrading reconfiguration  
By the second half of 2009, the SMH proposed in its Plurianunal Plan (PPA 2010-2013) a 
housing strategy named 'Morar Maravilha' that entailed housing construction and the 
regularization of settlements declared as Areas of Special Social Interest (AEIS) (SMH 
2009; DCMRJ 6/11/2009: 75-87). In order to achieve these objectives the SMH proposed 
the development of housing construction, in particular, in urban empty spaces primarily 
located in the centre of the city and harbour and the development of a partnership with the 
public and private sector for financing this production. The SMH targeted the construction 
of 50,000 during Paes' administration (10,000 in the first year) plus a reduction in at least 
5% of the area occupied by the favelas (taking the year 2008 as reference) (ibid). The 
possibility of reaching these targets increased with the launch of the MCMV (My Home My 
Life) programme in March 2009 that aimed at the construction of one million houses 
across the country (see CHAPTER 2 page 45).  
 
Morar Maravilha included on the one hand the development of housing construction on a 
large scale through the MCMV, PAC Moradia, FNHIS (National Social Housing Fund) and 
the municipal programme 'Novas Alternativas' that emerged in the 1990s (see Table 8 page 
112), and was developed during the first decade of the 2000s (see CHAPTER 6 page 168). 
On the other, the SMH proposed the development of the slum upgrading through the 
PAC, Pro-Moradia, BID loan and FNHIS. The new approach regarding the slum 
upgrading aimed at overcoming the slum upgrading limited results, in particular, by 
focusing on maintenance, favela surroundings, housing construction and regulating favelas 
density:  
'The Favela-Bairro was important, we all acknowledge it, but it needs to evolve based on the 
criticisms that this House [Municipal Chamber] has made, the reports made by the Municipal 
Chamber that highlighted some deficiencies in the Favela-Bairro programme, the need for bigger 
and better resettlements, the need of maintenance work in our communities ... It is not worth the 
investment if you do not do maintenance... it's what happened historically, upgrading works 
deteriorate, it is necessary to integrate the favelas that are urbanized into the city. For this it is 
necessary to improve accessibility also within these communities. It is necessary to invest in the 
community, in its surroundings, in social facilities for income-generation and employment, in health, 
in education. In short, we are re-conceptualizing, promoting a certain evolution of urbanization 
actions and also promoting a large resettlement, i.e. a more comprehensive work of making less 
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dense our communities to get more in the right direction, getting closer to the idea of a community 
that can truly become a liveable neighbourhood of the city. The favela after receiving improvements, 
investments, can become a neighbourhood, which was the dream of the Favela-Bairro programme, 
that up to now has not fully happened, although life has improved considerably in the favelas served 
by sanitation, lighting, streets, all those things... 
Reduce, this is an important goal too, in at least 5 % the areas occupied by the favelas of the City. 
What is our idea? Let's urbanize slums and we could resettle, with this new housing construction, 
many families who live in riverside, hillside, we are going to make less dense many favelas' (Jorge 
Bittar, SMH secretary, DCMRJ 06/11/2009: 76-77). 
For the year 2010 the SMH through the Project's Office managed by Augusto Verissimo 
sought to continue the implementation of the slum upgrading as follows: 5 projects 
thought the PAC and 12 through the Pro-Moradia. In addition the SMH expected to 
obtain Pro-Moradia resources for 6 other favelas (SMH 2009b) and a third BID Loan 
(interview with Jose Brakarz, specialist in slum upgrading at the BID); DCMRJ 
06/11/2009: 75-87).  
*** 
This part described how the slum upgrading re-emergence related to the building of new 
'associations' through 'interessement' and 'enrolment' mechanisms. Its new lease was 
supported mainly by the 'associations' with the Federal and regional state governments, 
federal programmes (PAC), developers and old allies such as architectural practices and 
municipal and regional state staff. The building of 'associations' reshaped the instrument; in 
particular, the vast amount of investments allowed the implementation of larger and more 
comprehensive interventions: resettling more families, constructing housing units and 
building transport infrastructure. It also reshaped the constellation of actors as developers 
got involved.  
 
This part also illustrated how at municipal level the 'problematization' of Rio's housing 
policy continued. During this process, the slum upgrading continued to be questioned for 
not solving Rio's housing issues and in particular favelas' increase and expansion. This 
undermined its possibility to be constituted as 'Obligatory Passage Point' (OPP) of Rio's 
'new' housing policy. The 'problematization' moment resulted in the consolidation of 
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housing construction as the OPP of Rio's housing policy during Paes' first year as it also 
got the support of Paes agenda (shock of order) and federal funding (MCMV).  
 
Lastly, this part described the re-emergence of the slum upgrading as instrument was 
supported by the methods, processes and regulations created in the last two decades, and 
people with expertise in this type of initiatives, in particular, municipal staff and 
architectural practices.   
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
210 
7.3 THE MORAR CARIOCA PLAN: SEEKING TO INTEREST AGAIN 
7.3.1 An Olympic support 
Slum upgrading as legacy  
Hosting the Olympic Games was an aspiration of Rio de Janeiro since 1990. The city 
presented a candidacy for hosting the 2004 and the 2012 Olympic Games; however, in 
both processes it was eliminated in the first round. In September 2006 Rio de Janeiro 
submitted its candidacy for hosting the 2016 Olympic Games. One year later seven cities 
were selected, including Rio, and by 2008 Rio made it to the final round together with 
Madrid, Chicago and Tokyo. In October 2009 Jacques Rogge, president of the 
International Olympic Committee, announced Rio de Janeiro's victory. Right after this 
announcement Rio de Janeiro started the elaboration of the Olympic Games Legacy Plan. 
Coordinated by the SMU (Municipal Planning Secretariat), this urban, environmental and 
social legacy plan included all the projects and programmes that could be considered as a 
legacy and that could be boosted by the Olympic Games. For instance, among the main 
projects and programmes identified by the different municipal secretariat were the 
transport infrastructure network and the 'Porto Maravilha' regeneration project (Rio de 
Janeiro's old harbour). For the housing legacy plan, the SMH put together all the projects it 
was implementing; however, the SMH realized that the 'housing legacy' was small 
(interview with Luis Valverde, project manager at the SMH Projects' Office).  
 
Building on the idea that the 2016 Olympic Games could be an opportunity for solving Rio 
de Janeiro's favela problem, the SMH worked on a financial analysis and schedule to assess 
possible scenarios (interview with Luis Valverde). This process included, as previously, the 
elaboration of a classification matrix (see CHAPTER 5 page 115). This time, one of the 
main criteria was favelas' location in relation to each other, generating two main types: 
'isolated' and 'complex' favelas. The other two main criteria were favelas' size and degree of 
urbanization. This new classification allowed the reorganization of the 1020 favelas 
identified by the IPP (Municipal Insitute of Urbanisme) in 2009, into 625 favelas, out of 
which 481 were 'isolated' favelas and 144 'complex' (formed by 539 favelas). This new 
classification considered that only 55 favelas were urbanized. The SMH also analysed the 
investment needed for the urbanization of each favela, prioritizing the favelas located near 
the Olympic Cluster (interview with Luis Valverde).  
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Financially, the SMH realized that there was the opportunity to scale their interventions 
because on the one hand the Olympic Games would attract important public and private 
investments and on the other hand, in March 2010, the Federal Government launched the 
PAC 2 (see CHAPTER 2 page 46), from which the municipality could benefit. Moreover, 
the municipality was negotiating a third BID loan since 2008 (interview with Jose Brakarz) 
and a loan from the World Bank (WB) with the aim of restructuring its debt with the 
Brazilian Federal Government (World Bank 2010). The BID loan had been on the table 
since 2004, but it was not until 2008 that the loan project went into a preparatory stage that 
led to the elaboration of a project profile (BID 2008). A year and a half later the BID 
approved the loan of a total of US $ 300 million (BID 2010). Signed in August 2010, the 
WB loan of R$ 1.9 billion (US $ 1 billion) was unique in its kind as its objective was the 
reduction of the interest rate of the municipal debt with the Federal Government that 
reached that year R$ 7.4 billion, compromising municipal government investments. The 
reduction of interest rates from 9% to 6% could allow the municipality to free around 
R$400 million every year for investments including slum upgrading projects (PCRJ 2010c). 
Therefore, the SMH focused on the elaboration of a proposal that included the 
urbanization of all the favelas of the city, prioritizing as well the favelas close to the major 
projects in the city such as the four Bus Rapid System (BRT) corridors: Transoeste, 
Transcarioca, Trasolimpica and Transbrasil.  
 
The elaboration of the proposal included the identification and inclusion of different 
municipal bodies whose actions related to the materialization of the slum upgrading 
instrument like the SMU as it controlled the POUSO and approved construction permits, 
the Municipal Environment Secretariat (SMAC) which monitored the expansion of favelas 
on natural preserved areas, the Municipal Education Secretariat (SME) that managed 
schools and childcare centres, the SMO that was responsible for public works and services, 
the SMDS involved in social programmes and the IPP that supported among other 
activities the city's urban development. Through their involvement since the inception of 
the proposal, the SMH sought to secure the coordination of these bodies during the 
implementation of the instrument. This objective was the same as the one that 
underpinned the creation of the Executive Group of Special Programmes for Popular 
Settlements (GEAP) that involved several municipal bodies in the formulation of the 
municipal housing policy basis back in the 1990s (see CHAPTER 5 page 110). The SMH 
held meetings with several departments to discuss the Morar Carioca plan regulations. The 
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involvement of the different departments since the beginning of the elaboration of the 
Morar Carioca plan secured their support and willingness to work together with the SMH 
(interview with Luis Valverde). In addition, the SMH discussed with the CEDAE the terms 
of an agreement for implementing and maintaining water and sanitation services in favelas. 
At national level, the SMH met with the Ministry of Cities, 'Casa Civil' (Chief of Staff 
Office) and Ministry of Sports.  
 
The Morar Carioca plan aimed at urbanizing all favelas by 2016; however, this objective 
was judged impossible even with the municipality's experience. For instance, the lack of 
work force was a limit to this ambitious plan. This led the SMH to review its proposal. The 
SMH also engaged discussion with the IAB-RJ. This partnership was sealed when Sergio 
Magalhães, ex-Housing Municipal Secretary (1995-2000), was appointed to the head of this 
institute for the period 2010-2011 and re-elected for the period 2012-2013.  
7.3.2 Morar Carioca launch  
Objectives 
Presented as a 2016 Olympic Games social legacy, Rio de Janeiro's municipality launched 
the Morar Carioca Plan in July 2010. The stated goal was to urbanize all Rio de Janeiro 
favelas by 2020, with an investment of about R$ 8 billion. To achieve this goal the plan was 
divided into three different stages. The first one included the 24 ongoing slum upgrading 
projects, with an investment of around R$ 2 billion until 2012. The second phase involved 
the implementation of 84 slum upgrading projects following the new methodology 
established through the process mentioned above and an investment of R$ 2.4 billion from 
2012 to 2016. The last phase was expected to be the continuity of the previous one, which 
earmarked R$ 3 billion for 113 projects to be conducted from 2016 to 2020. Furthermore, 
the Morar Carioca included a contract with the IAB-RJ worth R$ 8 million (O Globo 
2010h). This agreement aimed primarily at organizing an architectural competition to select 
practices to develop the slum upgrading projects. (IAB-RJ 2010a) like the one organized in 
1994 (see CHAPTER 5 page 115), and reproduced for the upgrading of Dona Marta and 
Rocinha by the state of Rio de Janeiro in 2004 and 2005 respectively (see CHAPTER 6 
page 173).  
 
Even if the Morar Carioca plan shared several similarities with the Favela-Bairro 
programme, the plan also included the following novelties: (i) the inclusion of housing 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
213 
construction as an important item, (ii) a wider footprint of the interventions, (iii) the 
relocation of more families (PCRJ 2010a), (iv) the close involvement of the Public Order 
Municipal Secretariat (SEOP) to prevent the formation of new informal settlements and of 
the Conservation and Public Services Municipal Secretariat (SECONSERVA) responsible 
for infrastructure and public services maintenance (PCRJ 2010a), and (v) the use of the 
mega events (2012 Rio+20 UN Conference, 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games) 
and state government interventions (PAC projects, UPAs, and UPPs) to foster the 
instrument's implementation and impact. 
Moving forward  
In October 2010 the IAB-RJ and SMH organized the architectural competition called 
'Morar Carioca, conceptualization and practice in slum urbanization' aimed at the selection 
of multidisciplinary teams led by architectural practices to elaborate and conduct slum 
upgrading projects. This competition was the first activity of the contract between the IAB-
RJ and the SMH. In the 1990s the use of an architectural competition to choose the 
practices that were going to conduct Favela-Bairro projects concerned only the first 16 
projects implemented at that time as it was substituted with public tenders when the 
municipality negotiated the first BID loan. In contrast, the 2010 architectural competition 
involved the selection of architectural practices for all projects included in the Morar 
Carioca Plan. The launch of the competition coincided with two events related to the 2016 
Olympic Games: a debate about Rio-London and the launch of the Olympic harbour 
architectural competition. Organized by the IAB-RJ, these events allowed to emphasize the 
relationship between the Morar Carioca plan and Rio 2016 agenda. For example, Paes who 
attended the launch of the Morar Carioca competition underlined that:  
'The idea and the commitment that the great legacy of the Olympics will be this [Morar Carioca]. 
Our goal is to dare. Without pharaonic works, but with projects that meet all the needs of this 
process' (IAB-RJ 2010b). 
At the beginning of December 2010, 40 architectural practices were selected to develop 
urbanization projects that included primarily: the delineation of settlements, the production 
of a physical, social and legal diagnosis and the production plans and designs and urban 
parameters (interview with Luis Valverde). Several architectural practices and people that 
participated in the competition had been involved in Favela-Bairro projects. Thus, the 
development of the Morar Carioca plan was supported by the expertise of these 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
214 
architectural practices that consolidated their know-how through the use of the slum 
upgrading instrument (Figure 34 page 216).  
'A big problem that existed was that there were no trained technicians to design favela areas. The 
first teams included postgraduates without any type of know-how and after years and years now 
they have this knowledge. And the traditional architecture practices of Rio de Janeiro, good 
architecture and urban planning practices, were also added to this experience. They formed into 
teams and now they have the expertise to intervene in favelas' ( Fernando Cavallieri, Advisor at 
the Municipal administration Freire & Oliveira 2008: 254). 
The SMH signed another agreement with the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic 
Analyses (IBASE) to invigorate community participation in the design and implementation 
of the Morar Carioca projects. IBASE was an NGO founded in 1981. IBASE was hired for 
its expertise acquired through different works, including the project called 'Pact for 
Citizenship' realized in the context of PAC 1 in 2008. The objective of IBASE in the 
context of the Morar Carioca was to enable civil society to influence the planning process 
(IBASE 2012). The agreement included the elaboration of participative social diagnosis, the 
collection and dissemination of favela information for the architectural practices and public 
institutions and for publications. In order to avoid Favela-Bairro participation issues, 
IBASE aimed to interact with the architectural practices responsible for the urban projects 
before the beginning of works. In the same spirit an agreement was also signed with PUC 
university for doing research in favelas. 
Continuity of the Federal Government support  
By 2010 the instrument already benefited from important Federal Government 
investments. At the level of the state of Rio de Janeiro R$ 24.1 billion were invested for 
housing finance (MCMV not included) and R$ 2.9 billion for slum upgrading projects 
(PAC 2010c). In particular, the investment (executed and earmarked) for slum upgrading in 
the municipality of Rio de Janeiro reached R$ 2.2 billion, of which $R 1.4 billion was 
earmarked by the state government and R$700 million by the municipality (PAC 2010c).  
 
The 2010 elections did not modify the political alignment at the three levels of government 
achieved since the arrival of Paes at the head of Rio de Janeiro. At federal level Dilma 
Rousseff was designated as PT presidential candidate. Rousseff joined the PT party in 2000 
and was appointed by President Lula as Minister of Energy in 2003. In 2005 she became 
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Presidential Chief of Staff Minister after Jose Dirceu left this position because of the 
Mensalão Scandal (see footnote 14 page 43). Rousseff did not win in the first round and 
faced Jose Serra State Governor of São Paulo in the second round. In the state of Rio de 
Janeiro in 2010 Rousseff sealed an alliance with Cabral that enabled her to obtain more 
than 60% of the votes of the state of Rio (Figure 35). Rousseff won the second round with 
56% of votes at national level (O Globo 2010i). During the same elections Sergio Cabral 
obtained about 60% of votes in the first round for the state of Rio de Janeiro. With 
Rousseff and Cabral's victory, Paes secured continuity of State and federal investments that 
heavily the financed municipal housing policy.  
*** 
This part described that the development of the slum upgrading instrument through the 
Morar Carioca plan involved its 'problematization' during which associations were rebuilt 
and objectives were redefined. The building of alliances and definition of aims entailed 
'interessement' through several devices such as the elaboration of the Olympic Legacy plan, 
architectural competition, the elaboration of the Morar Carioca plan and the new 
classification matrix. This process resulted in the 'enrolment' of several departments and 
institutions at the three levels of government, BID, IAB-RJ, architectural practices and 
IBASE.  
 
This part also noted that the use of the slum upgrading instrument was supported by the 
expertise developed primarily through the Favela-Bairro experience. Moreover, the 
instrument's re-emergence fostered new knowledge and expertise through different 
processes such as the elaboration of the new classification matrix and architectural 
competition which allowed the rethinking of possible strategies based on the outcome of 
the slum upgrading in the past years. The development of this knowledge and know-how 
reinforced slum upgrading technical/scientific legitimacy and favela experts' authority. 
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Figure 34 Morar Carioca competition, December 2010. Exhibition of architectural practices 
proposals at the winners' announcement event. Source: IAB-RJ 2010c 
 
 
Figure 35 Presidential campaign, October 2010, before the second round. From left to right: 
Sergio Cabral Rio de Janeiro State Governor, President Lula, PT presidential candidate 
Dilma Rousseff, and Rio de Janeiro Mayor Eduardo Paes. Source: Estadão 2010 
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7.4 DIFFICULT TIMES FOR THE SLUM UPGRADING INSTRUMENT 
7.4.1 Slum upgrading in the shade of the MCMV programme 
The development of the use of the slum upgrading instrument 
In the following years the use of the slum upgrading instrument increased. By 2011 the 
SMH slum upgrading initiatives represented a total investment of more than R$ 1.8 billion 
(SMH 2011). Overall, the main items in all these projects, excepting housing construction 
and improvement, were similar to the ones of the 1990s: project design and urbanization 
works, community equipment and urban furniture, indemnification, housing acquisition, 
land regularization, social work projects, technical assistance, environmental recovery (ibid). 
The use of the slum upgrading instrument supported by important financial resources 
allowed the SMH to undertake more in-depth transformations of favelas than before and 
integrate new actors such as in the case of Providência. This favela was included in the 
second BID loan signed in 2000 and the original project included the construction of a 
cable car and an intervention on the top of the hill that would cause the demolition of 
houses and relocation of residents. At that time the project was only partially implemented 
because of lack of investments and the modification the Urban Cell Office made to the 
project to build the 'Open Air Museum' (see CHAPTER 6 page 170). 
 
In 2010 the SMH resumed the works in Providência with the ambition of 'truly integrating' 
the favela into the city (DCMRJ 06/11/2009: 76-77). The project was financially supported 
by PAC 2 and linked to the 'Porto Maravilha' regeneration project developed by the 
consortium 'Porto Novo' formed by Odebrecht, OAS and Carioca Engenharia through a 
Public-Private-Partnership (PPP). This PPP established that the consortium would be 
responsible for the slum upgrading project and public spaces maintenance (O Globo 
2011a). The new proposal developed by the same architect that elaborated the Favela-
Bairro project, Fernanda Salles, was estimated at R$ 119 million and included most of the 
elements that were abandoned in 2004 (SMH 2010). This new proposal involved more 
evictions and housing construction as it included the construction of the cable car and the 
razing of half of the houses that were obstructing the view of the Cruzeiro Chapel located 
at the top of Providência hill. The number of houses to be razed increased when the 
Culture Municipal Secretary (SMC) demanded the demolition of all the houses around the 
Chapel and forbidden the construction of new ones (interview with Fernanda Salles 
architect in charge of the Providência project) (see Figure 37).  
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Figure 36 PAC Providência project. Cruzeiro Chapel at the top of the hill. 
 Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 37 PAC Providência project. Image of the top of the hill with the new buildings and 
public spaces constructed. This image was created before the SMC forbidden the 
construction of buildings around the Chapel. Source: SMH n.d.  
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The SMH budget that was mostly earmarked for the use of slum upgrading gradually 
increased, reaching R$ 594 million in 2012 (Figure 38). Moreover, the SMH budget during 
the Paes administration was by far the largest since Maia's first administration (Figure 39). 
The slum upgrading instrument was financially supported by the PAC, Pro-Moradia, 
FNHIS, municipal resources and the BID loan. As for the latter, in February 2012, the 
Senate approved the BID loan (BAND 2012) and in July 2012 the municipality signed the 
contract (PCRJ 2012).  
 
 
Figure 38 SMH budget during Paes' administration. Source: CGMRJ n.d. 
Elaborated by the author. 
 
 
Figure 39 SMH budget (in R$ millions) by administration since 1993. Source: CGMRJ n.d. 
Elaborated by the author. 
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Playing a second role 
Despite the fact that the slum upgrading became stronger, in particular financially, it had a 
second role in Rio de Janeiro's housing policy during Paes' administration. The slum 
upgrading was the flagship of Rio's housing policy during the 1990s (CHAPTER 5), and 
even if it was gradually abandoned (CHAPTER 6), it was still the most used instrument up 
to the end of Maia's third administration. However, the instrument faced difficulty to grow 
stronger as it continued to be questioned for not solving favelas' problems (Figure 40). 
Moreover, the housing construction became central as Paes' shock of order involved 
evictions and housing construction and the Federal Government programmes supported it: 
'My commitment to the issue of housing is that we are sure today that Brazil would change when 
all people would have access to better living conditions. And then the house is a special place, it is 
home, where the children grow, where you receive their friends, where you can constantly improve the 
safety of your family. I'm sure that now we are taking another step to put a brick in building a 
better Brazil... The "My Home My Life" is one of the most important programmes in Brazil. 
Here at "Carioca-Neighbourhood" it is even more important because there are families who have 
suffered from natural disasters in hazardous areas and here they are, wanting a fresh start. And 
they will have a fresh start. This fresh start is not only a new home, it is also the fact that I saw 
here an infrastructure that is as or better than many neighbourhoods of the upper classes' 
(President Rousseff, inauguration of Carioca Neighbourhood in Rio de Janeiro funded through the 
MCMV, Planalto 2012).   
The development of the housing construction was possible as resources were available and 
without cost for Rio's treasury. From 2009 to 2012 the SMH budget (used mainly for slum 
upgrading projects) reached about R$ 1.6 billion, while MCMV investments in Rio de 
Janeiro's municipality represented more than double: R$3.5 billion26. 
 
                                                 
26 By the end of 2012 the SMH had contracted 50,000 houses and finished 30,000. For calculating 
the investment I use an average value of R$70,000 per contracted house. The R$ 70,000 is a average 
that did not take into account the increase of housing prices approved in August 2012 by the 
Federal Government. 
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Figure 40 Favela-Bairro project in Mangueira favela. Public space abandoned. 
Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011 
 
 
Figure 41 MCMV Carioca-Neighbourhood inauguration in July 2012. From right to left: 
President Rousseff, Mayor Eduardo Paes and state Governor Sergio Cabral.  
Source: Planalto 2012 
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7.4.2 Slum upgrading: old issues and new problems  
Timing 
During the Paes administration the use of the slum upgrading instrument brought to the 
surface old issues and the appearance of new problems that weakened the instrument's 
comeback. Firstly, the implementation of Morar Carioca slowed down, threatening the 
instrument's functioning and credibility. The Morar Carioca plan was announced in July 
2010 and the architectural competition organized by the IAB-RJ was finalized by the end of 
that year (see page 212). The SMH planned to launch the second phase of the Morar 
Carioca in 2011(O Globo 2011b); however, during that year the programme did not 
progress. The signature of contract between the municipality and the selected architectural 
practices was delayed, together with the partnership with IBASE. This led to the plan being 
renamed 'De-Morar Carioca' (delay carioca). It was not until April 2012 that some contracts 
with architectural practices were signed (IAB-RJ 2012). This delay did not mean that the 
SMH was not developing projects in the meantime but that the new methodology of the 
second phase was not implemented. This methodology included among others the 
participation of architectural practices to develop the projects (see page 212) and IBASE 
for strengthening civil society participation as a way to overcoming instrument's limitation 
(see page 214).  
 
In addition, the mega events' schedule interfered with the use of the slum upgrading 
instrument as in the case of Babilônia/Chapéu Mangueira. This project called Green Morar 
Carioca emerged in the middle of 2011 and was linked to Rio+20 conference (O Globo 
2011c). Works in Babilônia/Chapéu Mangueira took more time than expected. Right until 
the conference, the works were botched, weakening on top the credibility of the instrument 
among favela dwellers (field visit to Babilônia/Chapéu Mangueira).  
State coordination and competition 
During Paes' administration, the use of the slum upgrading instrument involved as before 
water and sanitation issues. Right after the 2006 state election, Sergio Cabral and Cesar 
Maia met to discuss state and municipality partnership (O Globo 2006b; O Globo 2006g). 
One of Maia's objectives during these negotiations was the municipalization of water and 
sanitation services. This old demand based on the idea that the city would be in the best 
position to organize and manage this service was taken into account (DCMRJ 19/05/1997: 
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04-13). Both administrations reached an agreement which established that the municipality 
would manage the water and sanitation services in the 21 neighbourhood of 'Zona Oeste' 
(West Area) of the municipality and favelas while CEDAE would remain responsible for 
the rest of the municipality (PCRJ 2010b). The Municipal Decree 'P' No.313/2007, 
delegated the responsibility of the 'Zona Oeste' and favela sewage service to the SMO and 
SMH respectively (DCMRJ 28/02/2007: 4). The SMH tried to consolidate a managing 
structure to take care of the favela sewage service. A year and a half later, in June 2008, R$ 
8.5 million were allocated to it and the SMH was going to sign contracts with the 
companies that were going to provide the services (DMRJ 09/06/2008: 25). However, in 
2009 Paes' administration disagreed with the arrangement. It argued that the city did not 
have the capacity to manage favela sewage service. Furthermore, the implementation of the 
agreement would lead to a waist of municipal resources as it would imply the creation of a 
system which would not benefit from CEDAE's existing infrastructure. Thus, the 
municipality tried to backtrack; however, by 2011 no other agreement was reached between 
the municipality and the CEDAE despite Paes and Cabral being political allies (DCMRJ 
30/11/2011: 16). Meanwhile the favela sewage system was still abandoned (Figure 42):  
'All thirty sewage treatment stations, built by the Favela-Bairro, are stopped, as well as the 80 lift 
sewage and about a million and a half kilometres of the sewage system in the slums, which are 
without operations and maintenance, since 2007' (Eliomar Coelho, municipal councillor, 
DCMRJ 01/07/2011: 25). 
In 2012, the municipality and CEDAE reached a new agreement in which CEDAE would 
resume sewage services in urbanized slums. Nevertheless, this ongoing issue of water and 
sanitation (see CHAPTER 5 page 138) weakened the instrument's support as one of the 
main objectives of its use was solving this specific problem.  
 
In the meantime, the role of the state of Rio de Janeiro in the municipal housing policy was 
growing, not only through the PAC with new investments such as the Mangueira project 
(Figure 43), but also through the UPAs and UPPs. By August 2013, the state of Rio de 
Janeiro had constructed 19 UPAs (SES-RJ n.d.) and 33 UPPs (UPP n.d.) (Figure 44). 
However, instead of being a complementary work, the state's actions created a competition 
between the two levels of government as their projects tended to concentrate in the same 
location such as Alemão complex and Mangueira favela, complicating the slum upgrading 
implementation (interview with Leandro Balbio architect; Luis Valverde).  
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Figure 42 Current sanitation issues in Vidigal favela. It benefited from the Favela-Bairro 
programme at the end of the 1990s (see Figure 19 page 149). 
Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011 
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Figure 43 A Scene with more beauty. Urbanization project of Mangueira include cable car 
and Samba Sidewalk. Source: O Globo 2010d 
 
 
Figure 44 Military police positioned in a building in front of Rocinha during the 
inauguration of the UPP in this favela. Source: Tânia Rêgo/Agência Brasil 2012 
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Growing opposition 
During the Paes administration, several evictions and relocations took place. Some of them 
were conducted as the municipality established that the favelas were risk areas such as 
Tabajaras. Other evictions related to SMH projects like Mangueira. By the end of 2009 the 
SMH requested Jorge Mario Jáuregui to elaborate a proposal for Mangueira upgrading. In 
April 2010, Jáuregui's proposal included as requested the 'Favela do Metro' demolition and 
relocation of people in apartments nearby constructed with Federal Government 
investments. This relocation was intended to create at the Favela do Metro a public space 
for Mangueira favela dwellers and nearby neighbourhoods (interview with Fram president 
of Favela do Metro residents' association, Jorge Mario Jauregui architect, Ana Mangueira 
favela residents' association ; visits to Favela do Metro and Mangueira favela).  
 
Other evictions related primarily to 2014 and 2016 mega events: for example, Vila 
Autodromo located within the site of the future Olympic Pack (eviction in progress). 
Lastly, several evictions resulted from the construction of Rio de Janeiro's BRT corridors 
conducted by the SMO. The SMH was responsible for offering housing solution for the 
people affected (interview with Luis Valverde). The SMH demanded, without success, that 
land expropriation be not limited to the BRT corridors but include more land, so housing 
projects could be developed along the route. 
 
The evictions and relocations fostered the reluctance of favela dwellers, civil society and 
other people and groups such as NGOs, scholars, to support the instrument and were at 
the root of initiatives trying to fight back these plans. For instance, the journal 'The New 
Democracy' (A nova democracia n.d.), the NGO Rio on Watch ((Rio on Watch n.d.), and 
the Popular Council (Conselho Popular n.d.) formed amongst others by favela dwellers 
denounced on several occasions and campaigned against the SMH initiatives, including the 
slum upgrading instrument (interview with Pastoral de Favelas; meetings Popular Council 
and PMHIS; field visit to Tabajaras) (Figure 45; Figure 46). Moreover, the UPPs fostered 
favela dwellers discontent as police excesses and other issues had occurred, favouring the 
reluctance to support governmental initiatives, including the slum upgrading instrument 
(ibid). In addition, well known personalities involved in national and international housing 
debates openly criticized latest Brazilian housing policies and the increase of evictions in 
Rio such as Rolnik (2011; 2012), weakening Rio's housing policy allies.  
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Figure 45 Favela do Metro event. Fram, president of favela do Metro resident's association, 
sharing with students of the UERJ her story about the eviction and razing of her favela. 
Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011 
 
 
Figure 46 Favela Tabajaras. Graffiti illustrating the fight against evictions painted during 
an event organized by Tabajaras residents' association in partnership with other CBOs and 
NGOs. Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011 
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Slum upgrading weakened by the MCMV 
A share of the houses produced through the MCMV were used for relocating favela 
dwellers. Most of the MCMV housing projects were constructed in the 'Zona Oeste' (West 
area) of Rio de Janeiro (Figure 47) where there are few job opportunities (Veríssimo 2010), 
and a lack of infrastructure and public services:  
'You give housing to people who are homeless or who need to buy their own home, to ensure a roof 
over their family. I think it's great. Just think that just cannot be "My home My life". It has to be 
" My Sewage, My Life", "My Water, My Life", "More school for my son, My Life." You must 
have it all together: school, square, sewage, drainage, and not only the house, no. Do not get a home 
for the worker and take away the classroom of his son because within that programme school 
construction is not included. I'm saying this because I went to see the project "My House My Life" 
on Encanamento Road in Santa Margarida, I got there and went to see, there are eight hundred 
and something units and it's the trench that is going to receive all sewage from the "My House My 
Life" because there is no sewage treatment in our region, so our drainage network will be 
compromised; it is already bad, it is precarious. Today you are attending a parcel and will more 
with this programme "My Home, My Life", which is a great programme (Applause)' (Lucinha, 
Municipal councillor, DCMRJ 14/12/2009: 29). 
There was also a lack of quality. This was not only to do with the bad quality of materials 
but also the size of the apartments. Indeed, people that used to live in houses of about 
80m² were moved to houses of about 35 m² (visit to Tabajaras favela). These problems 
generated by the housing construction weakened the use of the instrument at the same 
time as they contributed to creating an opposition against all municipal housing initiatives, 
among different actors such as favela dwellers and their leaders, NGOs, CBOs, scholars 
and even municipal staff (meetings PMHIS).  
Paes' re-election 
The year 2012 was an electoral year for Rio de Janeiro's municipality. The electoral 
campaign started in July with Eduardo Paes (PSDB) as the preferred candidate; he won the 
municipal elections in the first round with 64.6%, followed by Marcelo Freixo with 28.1% 
of the votes. Paes' re-election secured the alliance among the three levels of government (O 
Globo 2012) (Figure 48). By November 2012 Paes appointed Pierre Batista as SMH's 
secretary and Jorge Bittar returned to his federal deputy position.  
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Figure 47 MCMV Rio de Janeiro. The bulk of MCMV projects are located in Zona Oeste. 
Source: SMH 2011 
 
 
Figure 48 Elections 2012. Brasilia. Vice-Governor of Rio de Janeiro Luiz Fernando Pezão, 
President Dilma Rousseff, re-elected Mayor, Eduardo Paes and the Governor Sergio 
Cabral. Source: Jose Cruz /Agência Brasil 2012 
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*** 
This part described how despite the gain of strength of the slum upgrading instrument 
through the development of the Morar Carioca plan, it did not play a prominent role 
during the last two years of Paes' administration. Slum upgrading continued to be 
questioned because of the slow implementation and maintenance problems exacerbated by 
the mega events schedule, the increase of evictions and lack of quality of the housing 
construction. All these elements contributed to generate 'dissidence' of different actors. 
Specifically, favela dwellers, NGOs, CBOs and scholars did not want to support the 
instrument or Rio's housing policy, undermining the strengthening of the instrument.  
7.5 CONCLUSION 
The chapter explored the latest 'translation' moments of the slum upgrading instrument. 
The first part noted that the re-emergence of the instrument related primarily to the 
building of 'alliances' with the regional state and federal governments, PAC, developers, 
architectural practices and municipal staff. The building of 'associations' transformed the 
instrument; in particular, PAC interventions included the participation of developers and 
became larger and more comprehensive, integrating more resettling, housing construction 
and heavier infrastructure (transport systems). This part also described how Rio's housing 
policy 'problematization' continued in the municipality as well as the instrument's 
'controversy', undermining its possibility to be constituted as 'Obligatory Passage Point' 
(OPP) of Rio's 'new' housing policy. Out of the 'problematization' moment the housing 
construction approach emerged as the OPP of Rio's housing policy as it was 'associated' to 
Paes' agenda (shock of order) and federal funding (MCMV). Lastly, this part showed that 
the re-emergence of the slum upgrading instrument was supported by people with 
expertise, in particular, municipal staff and architectural practices, and methods, processes 
and regulations created in the last two decades.  
 
The second part observed that the elaboration of the Morar Carioca plan through which 
the slum upgrading instrument developed since 2010 entailed a 'problematization' moment 
during which associations were rebuilt and objectives were redefined. The creation of 
'associations' and definition of objectives, involved 'interessement' through several actions 
such as the elaboration of the Olympic Legacy plan, the creation of the architectural 
competition, and the elaboration the new classification matrix and slum upgrading strategy. 
This process resulted in the 'enrolment' and 'mobilization' of several departments and 
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institutions at the three levels of government, BID, IAB-RJ, architectural practices and 
other actors such as IBASE. This part also highlighted on the one hand that the use of the 
instrument was supported by the Favela-Bairro experience. On the other, it described how 
the use of the instrument created new knowledge and expertise through different processes 
such as the elaboration of the new classification matrix and architectural competition, 
reinforcing its technical legitimacy and favela experts' authority. 
 
The third part described how that the slum upgrading instrument did not play the 
prominent role during the second half of the Paes administration, and this in spite of the 
new alliances it created through the Morar Carioca plan. It noted that the slum upgrading 
instrument was questioned because of its implementation issues (delays and maintenance 
problems) aggravated by the World Cup and Olympic Games agenda, the recrudescence of 
evictions and housing construction lack of quality. These elements fostered a 'dissidence' 
moment during which various actors and in particular favela dwellers, NGOs, CBOs and 
scholars, did not want to support the slum upgrading instrument or Rio's housing policy. 
 
Based on these elements, this chapter illustrates how the slum upgrading instrument 
contributed to indirectly reshape Rio's latest housing policy. It observed that the slum 
upgrading played a second role during the Paes administration. However, the slum 
upgrading 'controversy' contributed to the strengthening of housing construction as the 
major housing policy approach. Therefore, the chapter contributes to substantiate 
hypothesis 1 that argues that the choice and use of the slum upgrading instrument fostered 
the inflexion moments of Rio's housing policy.  
 
The chapter also shows that the constitution of the slum upgrading through PAC enabled 
the expansion of the actors' range of involvement to include the federal and regional state 
governments and developers. Thus, it supports hypothesis 2 that argues that the use of the 
slum upgrading contributed to modify Rio's housing governance. The chapter also 
illustrates the municipality's capacity to implement PAC projects in favelas and the Morar 
Carioca plan thanks to the knowledge and know-how accumulated such as the classification 
matrix, Favela-Bairro regulatory frameworks, and expertise to build alliances with various 
entities such as BID and IAB-RJ. Therefore, the chapter suggests that the municipality 
enhanced its power within the housing policy.  
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Lastly, the chapter described how the municipal staff and architectural practices continued 
to enhance their skills and legitimacy through the development of the PAC and Morar 
Carioca plan, becoming key players in the housing policy process. It also highlighted that 
PAC projects created a new operational framework for implementing large scale slum 
upgrading project that included among others transport infrastructure, and that the 
elaboration of the Morar Carioca plan entailed the development of a new classification 
matrix, and new strategies for urbanizing Rio's favelas. Both experiences developed further 
the technical legitimacy of the slum upgrading instrument in recent years. Thus, this 
chapter contribute to reinforce the argument that the slum upgrading promoted the 
weakening of political regulation, contributing to the depoliticization of Rio 's housing 
policy (hypotheses 3).  
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INTRODUCTION  
The thesis explored the role of the slum upgrading instrument in the evolution of Rio de 
Janeiro's housing policy and governance. Specifically, it examined the significance of the 
dynamics and outcomes generated by the choice and use of the slum upgrading instrument 
from 1993 to 2012. On its theoretical stand, the research built the Political Sociology of 
Public Policy Instruments (PPI) approach (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004) presented in 
CHAPTER 1. The PPI approach considers public policies in relation to sociological, 
political and State transformation dimensions. In particular, it argues that policy 
'instruments' must be constituted and produce specific effects, shaping policies in spite of 
the aims ascribed to them. Subsequently, the PPI approach points out that the analysis of 
policy 'instrumentation', i.e. the issues related to the choice and use of instruments, is a 
major concern in public policy as it has social and political repercussions. 
 
Based on the PPI approach, CHAPTER 2 called in to question the case of Rio de Janeiro, 
with an understanding of the slum upgrading as a 'policy instrument'. After offering an 
overview of Brazil's housing policy evolution, it presented Rio de Janeiro's case, identifying 
the existence of two main policy analysis streams: (i) evaluative studies that represent the 
bulk of the existing literature and focus on policy efficiency and effectiveness and (ii) 
studies that focus on the 'explanation of policy functioning' through sociological 
approaches. The latter stream included analyses that aimed to unveil hidden processes, 
denounce rhetorical illusions and identify meagre or perverse policy outcomes ('unveiling 
perspective'), and analyses that explored, social, institutional, conceptual and political 
changes in order to understand housing policy development and change.  
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Both streams have contributed to the understanding of housing policy and housing-related 
processes; however, in the view of the PPI approach they present two major gaps. Firstly, 
they have understudied how Rio's housing governance has evolved over time. Secondly, 
they have tended to underestimate the role of the 'slum upgrading instrument' and its 
'instrumentation'. The slum upgrading instrument has been analysed by the 'evaluative' 
stream only in terms of effectiveness or efficiency, and as an instrument at the service of 
the Carioca élite or political group by the 'unveiling perspective'. Lastly, the studies that 
focus on policy change have overlooked the instrument as they tend to primarily focus on 
social, cognitive, institutional and political variables.  
 
Aiming to address these gaps and generate a better understanding about how housing 
policy changed and how governance frames evolved over time, the thesis focused on 
exploring the following question: how did the slum upgrading influence Rio de Janeiro's 
housing policy and governance development from 1993 to 2012? The research considered 
three hypotheses:  
1. The dynamics and outcomes generated by the slum upgrading contributed to produce 
the inflexion points of the evolution of Rio's housing policy  
2. The dynamics and outcomes generated by the slum upgrading fostered the 
transformation of Rio's housing governance 
3. The dynamics and outcomes generated by slum upgrading supported the depoliticization 
of Rio's housing policy.  
 
CHAPTER 3 presented and discussed the research methods. Specifically, it explored the 
Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) that understands 'the social' as an heterogeneous network 
of entities called 'actants' that are open-ended entities created by a specific movement of 
're-association and reassembling' (Latour 2005). It stressed that ANT localizes agency in the 
'actants' and understands reality as an emerging process produced by actants' linking 
process named 'translation'. It also noted that this mechanism of 'association' entailed the 
following moments: 'problematization', 'interessement', 'enrolment', and 'mobilization' (or 
'dissidence'). Based on this perspective CHAPTER 3 described that this research 
understood the slum upgrading instrument as an 'actant'. Subsequently, through 'detective 
work' (Austrin & Farnsworth 2005), the thesis delved into the unfolding of Rio's slum 
upgrading network of 'associations', using primary municipal archives, semi-structured 
interviews and policy documents. Therefore, the data analysis did not involve any 
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interpretation or measurement using the collected data as this investigation considered that 
reality is an emerging phenomenon that results from the interaction of things rather than 
being socially constructed or objectively given. The thesis also stressed that the 
investigation extended over 16 months and supported the production of a chronological 
'thick description' of the choice and use of the slum upgrading which reveals its role in the 
transformation of Rio's housing policy and governance. 
 
CHAPTER 4 introduced in detail the housing sector landscape from which Rio's slum 
upgrading emerged. It presented the emergence of the slum upgrading as a municipal 
housing instrument that was informed by previous associations that stabilized cognitive 
and normative frames for its use. Specifically, it described how the municipal 
administration from the second half of the 20th century developed various experiences 
through which it stabilized the slum upgrading as the most appropriate instrument to use 
while developing 'alliances' for upgrading Rio's favelas. Therefore, at the beginning of the 
1990s the slum upgrading instrument was already being considered as a suitable solution 
for addressing Rio's housing issues and in particular the favelas' problem.  
 
CHAPTER 5, CHAPTER 6 and CHAPTER 7 deployed the slum upgrading instrument' 
network of 'associations' through a chronological 'thick description', considering the 
research hypotheses. 
 
This conclusion section is divided into four parts. The first part reviews the learning from 
the investigation showing how it supports the research hypotheses. The second part 
considers the implications of the investigation for the understanding of housing 
development and housing governance, and reflects on the use of the PPI approach and 
ANT. The third part considers the limitations of the investigation while the fourth part set 
out the basis of future research.  
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LEARNING FROM THE RIO DE JANEIRO INVESTIGATION 
Shaping the municipal housing policy  
CHAPTER 5 illustrated that the instrument was supported among others by Rio's Master 
Plan, previous municipal experience and consensus about its use, making it the corner 
stone of the municipal housing policy. It also noted that the choice of the slum upgrading 
instrument during the 1990s fostered the consolidation of the municipal housing policy by 
'interesting', 'enrolling' and ultimately 'mobilizing' a wide range of entities through a vast 
range of actions while limiting 'dissidence'. In particular, the chapter showed that the 
instrument played a crucial role in Rio's housing policy as it contributed to the creation of 
the SMH and increase of its financial, institutional and technical capacities, the 
development of Rio's housing policy credibility, visibility and legitimacy, and the blockage 
of opposition fostered by several problems that emerged during the instrument's 
materialization.  
 
CHAPTER 6 described how during Maia's second and third administrations (2001-2008) 
the use of the slum upgrading instrument entailed several 'controversies' that contributed to 
the development of 'dissidence' and (re)'problematization' moments that fostered its 
abandonment and Rio's housing policy collapse. Specifically, the chapter observed that the 
slum upgrading instrument controversies resulted not only from Maia and Conde electoral 
battle and the 2001 politico-administrative change, but also from the several materialization 
problems it carried with it. Furthermore, it showed that the instrument abandonment and 
housing policy erosion were a progressive and collective process as not only the municipal 
administration but also other actors rejected them and/or engaged in the building of other 
'actor-networks' such as housing construction.  
 
Lastly, CHAPTER 7 explained how the use of the slum upgrading instrument contributed 
indirectly to reshaped Rio's latest housing policy during Paes' administration (2009-2012). It 
observed that the instrument was still questioned for not having solved the city's housing 
problems and transformed favelas into neighbourhoods as expected, contributing to the re-
emergence of housing construction as suitable solution. Moreover, during the second half 
of Paes' administration (2011-2012), the development of the Morar Carioca plan generated 
a 'controversy' about slum upgrading maintenance problems (in particular water and 
sanitation services), projects delays, the development of mega-events constraints and 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
237 
opposition, and an increase in evictions. This 'controversy' fostered even more the 
strengthening of housing construction as ideal for addressing the municipality's housing 
deficit.  
 
Based on these findings, the thesis supports hypothesis 1 that argues the slum upgrading 
contributed to produce the inflexion points of the evolution of Rio's housing policy. It 
shows how the development and consolidation of the housing policy were influenced and 
fostered by the choice use of the slum upgrading instrument. It also revealed that the fall of 
the policy during the first decade of the 2000s related to the outcomes and dynamics that 
the slum upgrading fostered in this period and was not only due to the politico-
administrative change of 2001.  
Transforming Rio's housing governance dynamics 
As mentioned in CHAPTER 4 the social housing sector included the SMDS and few other 
actors, primarily governmental bodies such as IPLANRIO and CEDAE during the 1980s. 
CHAPTER 5 described how from 1993 to 2000 the choice and use of the instrument 
contributed to expand gradually the number and nature of actors involved: the SMH and 
other governmental bodies (SMU, SMO, RioUrbe, Geo-RIo, COMLURB, RioLuz and 
PMG), private sector actors (architectural practices, construction companies), and national 
and international institutions (BID, IAB-RJ, CAIXA, European Union), NGOs and CBOs 
(G-16, residents' associations) and other actors/groups/institutions that participated on ad 
hoc basis such as Footballer Ronaldinho and the Catholic Church. Moreover, the chapter 
noted that the role of these actors was framed by regulations, contracts, and agreements 
which contrasted with the more informal relationships established during the 1980s. Then, 
CHAPTER 6 showed that despite the abandonment of the slum upgrading, relationships 
subsisted (BID, SMH, architectural practices, construction companies) and even new actors 
emerged that related to the previous 'associations' such as the Urban Cell office. Finally, 
CHAPTER 7 described that in recent years the comeback of the slum upgrading 
instrument entailed the rebuilding of 'associations' that were developed in the 1990s (IAB-
RJ, BID, CAIXA) and the involvement of new actors such as the federal and regional state 
governments and developers. The association of these newcomers was based on the type 
of relationships established in the 1990s such as contracts and agreements.  
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In addition, CHAPTER 5 told how despite the diversification of actors involved, the 
municipal government through the SMH did not lose the control of the development of 
the slum upgrading instrument and that its institutional and technical capacities to design 
and conduct housing initiatives were enhanced. Moreover, through the constitution and 
use of the slum upgrading instrument, the municipal government gained legitimacy and 
credibility, neutralizing criticism and opposition. CHAPTER 6 gave more evidence that in 
spite of the gradual fall of the instrument and housing policy and the development of 
politico-administrative fragmentation, the municipal government did not lose its 
institutional and technical capacities to elaborate and implement housing initiatives such as 
the implementation Urban Cell projects in Providência and Jacarezinho, and the 
elaboration of Alemão and Manguinhos master plans. Lastly, CHAPTER 7 illustrated that 
the municipality had the capacity to implement PAC projects and the Morar Carioca plan 
thanks to accumulated expertise such as the classification matrix, the Favela-Bairro 
programme, and know-how to build 'alliances' with actors such as BID and IAB-RJ.  
 
Through this evidence, the thesis supports hypothesis 2 that argues that the slum upgrading 
instrument contributed to modify housing governance as it supported the creation of a new 
constellation of actors which produced new dynamics within the housing sector. However, 
it also demonstrates that the slum upgrading instrument maintained and enhanced 
municipal administration power. It shows that the slum upgrading contributed to develop 
municipal administration's credibility and legitimacy to limit opposition during the 1990s, 
and its institutional capacity, knowledge and expertise for developing housing programmes 
and projects during the whole period (1993-2012). 
Rio's housing policy depoliticization  
Lastly, the thesis substantiates hypothesis 3 as it reveals that the slum upgrading supported 
the weakening of strictly political control, contributing to the depoliticization of Rio de 
Janeiro's housing policy. Specifically, the thesis showed that the instrument fostered this 
process by supporting the development of favelas' experts, knowledge and know-how 
about favelas and their urbanization.  
 
CHAPTER 5 illustrated how the use of slum upgrading instrument developed different 
actors' expertise (BID, architectural practices, construction companies) and consolidated 
the skills of the SMH and other municipal bodies such as IPLANRIO. It also stressed that 
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the use of the slum upgrading carried with it the creation of scientific and technical 
knowledge through various actions: elaboration of municipal housing basis, first 
classification matrix, contracts, programme's and projects' regulations, and the 
establishment of the SMH. The constitution of these experts' knowledge and know-how 
contributed to move Rio's housing policy towards a scientific/technical domain while 
limiting political interference, in particular, during the selection of favelas to be upgraded 
especially thanks to the classification matrix.  
 
CHAPTER 6 described how Rio's housing policy remained in the scientific/technical 
domain, and this despite the fall and isolation of the instrument during the first decade of 
the 2000s. Experts such as architects and municipal and regional state staff continued to 
play their role in slum upgrading-related initiatives. During this period expertise about 
favelas were expanded through the various initiatives within the municipality (Urban Cell 
projects and Alemão and Manguinhos Complex master plans) and at the regional state level 
(Dona Marta, Rocinha, and Cantagalo projects). The chapter also noted that the use of the 
slum upgrading during Maia's second and third administrations involved practices of 
clientelism, yet these were difficult to put into practice or were limited by the slum 
upgrading regulatory frameworks.  
 
Finally, CHAPTER 7 reveals how the experts, constituted through the development of the 
slum upgrading instrument, in particular, municipal staff and architectural practices, 
continued to enhance their skills and legitimacy through the development of the PAC and 
Morar Carioca plan. It also highlighted that PAC projects created new regulatory 
frameworks that included among others transport infrastructure, while the elaboration of 
the Morar Carioca plan entailed the development of a new classification matrix and a new 
slum upgrading strategy. Both experiences and the consolidation of the group of experts 
showed that Rio's housing policy related to the strengthening of a housing domain/field 
based on a technical rational.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
240 
INVESTIGATION IMPLICATIONS 
Reconsidering housing policy development, erosion and new lease 
The thesis findings contribute to the rethinking of the role of political will in the 
development of Rio's housing policy. As noted in CHAPTER 6, the consolidation of the 
municipal housing policy during the 1990s has tended to be attributed to Mayor Cesar Maia 
or to Mayor Luiz Paulo Conde (and SMH Secretary Sergio Magalhães). The thesis 
described, in CHAPTER 5, how the emergence of the housing policy (1993-1996) did not 
only relate to Maia or Conde political will or vision, but also to the previous experiences 
(Mutirão programme), Rio's Master plan regulations, and a consensus about the 
instrument's relevance for addressing housing problems. The thesis also showed that Rio's 
housing policy development (1997-2000) was not only driven by Conde's political will or 
Magalhães' actions. It related to the building of several 'alliances' through different actions, 
supported primarily by the use of the slum upgrading instrument. Therefore, Rio's housing 
policy development cannot be explained through Maia's or Conde's political will or actions. 
Subsequently, the thesis agrees with Lascoumes & Le Galès (2007a) who argued that the 
analysis of policy 'instrumentation' questions the ''heroic' view of policy changes often put forward 
by the actors' (ibid: 6).  
 
The thesis also goes on to reflect on the erosion process of the municipal housing policy 
during the first decade of the 2000s. The existing literature tends to argue that the politico-
administrative change in 2001 caused the fall of Rio's housing policy and the abandonment 
of the slum upgrading instrument (Magalhaes & Conde 2004; Freire & Oliveira 2008; O 
Globo 2001a; Fiori et al. 2000). CHAPTER 6 illustrated that the politico-electoral battle 
and administration change that followed destabilized the housing policy and the slum 
upgrading, nevertheless, the thesis revealed that the abandonment of the slum upgrading 
instrument and fall of the housing policy related to a collective and gradual process of 
'dissidence' and 'problematization' fostered by a series of 'controversies'. This process was 
collective as the rejection of the instrument included actors outside the municipal 
administration, and resulted in the isolation of the instrument and housing policy. 
Therefore, the thesis argues that the politico-administrative chance in 2001 was only one of 
the several controversies that step by step weakened Rio's housing policy, producing its 
erosion and re-problematization that resulted in the comeback of housing construction as 
an suitable approach for solving favelas' problems and the city's housing deficit. 
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In addition, the thesis allows to better understand how the housing construction gained 
importance in Rio de Janeiro in recent years. The thesis described how PAC investments 
and the launch of the Morar Carioca plan gave a new lease to the instrument, though its 
development was limited during Paes' administration (2009-2012) due to the persistence of 
'controversies' about its use and outcomes. The thesis showed that these 'controversies' 
about the instrument contributed to the re-emergence of housing construction as suitable 
solution, becoming Rio's latest housing policy central element. This is an important insight 
since the development of housing construction tends to be explained by the development 
of macroeconomic policies and the strength of the private sector interests (developers' 
interests) that resulted in the creation of the MCMV, overlooking the weakening of slum 
upgrading as a significant factor. 
 
Lastly, the thesis suggest the existence of a deep crisis in the municipality as Rio's latest 
housing policy is questioned not only for the slum upgrading but also for the housing 
construction. Despite the support it gained in recent years, housing construction is also 
criticized as housing estates are often of bad quality and tend to be constructed in areas 
without infrastructure, public services and far from job opportunities. Therefore, the thesis 
argues the need for entirely reviewing slum upgrading and mass housing construction 
solutions. In particular, the thesis suggests that the slum upgrading instrument examination 
should focus on finding new ways of 'linking' the entities involved (people, aspiration, 
processes, infrastructure, interest, public services, places, etc.) so as to build long term 
'associations', achieving slum upgrading ambitions.  
Rio's housing governance and municipal government evolution 
The thesis challenges the argument put forward by the existing literature, in particular by 
the 'unveiling perspective' (Bahia 2000; Broudehoux 2001; Randolph 2004; Silva 2006), that 
in Rio de Janeiro existed or exists a powerful, coherent and cohesive actor or coalition that 
convincingly impose their interests and views at a city level. The thesis findings suggest that 
it would be unlikely for Rio de Janeiro's housing policy to be controlled by a specific actor 
or group of actors as the use of the slum upgrading instrument involved (i) several actors 
and interests, (ii) tangled institutional arrangements, (iii) intricate financial set up, (iv) 
complicated territories and (v) complex procedures. Instead, the thesis argues the existence 
of a 'helpless governance' pattern that entails taking control and gaining power in the 
middle of a chaotic landscape through 'coup par coup' negotiations rather than 
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premeditated arrangements. Accordingly, Rio's 'helpless governance' pattern means 
governing through fragmentation following the maxim 'divide and rule'. Based on this 
understanding, the thesis suggests that rather than focus on 'whose interest' or 'why', 
studies should explore 'how' in a such fragmented landscape, specific interests, ideas 
and/or processes that contribute to materialize housing-related initiatives and ultimately 
govern the city, could emerge and take shape.  
 
In addition, the thesis contributes to better understand Rio's municipal government 
evolution within the housing sector. It showed that after the decentralization of urban and 
housing policies in the 1980s, Rio de Janeiro's municipal government has been in a 
paradoxical position. On the one hand, the thesis described that during the 1990s the 
municipality gained more capacities even if it redistributed responsibilities and power 
among the private sector (architectural practices, construction companies, developers), 
international organizations, NGOs, and CBOs (favelas residents' associations). It showed 
how in recent years the municipality enhanced its capacity mainly through federal 
government financial aid, leading to bulldozer actions such as the relocation of current 
slum upgrading projects. Thus, the thesis illustrated how the municipality became strategic, 
flexible and opportunistic, trying to articulate its actions with third parties for gaining scale; 
having a portfolio of projects and programme ready to be funded; and hunting for 
contracts with international organizations and/or other level of government. On the other 
hand, the thesis illustrated the municipality's greater dependence as Rio de Janeiro was 
unable to autonomously implement a municipal housing policy: it needed financial support 
such as the one provided by the BID. Furthermore, the thesis noted that since 2007 the 
municipality heavily depended on the Federal Government and that the mega events 
constrained municipality housing initiatives. Thus, the municipal government became more 
dependent than ever on other actors, actions, and schedules for implementing its housing 
policy.  
 
Therefore, an important question to consider in Rio is how the municipal government can 
be strategic, flexible and opportunistic, and at the same time create and develop coherent, 
comprehensive and sustainable housing policy in the context of a growing dependence on 
federal funding. Some voices argue that the municipal housing policy could be better if it is 
regulated as health and education, which have a specific allocation budget. An amendment 
to the constitution called PEC 'Moradia Digna' (dignified housing) supports the creation of 
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a specific percentage allocation from the local and national governments' budget (Moradia 
Digna n.d.). However, PEC 'Moradia Digna' if approved will restrain municipal budget 
which are already constrained by health and education expenses. 
 
Lastly, the thesis allows to reflect on the influence of the Federal Government comeback 
on Rio's latest housing policy. It described how the Federal Government contributed to 
reshape Rio de Janeiro's housing policy in recent years. Under an ANT perspective this 
thesis understands that unlike the 1990s when the municipal government was the one 
building 'alliances', this time it is the federal government that has been the trying to 
'interest', 'enrol' and 'mobilize'. The Federal Government did not directly control the 
municipal housing policy; however, it heavily shaped its development since the launch of 
the PAC in 2007 and MCMV in 2009. While the financial support of the Federal 
Government has helped to develop Rio's housing policy, it has also supported bulldozer 
actions that involve more relocations and evictions and the construction of housing units 
in areas without neither public services/infrastructure nor job opportunities. Furthermore, 
the Federal Government comeback supported the emergence of the regional state of Rio 
de Janeiro as an important player in the development of housing policies which has tended 
not only to cooperate but also compete and interfere in municipal housing initiatives. 
Therefore, the thesis suggests that after about 20 years of absence (1986-2003, abolition of 
the BNH and creation of the Ministry of Cities respectively) the comeback of the Federal 
Government was needed; however, the way in which it came back represents a setback for 
the development of Rio's housing policy.  
Theoretical and methodological implications 
The research and in particular the fieldwork process and empirical chapters contributed to 
reflect on the analytical and methodological frameworks used as follows. As mentioned 
earlier (see page 65) rather than building a 'Tools Policy Theory' the PPI approach aimed to 
complete traditional analyses (interest, ideas institutions). Under this understanding, its use 
contributed to reveal processes of Rio's housing policy that were overlooked by the existing 
literature, completing and expanding existing understanding on the case. However, the 
thesis demonstrates that, as Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007a) observed, policy instruments 
tend to be meta instruments, i.e. a complex assemblage of techniques of government. Thus, 
there is a real operational limitation for analysing policy instruments as they are not closed 
objects 'out here' waiting to be studied. Instead, the analysis of the slum upgrading 
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instrument showed that they are constituted by a wide range of linkages. Consequently, the 
thesis suggests that the PPI approach is an interesting conceptual frame; however, its use is 
not a straight forward exercise. Based on this investigation, a way to overcome this 
difficulty is to focus on 'technologies of government' understood as different entities 
constituting a policy instrument. This positioning can contribute to reinforce PPI 
understanding that policy instruments are not 'out there' ready for use while making clearer 
that the analysis of 'policy instrumentation' entails the tracing of different devices such as 
regulations, contracts and norms.  
 
The thesis also shows that ANT proved to be a vital theoretical and methodological 
complement to the PPI approach for it allows the inclusion of humans and non-humans 
entities in the analysis and a focus on the interaction between them. Furthermore, ANT 
contributed to clarify that there are no instrument's effects per se, but rather diverse 
outcomes generated through the different 'associations' in which a policy instrument and 
different entities, including humans participated. Nevertheless, the investigation of past 
controversies tend to be difficult to trace as data about them tend to get lost. Thus, 
investigations aiming to use an ANT perspective should evaluate the feasibility of 
unfolding the 'actant' under study. In addition, the translation moments (problematization, 
interessement, enrolment and mobilization) generally overlap, making it difficult to clearly 
isolate them and account for them as single processes.  
INVESTIGATION LIMITATIONS  
The thesis includes three main limitations.  
-Firstly, the findings cannot be generalized to all the Brazilian municipalities. This is 
because the case of Rio de Janeiro relates to specific socio-economic and politico-
administrative landscapes, and because not all municipalities used slum upgrading as their 
housing policy instrument.  
-Secondly, the thesis focused on the slum upgrading instrument that was the main housing 
policy instrument during 16 years. Thus, its study allowed to grasp most of the dynamics 
around Rio de Janeiro's housing sector. However, in recent years, with the creation of the 
SNHIS (National Social Housing System) and the launch of PAC and MCMV 
programmes, the study of the slum upgrading instrument proved limited for exploring local 
housing sector in the last 6 years. 
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-Thirdly, the thesis focused primarily on the local government, overlooking how the use of 
the slum upgrading influenced other actors or groups.  
FUTURE RESEARCH  
The thesis points out several areas of research that would be important to develop in order 
to overcome the mentioned limitations and improve the understanding about housing 
policy and governance transformations.  
 Rio de Janeiro experience for further research 
The analysis of Rio de Janeiro can be further developed as follows: 
-To better understand how the slum upgrading instrument influenced other actors involved 
in Rio housing policy process besides the municipal government. This would allow to 
highlight the overall influence of this instrument over the housing sector in Rio de Janeiro. 
In particular, the thesis suggests the following research hypothesis: despite the ambition of 
integrating favelas dwellers into slum upgrading projects' implementation, they were 
gradually excluded because the slum upgrading instrument became technically driven and 
the experts (architects and municipal staff primarily) gained more legitimacy than them. 
-To explore and understand the evolution of municipal housing policies across Brazil 
through the analysis of the different instruments. This investigation could move beyond a 
mere collection of different experiences and produce a comparative analysis which would 
contribute to the case of Brazilian municipal housing policies' evolution being considered 
globally.  
-To analyse other cases that used slum upgrading instrument in order to understand how 
the instrument tends to produce (or not) similar housing policy and governance outcomes. 
This research could be richer if it were to include cases beyond Brazil as it will allow to 
understand how the slum upgrading instruments were constituted in other politico-
administrative landscapes.  
- To investigate how and to what extent in Rio de Janeiro's fragmented governance 
landscape, the mega events allowed specific actors to impose their views and interests. In 
particular, it is important to understand the dynamics around eviction that have occurred in 
the municipality in recent times and have being solely associated with the mega events 
without considering other hypotheses such as slum upgrading 'controversy' that might be 
also a cause for choosing evictions and housing construction as solutions.  
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Housing policies in Brazil  
Another area of research includes the Brazilian housing sector recent changes with the 
creation of the SNHIS and the implementation of large scale slum upgrading projects and 
housing construction through the PAC and MCMV programmes. In this new housing 
sector landscape the thesis proposes two main research agendas:  
- To study how national housing system instruments (fund and plans) have influenced local 
and national housing policy materialization process and housing sector dynamics. In 
particular, how they have been influencing the housing policy decentralization process 
started at the end of the 1980s, and how they have affected the role of regional state 
governments in the housing sector. The investigation showed that is crucial to analyse the 
role of regional states because in recent years they gained strength thanks to federal 
programmes and remain key for housing policy development as they tend to control public 
services such as sanitation and could play an important role in urban planning at a 
metropolitan scale where the housing deficit is concentrated. 
- To explore how the PAC and MCMV programmes have reshaped national and local 
housing policies and housing governance dynamics. In particular, to understand how 
MCMV has influenced the use of specific instruments at municipal level such as slum 
upgrading or participatory budgeting, and influenced housing sector relationships in 
medium and small cities. 
Housing policy analysis and new ways of collecting data 
Finally, further investigations should consider conducting research and data collection in 
the digital era. Throughout this research I could experience the evolution of media and 
tools. The amount of data for exploring the 1990s period was small and its access difficult; 
however, the volume of data for the 2000s period and in particular, after the second half of 
the first decade of 2000s, was high and its access easier. This relates to the fast 
development of the digital universe (Gantz & Reinsel 2011). This major change pose three 
major questions:  
-How can the growing digital universe challenge existing knowledge and understanding 
about housing? 
-How can the burgeoning 'big data' era foster the emergence of new question of housing 
and fields of inquiry?  
-How and to what extent will new technologies influence our conception and practice in 
housing research ― now and in the future?  
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 Name Position and/or activity during 1993-2012  Date interview 
 Private Sector 
1 Pablo 
Benetti 
Architect involved in the following 
programmes Favela - Bairro, PAC, and Morar 
Carioca 
01/09/2011 
2 Jorge Mario 
Jáuregui 
Architect involved in the following 
programmes Favela - Bairro, PAC, and Morar 
Carioca 
24/06/2011 
04/09/2011 
3 Eduardo 
Petersen 
Architect involved in the Urban Cell Project in 
Providência (in presence of Lu Petersen) 
13/10/2011 
4 Fernanda 
Salles 
Architect involved in Favela Bairrio, Morar 
Carioca Providência 
 
13/10/2011 
5 Leandro 
Balbio 
Architect involved in PAC Alemão Complex 22/09/2011 
6 Lilia Sodre Architect involved in Morar carioca 08/07/2011 
7 Eduardo 
Polay 
Odebrecht, working in PAC Alemão Complex 27/09/2011 
 Community based organizations 
8 Márcia Vera 
Vasconcelos  
Community leader. President of the Resident 
association federation of Rio de Janeiro (FAM 
RIO) 
09/09/2011 
9 Claudio Community leader. Ex president of Vidigal 
resident association during the implementation 
of the Favela-Bairro 
05/10/2011 
10 Rosiete Community leader. Member of the Providência 
resident association  
06/10/2011 
11 Fram Community leader. President Favela do Metro 
resident associations 
29/09/2011 
12 Ana Community leader. Vice president of 
Mangueira resident association  
10/10/2011 
13 Zezinho da 
Torre branca 
Community leader. President of the federation 
of favelas association of Rio de Janeiro during 
the 1990s 
23/08/2012 
 NGO's and other organizations 
14 Itamar silva  Brazilian Institute for social and economic 
analyses (IBASE) & community leader  
11/07/2011 
15 Luis 
Severino 
Member of the Pastoral de Favelas 21/09/2011 
16 Pastoral de 
Favelas  
Team meeting: Monsegnor Luis Antonio, Maria 
alice, Luis Severino, Erika Gloria, Josefa, Celia, 
Lucia, Eliana, Maria da Paz) 
30/08/2011 
17 Erika Member of the Pastoral de Favelas 31/07/2012 
18 Ricardo 
Gouvêa  
Bento Rubiao NGO Executive coordinator  04/09/2012 
 Politicians (Municipal Legislative Body) 
19 Eliomar Politician. Municipal councillor (1986-1993) 27/09/2011 
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Coelho and (1998-2016) 
20 Andrea 
Gouvêa  
Journalist. Municipal councillor (2005-2012). 
Member of the finances commission at the 
Municipal 
28/08/2012 
 Municipal administration 
21 Cesar Maia Mayor of Rio de Janeiro (1993-1996; 2001-
2008) 
16/08/2012 
22 Alfredo 
Sirkis 
Rio de Janeiro Municipal environment 
Secretary (1993-1996) and Municipal Planning 
Secretary (2001-2006). Four times Municipal 
councillor, and Rio de Janeiro Federal deputy 
(2011-2015) 
29/08/2011 
23 Sergio 
Magalhães 
Rio de Janeiro Municipal hosuing Secretary 
(1993-2000) Rio de Janeiro state ... secretary. 
President of the Brazilian institute of Architect 
IAB Rio de Janeiro. 
12/09/2011 
24 Lucia 
Petersen 
Worked for the Municipal administration since 
the 1980s. Involved in the Mutirão project, 
Favela-Bairro ( pogramme manager 1993-2000), 
Urban cell (coordinator 2001- 2008). 
14/09/2011 
10/10/2011 
27/07/2012 
25 Fernando 
Cavallieri 
 Special advisor at the Municipal urban institute 
(IPP). Worked for Rio de Janeiro's municipality 
since 1981. Involved in Favelas issues and 
municipal housing initiatives including the 
Favela-Bairro.  
15/06/2011 
17/08/2011 
26 Aderbal 
Curvello 
SMH (1993-2004); Inter-American 
Development Bank (2004- date) 
25/07/2012 
27 Jozé 
Candido 
Sampaio 
SMO (1980s -1990s); SMH (2001-2008) as 
Project coordinator 
04/08/2011 
28 Leonardo 
Perazo 
SMO (1980s -1990s); SMH (2001-2008) as 
Structure coordinator  
19/08/2011 
29 Isabel 
Tostes 
SMDS (1980s); SMH (1993-2000); PCRJ (2000-
2008); SMH (2009-date as social work 
coordinator  
19/07/2011 
30 Luiz 
Valverde 
SMH (2009-2012) Project manager. 21/09/2011 
31 Antonio 
Augusto 
Verissimo 
SMU (1987-1993); SMH (1993-2005), SMU 
(2005-2006); Niteroi SMU (2007-2008); SMH 
(2009-date) Project coordinator.  
16/08/2012 
 National Administration or Institution. 
32 Ines 
Magalhães  
Ministry of Cities, National Housing Secretary 
from 2003 - date 
24/07/2012 
33 Paulo 
Magalhães 
CAIXA  07/07/2011 
21/08/2012 
34 Gilda Blank  CAIXA since the 1990s  03/09/2012 
  International organization  
35 Jose Brakarz  Inter-American Bank. involved in the three 
BID loan for the Favela-Bairro 
10/05/2012 
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LIST OF DCMRJ  
Date Type of debate or document. /Participants  
DCMRJ 
17/06/1994 
P05-07 
Municipal housing policy, instruments and resources for its 
implementation. August 1993.  
Report. 
DCMRJ 
01/12/1994 
P25-28 
Minutes of the special meeting No. 55 held on 29 November 1994. 
Discussion and vote on the creation of the Municipal Housing 
Secretariat (SMH)  
Participants: several municipal councillors (MCs). 
DCMRJ 
09/12/1994 
P01-08 
Public hearing of the Committee for the defence of human rights held on 
28 November 1994. Theme: the new Housing Secretariat and the 
municipal housing policy. 
Panel: Municipal Councillor (MC) Jurema Batista, president of the panel; 
Sérgio Magalhães, Secretary of the Municipal Housing extraordinary 
Secretariat (SeMH); Jorge Rodrigues SeMH cabinet chief; Antônio 
Augusto Verissimo, SeMH land issues responsible. Other participants: 
MC Dilson Cardoso; MC Jorge Bittar; Maria Aparecida, Campinhos 
neighborhood resident; Letici Hassan, adviser to MC Fernando William; 
Ricardo Gouvêa, NGO Bento Rubião representative; MC Fernando 
William; MC Edison Santos; MC Chico Alencar; Demetre Anastassakis, 
IAB-RJ president. 
DCMRJ 
22/08/1995 
P04-19 
Information requested by the Committee for Justice and Editing about 
the bill No. 1114/95 (Message No. 331/95) that "authorizes the 
executive to hire loan with the Inter American Development Bank, BID, 
and other measures", in proceedings at Municipal Chamber. 
DCMRJ 
28/08/1995 
P11-18 
Public hearing of the Committee for Urban and Environment Affairs 
held on 17August 1995. Theme: the Favela-Bairro programme. 
Panel: MC Jose Maria Vila Nova, president of the panel; MC Jurema 
Batista; Sergio Magalhães Municipal Housing Secretary (SMH).  
Other participants: José Nerson, president of the FAFERJ; João Filho, 
Escondidinho hill resident; Amaro Chagas, Pilares hill resident; Amaro 
Chagas, Fernão Cardim neighbourhood resident; Maria Rosilda Pereira, 
representative of the Praia da Rosa residents' association; Jorge 
Rodrigues, SMH undersecretary; Antônio Francisco, president of the 
Caminho do Outeiro residents' association; Maria Lucia Petersen, Favela-
Bairro programme manager (SMH); MC Edison Santos; MC Jorge Bittar.  
DCMRJ 
31/08/1995 
P07-11 
Minutes of the special meeting No. 36 held on 29 August 1995. Theme: 
discussion about the Favela-Bairro programme and the BID loan 
Participants: several MCs 
DCMRJ 
08/09/1995 
P10-18 
Minutes of the special meeting No. 91 held on 5 September. Theme: 
discussion and vote of the BID loan for implementing the Favela-Bairro 
programme.  
Participants: several MCs 
DCMRJ 
19/05/1997 
P04-13 
Public hearing of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) 
(Resolution No. 764/97), held on 15 May 1997. CPI about the quality 
and efficiency of water and sewer services provided in the municipality. 
Panel: MC Eduardo Paes, president of the panel; MC Gilberto Palmares 
rapporteur; MC Luiz Carlos Ramos; Carlos Dias, Projet officice manager 
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(SMO), Maria Lúcia Petersen, Favela-Bairro programme manager (SMH). 
Other participants: Maurício Tostes, Superintendent of the General 
Department of Urban Roads (SMO); MC Otavio Leite; MC Luiz Carlos; 
Ramos Antônio Dias Lopes, CBO Barra-alerta representative; Delair 
Dumbrosck, president 'Barra da Tijuca' Community Chamber; Paulo 
César, president 'Ladeira dos Funcionários' residents' association ; José 
Laurindo, president 'Ponteia' residents' association. 
DCMRJ 
08/05/1998 
P19-21 
Public hearing of the Committee for the defence of human rights held on 
22 April 1998. Theme: discussion about the Favela-Bairro programme 
and the problems faced by the Community of 'Mato Alto' 
Panel: MC Jurema Batista, president of the panel; Fábio Pereira Batista 
member Etnica theatre company; Mário Alberto Costa, psychologist; Sra. 
Cristina, resident Andaraí hill; Maria da Luz, resident Urubu hill; Marina 
Adelaide, resident Encontro hill; Ivanilda, resident Andaraí hill; Maria 
Julia, resident Andaraí hill; Marlene, community leader Urubu hill; 
Rosilda Soares, resident Andaraí hill; Hamilton Gomes, resident Urubu 
hill; José Vicente Ferreira, resident Encontro hill; Marisa, resident 
Encontro hill. 
DCMRJ 
23/06/1998 
P02-14 
Public hearing of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) 
(Resolution No. 787/98), held on 15 June 1998. CPI about the real estate 
developments without licensing [the public hearing involved a discussion 
about the Favela-Bairro programme and other housing policy issues]. 
Panel: MC Eliomar Coelho, president of the panel; MC S. Farraz, 
rapporteur; Prof. Ricardo Lira, director Law course (UERJ); Canagé 
Vilhena, director Architects' Union; José Chacon, president Regional 
Council of Engineering and Agronomy (CREA-RJ). Other participants: 
MC Gilberto Palmares; MC Otavio Leite. 
DCMRJ 
14/09/1998 
P06-11 
Public hearing of the Special Commission (Resolution No. 793/98), held 
on 3 August 1998. Commission instituted for questioning, monitoring 
and evaluating the issues related to the main municipal government's 
programme of investment: the Favela- Bairro programme.  
Panel: MC Gilberto Palmares, president of the panel; MC Otavio Leite, 
rapporteur; MC Paulo Cerri; Carlos Alberto, resident Canagalo 
community; Raimunda Lina Alves, resident Grota community; Letícia, 
adviser to MC Fernando William; Wilson Ferreia Gomes, representative 
Cidade de Deus community federation; Manuel, resident Formiga hill; 
Junior, member Andaraí residents' association; Adão, resident Borel hill; 
Ailton, President Candelaria-Mangueira residents' association; Nivaldo, 
resident Mata Machado favela; Silvério, representative Regional Council 
of Engineering and Agronomy (CREA-RJ); João Batista, resident Borel 
hill; Jorge, adviser to MC Otávio Leite; Rosangela, resident Borel hill; 
Ana Rosa, resident Borel hill; Celso Evaristo, president Architects' union; 
Mario Henrique; Amaro Henrique, adviser to MC Gilberto Palmares; 
Luis Octávio; Luci, resident Borel hill; Daniel, resident Borel hill; Jorge, 
resident Zona Sul community ; Leia, resident Borel hill.  
DCMRJ 
14/09/1998 
P12-20 
Debate of the Special Commission (Resolution No. 793/98.) held on 10 
August 1998. Commission instituted for questioning, monitoring and 
evaluating the issues related to the main municipal government's 
programme of investment: the Favela- Bairro programme. 
Debaters: MC Gilberto Palmares, president of the debate (moderator); 
Marcos Azevedo, former president architects' union of Rio de Janeiro; 
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Adauto Lucio Cardoso, professor Institute of Research and Urban 
Planning of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (IPPUR-UFRJ); 
Josinaldo Aleixo, sociologist and PhD candidate at the Institute of 
Philosophy and Science of the UFRJ; MC Eliomar Coelho; Davi; Kelson, 
member architects' union; Silverio, chairperson of the Regional Council 
of Engineering and Agronomy (CREA-RJ) and Engineers' union; Sr. 
Isidoro, member architects' union; Sr Jorge.  
DCMRJ 
11/11/1999  
P12-14 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
11 November 1999. Theme: discussion and vote of the 2000 budget bill.  
Panel: MC Gerson Bergher, president of the panel; MC Waldir Abrão; 
Jorge Secin, representative Mayor's cabinet; Sergio Magalhães, Municipal 
Housing Secretary. 
DCMRJ 
30/03/2000 
P88-89 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting No. 22 held on 29 March 2000. Theme: 
discussion about the Mayor's trip to the USA to sign the IDB loan. 
Discussants: several MCs 
DCMRJ 
31/03/2000 
P20-21 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting No. 23 held on 30 March 2000. Theme: 
discussion about the Mayor's trip to the USA to sign the IDB loan. 
Discussants: several MCs 
DCMRJ 
17/05/2000 
P12-13 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting No. 47 held on 16 May 2000. Theme: 
discussion about the Favela-Bairro programme.  
Discussants: several MCs  
DCMRJ 
01/06/2000 
P12-20 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting No.55 held on 30 May 2000. Theme: 
discussion about the Favela-Bairro programme.  
Discussants: several MCs 
DCMRJ 
08/06/2000 
P10-11 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting No. 60 held on 7 June 2000. Theme: 
discussion about the Favela- Bairro programme.  
Discussants: several MCs  
DCMRJ 
14/06/2000 
P26 
Minutes of the extraordinary meeting No. 17 held on 13 June 2000. 
Theme: discussion about the Favela-Bairro programme.  
Discussants: several MCs 
DCMRJ 
16/10/2001 
P01-11 
Public hearing of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI Favela 
Bairro) (Resolution No. 893/2001), held on 11 October 2001. CPI 
instituted for investigating the foundations of the facts widely publicized 
by the print media about the City's housing program, its 
mischaracterization, unfinished works and possible damage to the 
municipal treasury.  
CPI Members: MC Argemiro Pimentel, president; MC Ruben Andrade, 
rapporteur; MC Rodrigo Bethlem, MC Patricia Amorim and MC Luis 
Carlos Aguilar, members; MC Paulo Cerri and MC Pedro Porfirio, 
substitutes.  
Deponent: Solange Amaral, Municipal Housing Secretary  
DCMRJ 
26/10/2001 
P25-30 
Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held 
on 27 September 2001.  
Deponent: Sergio Magalhães, Special projects Secretary of the state of 
Rio de Janeiro and former Municipal Housing Secretary,  
DCMRJ 
22/10/2001 
P10-18 
Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held 
on 18 October 2001.  
Deponents: Hércules Ferreira Mendes, member NGO Guarda-16 (G-
16); Maria José do Nascimento Lopes, leader Canal das Taxas 
community; Vanilce de Castro Coutinho, president Jardim Moriçaba 
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residents' association; Wiliam Augusto de Souza Paloma, president 
Jacarepagua community chamber. 
DCMRJ 
03/12/2001 
P33-39 
Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held 
on 29 November 2001.  
Deponents: Davi Bezerra Lessa, former manager Works Coordination 
Office of the Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH); Hélio Aleixo, former 
manager Projects Office of the SMH; Andreia Cardoso, former Favela-
Bairro programme manager.  
DCMRJ 
27/12/2001 
P07-12 
Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held 
on 5 December 2001.  
Deponents: Márcia Garrido, Favela-Bairro programme manager; Aderbal 
Curvelo, deputy chief Special Technical Sub-office of the Municipal 
Housing Secretariat;  
DCMRJ 
27/12/2001 
P07-12 
Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held 
on 12 December 2001.  
Deponents: Bruno Sebastião, manager Works Coordination Office of the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH); José Cândido Sampaio, manager 
Projects office of the SMH.  
DCMRJ 
04/03/2002 
P09-22 
Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held 
on 28 February 2002.  
Deponents: Sônia Maria Correia Mograbi, Municipal Secretary of 
Education; Jorge Roberto Fortes, president RioUrbe.  
DCMRJ 
11/03/2002 
P04-08 
Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held 
on 7 March 2002.  
Deponents: Icaro Moreno Junior, former president RioUrbe; Carmem 
Lima C. Moura, former Municipal Secretary of Education.  
DCMRJ 
25/04/2002 
P24-26 
Final report CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001) 
DCMRJ 
12/11/2002 
P12-15 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 8 
November 2002. Theme: discussion about the 2003 budget bill for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat.  
Panel: MC Jose Moraes, president of the panel; Solange Amaral, 
Municipal Housing Secretary; MC Rubens Andrade; MC Mario del Rei. 
DCMRJ 
14/10/2003 
P03 
Relatório de viagem a Washington do prefeito para participar do 
seminario "Favela - Bairro, dez anos integrando a cidade". 
DCMRJ 
22/12/2003 
P17-30 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
19 November 2003. Theme: discussion about the 2004 budget for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat and Municipal Works Secretariat (bill No. 
1674/03) 
Panel: MC Professor Uoston, president of the panel; MC Rosa Fernades, 
vice-president; Solange Amaral, Municipal Housing Secretary (SMH); 
Eidir Dantas, Municipal Works Secretariat (SMO). Other dicusssants: 
Paulo Marcelino, SMO undersecretary; Mauro Batista, president Geo-
Rio; João Luiz; MC Rodrigo Bethlem; MC Jorge Pereira; MC Alexandre 
Cerruti.  
DCMRJ 
25/11/2004 
P05-09 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
18 November 2004. Theme: discussion about the 2005 budget for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat (bill No. 2225/04) 
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Panel: MC Rosa Fernandes, president of the panel; Solange Amaral 
Municipal Housing Secretary; MC Edson Santos; MC Rubens Andrade.  
DCMRJ 
01/12/2005 
P21-30 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
18 October 2005. Theme: evaluation of the Municipal Housing 
Secretariat performance during the first semester of 2005 and objectives 
for 2006. 
Panel: MC Rosa Fernades, president of the panel; MC Luiz Humberto, 
vice-president; Solange Amaral, Municipal Housing Secretary ; MC 
Ricardo Pires Ferreira; MC Andrea Gouvêa Vieira; MC Edson Santos.  
DCMRJ 
15/12/2005 
P24-28 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
25 November 2005. Theme: discussion about the 2006 budget for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat ( bill No. 547/05). 
Panel: MC Luiz Humberto, president of the panel; Paulo André Figueira 
da Silva, Municipal Housing undersecretary; MC Edson Santos; Gustavo 
Junior, analyst Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit. 
 
DCMRJ 
12/06/2006 
P20-24 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 1 
June 2006. Theme: evaluation of the Municipal Housing Secretariat 
performance during the first quarter of 2006 and objectives for 2007 (bill 
No. 790/06) 
Panel: MC Alexander Cerruti, president of the panel; MC Indio da Costa, 
vice-president; MC Andrea Gouvêa Vieira, member; Paulo André 
Figueira da Silva, Municipal Housing undersecretary 
DCMRJ 
07/08/2006 
P14-24 
Public hearing  held on 3 August 2006. Theme: public debate about the 
Favela-Bairro programme works (request No. 1220/06) 
Panel: MC Brozola Neto, president of the panel; Edialeda Salgado, 
president PDT black movement; Heitor Ney Mathias, representative 
ITERJ; Canagé Vilhena, representative Regional Council of Engineering 
and Agronomy (CREA-RJ); MC Andrea Gouvêa Vieira; José Nerson de 
Oliveira, vice-president Federation of Favelas' Associations of the state 
of Rio de Janeiro (FAFERJ); Márcia Garrido, representative Municipal 
Housing Secretariat; Maria de Graça da Cunha Simoões Costa, 
representative Municipal Court of Auditors (TCMRJ). Other discussants: 
MC Edison Santos; MC Eliomar Coelho; MC Rogério Bittar; Gilvan 
Ribeiro Lira, founder Jacarezinho residents' association; Wladimir, 
representative People's union movement and leader FAFERJ; Itamar 
Silva, member State front for a dignify housing and against evictions, and 
member Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis (IBASE); 
William, president Rocinha residents' association; Gibião, president 
Chapéu Mangueira residents' association; Eli Bittencourt, founder Rio 
das Pedras residents' associations; Julião, resident Vilas das Canoas 
community; José Castro, Vice president CONAN; Laerte Brasil, 
president Cidade de Deus association for social community; Marciel, vice 
president Borel residents association; MC Nandinho de Rio das Pedras; 
Letícia, resident Formiga hill; Djanira, president Bata residents' 
association.  
DCMRJ 
14/11/2006 
P07-12 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
10 November 2006. Theme: discussion about the 2007 budget for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat 
Panel: MC Indio da Costa, president of the panel; MC Andrea Gouvêa 
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Vieira; MCAloisio Freitas; MC Paulo Cerri; MC Silvia Pontes; MC Teresa 
Bergher; MC Chabel Zaib; Luiz Humberto, Municipal Housing 
Secretariat.Other dicussants: Fabio Luiz da Cunha, representative 
Campinho Fuba community; Maciel Pinheiro de Paula, vice-presidente 
Borel residents' association; Sandra Miguel Moreira, representative 
Serrinha Grota community; Rosângela da Silva Neto, representantative 
Jardim América residents' association and Leopoldina community; José 
vicente, member Caixa dÁgua residents' association; Marta Pereira da 
Silva, resident Caixa dÁgua community.  
DCMRJ 
13/06/2007 
P11-24 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
24 May 2007. Theme: discussion about the 2008 budget for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat ( bill No. 1.105/07). 
Panel: MC Jorge Felipe president of the panel; MC Andrea Gouvêa 
Vieira, vice-president; MC Romualdo Boaventura; Luiz Humberto, 
Municipal Housing Secretary. Other dicusussants: Paulo André Figueira, 
SMH undersecretary; Gisele Brito, representative Municipal Treasury 
Secretariat 
DMCRJ 
04/12/2007 
P22-30 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
12 November 2007. Theme: discussion about the 2008 budget for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat ( bill No. 1.353/07). 
Panel: MC Jorge Felipe president of the panel; MC Andrea Gouvêa 
Vieira, vice-president; Vereador Romualdo Boaventura; Luiz Humberto, 
Municipal Housing Secretary. 
DCMRJ 
09/06/2008 
P24-29 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
28 May 2008. Theme: discussion about the 2009 budget for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat (bill No. 1.661/08). 
Panel: MC Rosa Fernandes vice-president; MC Andrea Gouvêa Vieira; 
Paulo André Figueira, Municipal Housing Secretary. 
DCMRJ 
06/11/2009 
P75-87 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
23 September 2009. Theme: discussion about the Municipal Housing 
Secretariat pluriannual plan 2010-2013 (bill No. 322/09). 
Panel: MC Professor Uoston, president of the panel; MC Andrea Gouvêa 
Vieira; Jorge Bittar, Municipal Housing Secretary. 
DCMRJ 
16/11/2009 
P42-55 
Public debate of the Special Commeette of the City's Master Plan held on 
1 October 2009. Theme: housing ( PLC No. 25/2001)  
Panel: MC Aspasia Camargo, president of the panel; MC Roberto 
Monteiro, rapporteur; MC Chiquinho Brazão; MC Jorge Pereira; Jorge 
Bittar, Municipal Housing Secretary; Alex Domiciano Batista, SMH 
undersecretary; Roberto Kauffmann, representative FIRJAN; Luis 
Valverde, SMH planning director; Daisy Gois, president IAB-RJ. Other 
discussants: Raphael Mitchell, representative OAB; Valdinei Medina 
Machado da Silva, resident Chapéu Mangueira; Afonso de Souza Filho, 
representative housing cooperatives and vice-president national housing 
cooperatives' union; Luiz Bezerra, president Cantagalo residents' 
association; Ignez Barreto, coordinator Ipanema security project; Luiz 
Antônio Barreto, representative environmental commission of Vale do 
Rio Carioca; Claudio de Ajaujo Sideral, biologist; Casimiro Vare, 
president regional council of real estates' agents; Cesar Doria; Lucimar 
Fernandes, representative Institute Rio Carioca; José Borges, resident of 
a favela; Marcondes Mesqueu, resident Lapa neighbourhood; Ricardo 
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Gouvê, representative National Council of Cities; Marcia Vasconcelos, 
president Federation of Residents' Association of Rio de Janeiro 
(FAMRIO); Jorge Barros, representative Instituto Verde; Carlos Quintão, 
representative landlords in federal lands movement; Alvaro Braga, 
resident Santa Teresa neighbourhood. 
DCMRJ 
19/11/2009 
P72-75 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 6 
November 2009. Theme: discussion about the 2010 budget for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat ( bill No. 388/09). 
Panel: MC Professor Uoston, president of the panel; MC Nereide 
Pedregal, vice-president; MC Andrea Gouvêa Vieira; Jorge Bittar, 
Municipal Housing Secretary  
DCMRJ 
14/12/2009 
P28-36 
Public hearing of the Special Commission held on 28 October 2009. 
Theme: evaluate the implementation of sanitation programmes and 
agreement between the state and municipal governments.  
Panel: MC Carlos Caiado, president of the panel; MC Lucinha, 
rapporteur; MC Clarissa Garotinho; MC Jorge Manaia; MC Eidir Dantas; 
Alex Domiciano Batista, Municipal Housing Secretary 
DCMRJ 
11/06/2010
P29-32 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
28 May 2010. Theme: discussion about the 2011 budget for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat ( bill No. 601/2010) and the review of the 
pluri annual plan ( bill No. 601/2010).  
Panel: MC Professor Uoston, president of the panel; MC Jorginho do 
S.O.S, vice-president; Alex Domiciano Batista, Municipal Housing 
Secretary. Other discussants: MC Teresa Bergher; MC Paulo Pinheiro. 
DCMRJ 
08/07/2010 
P07-16 
Public hearing held on 23 June 2010. Theme: discussion about the 
sewage network in the municipality.  
Panel: MC Teresa Bergher, president of the panel; Dilio José Monroy 
Cabrejos, SMH chief of cabinet; Romério Luiz de Souza, manager SMH 
works office; Edson Mendoça manager Rio-Aguas sewage planning and 
projects office; Fabio da Silva lima, representative Rio de Janeiro state 
public defender's. Other dicussants: MC Lucinha; Joel Machado, director 
NGO Jovem Rio; Charles Gonçalves Guimarães, president Baixada do 
Sapateiro residents' association; Cida Neves, president Cidade Alta 
residents' association; Shirley Felix, president Parque Proletario de 
Cordovil residents' association; Erica Riederer; Seilce Lisboa, leader Vila 
Cruzeiro community; Alexandro Franquini, resident Vila Cruzeiro 
community.  
DCMRJ 
30/11/2010 
P12-30 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
22 November 2010. Theme: discussion about the 2011 budget for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat ( bill No. 737/2010). 
Panel: MC Professor Uoston, president of the panel; MC Jorginho do 
S.O.S, vice-president; MC Andrea Gouvêa vieira; Jorge Bittar, Municipal 
Housing Secretary. Other discussants: MC Lucinha, MC Teresa Bergher.  
DCMRJ 
02/06/2011 
P39-50 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
25 Mai 2011. Theme: discussion about the 2012 budget for the Municipal 
Housing Secretariat ( bill No. 910/2011). 
Panel: MC Professor Uoston, president of the panel; MC Andrea Gouvêa 
vieira; Jorge Bittar, Municipal Housing Secretary. Other discussants: MC 
Paulo Pinheiro; MC Reimont; MC Jorginho do S.O.S; MC Sonia Rabello; 
Izabel Barbosa Lima, adviser to MC Eliomar Coelho.  
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DCMRJ 
27/10/2011 
P19-35 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
21 October 2011. Theme: discussion about the 2012 budget for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat ( bill No. 1141/2011). 
Panel: MC Andrea Gouvêa Vieira, president of the panel; MC Carlos 
Eduardo; Jorge Bittar, Municipal Housing Secretary. Other discussants: 
Pierre Alex Domiciano Batista, SMH undersecretary; Sergio Dias, 
Municipal Planning Secretary; Claudio Pereira Duarte, president Nova 
Divineia residents' association; MC Teresa Bergher; Marcia Vera 
Vasconcelos, presiddent FAMRIO; Jorge Matias de Souza, president 
Andaraí residents' association; Alexandre Furlanetto.  
DCMRJ 
31/05/2012 
P46-57 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
25 May 2012. Theme: discussion about the 2013 budget for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat ( bill No. 1360/2012). 
Panel: MC Professor Uoston, president of the panel; MC Luiz Carlos 
Ramos, vice-president; MC Fernando Moraes; Jorge Bittar, Municipal 
Housing Secretary. Other discussants: Manuel Gama, president 
Providência residents' association; MC Paulo Pinheiro.  
DCMRJ 
12/2012 
P22-28 
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 
31 October 2012. Theme: discussion about the 2013 budget for the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat ( bill No. 1544/2012). 
Panel: MC Professor Uoston, president of the panel; MC Luiz Carlos 
Ramos, vice-president; MC Fernando Moraes; Jorge Bittar, Municipal 
Housing Secretary. Other discussants: Helio Albuquerque, adviser to MC 
Edson Zanata; MC Chiquinho Brazão; Marcos Henrique, community 
leader; MC Reimont; Bernardo Vastro, representative Meu Rio. 
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LAWS AND DECREES  
Date Law Decree Title 
23/08/1979 110  Authorizes the transformation of the current 
Municipal Tourism in Municipal Secretariat 
for Social Development. 
25/01/1991 1665  Creates the Municipal Council of Urban 
Policy, provides for its powers and 
composition. 
24/04/1992  10962 Provides for the working group that will 
form the land regularization office for illegal 
housing estates and modifies Decree No. 
7290/87. 
12/01/1993  11909 Delegates the duties it mentions to the 
Municipal Works Secretary 
01/02/1993  11935 Delegates the powers it mention concerning 
the Planning Areas (APs) of the Municipal 
Executive. / Sub-prefectures/ 
13/02/1993 1950  Modifies the organizational structure of the 
Municipal Council of Urban Policy. 
13/02/1993 1949  Creates four positions of Special Secretaries. 
13/08/1993  12205 Creates the Executive Group of Special 
Programmes for Popular Settlements 
(GEAP). 
18/08/1993  12210 Modifies Art.4, Decree No. 12205, 13 
August 1993. 
22/09/1993  12296 Provides for the Executive Group of Special 
Programmes for Popular Settlements 
(GEAP). 
07/10/1993  3422 Designates the public servant listed below as 
members of the Executive Group Special 
Programmes Working for Income 
Settlements (GEAP). 
12/11/1993  12432 Modifies Decree No. 12296/93  
16/12/1993 2058  Provides for the Plan of Rio de Janeiro City's 
Government for the period 1993-1996. 
19/01/1994 2120  Declares as Areas of Special Social Interest 
[AEIS], for purposes of land regularization, 
the settlements and housing estate registered 
at the Land Regularization Office, and 
establishes their particular urban regulations  
02/03/1994  12719 Delegates competences to the Special 
Secretaries  
10/03/1994  12741 Delegates competences to the Special 
Secretaries  
24/03/1994  Tender 
IPLANRIO 
Favela-Bairro Architectural Competition 
16/06/1994  12994 Repeals the Decree No. 12205, 13 August 
1993 
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16/12/1994 2262  Provides for the creation of the Municipal 
Housing Secretariat, extinguishes and creates 
positions at the Municipal Sports and Leisure 
Secretariat 
 
21/12/1994 
 13526 Provides for appointments, dismissals, 
assignments and waivers of commissioned 
positions and rewarded functions at the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat. 
22/12/1994  13533 Provides for the institutional coding of the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat.  
20/02/1995  13693 Opens additional credit of R$ 40,000.00 to 
the Social Security of the Municipality of Rio 
de Janeiro City in favour of the Municipal 
Housing Secretariat and Municipal Housing 
Fund. 
16/03/1995  13756 Modifies Art 3 and 4 , Decree No. 12994 16 
June 1994 
05/07/1996 Legislative 
Decree No. 
143 
 Authorizes the executive branch to contract 
a loan with the federal savings bank 
[CAIXA], offering warranties. 
15/09/1995 Legislative 
Decree 
No. 129 
 Authorizes the executive branch to contract 
a loan with the Inter- American 
Development Bank. 
07/11/1995  14322 Creates the Urbanization Programme for 
Popular Settlements of Rio de Janeiro, 
PROAP-RIO, and approves its operating 
regulations. 
27/11/1995 2387  Declares as Areas of Special Social Interest, 
for purposes of land regularization, the 
housing estates it mentions and establishes 
their particular urbanization regulations.  
26/11/1996 2499  Declares as Areas of Special Social Interest, 
for purposes of urban and land 
regularization the zones listed in the Annexe 
and establishes their particular urbanization 
regulations. 
20/03/1997  Ordinance 
No. 27 
IPLAN Rio 
Constitutes a Technical Committee to 
oversee the services related to the projects of 
the PROAP-RIO 3rd phase, effectively 
starting from 13 March 1997. 
04/04/1997  15661 Modifies the composition of the working 
group established by Decree No. 12205 of 
13 August 1993. 
16/04/1997 2541  Provides for the organizational structure of 
the Municipal Housing Secretariat. 
 
18/04/1997 
 15702 Modifies the budget of the Municipal 
Urbanization Company (RioUrbe) linked to 
the Municipal Work Secretariat.  
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18/04/1997 2540  Declares as Areas of Special Social Interest, 
for purposes of land regularization, the areas 
it mention, and establishes their urbanization 
regulations.  
24/04/1997  15704 Provides for the organizational structure of 
the Municipal Housing Secretariat. 
08/07/1997  15898 Regulates the Municipal Fund established by 
Law No. 2262, 16 December 1994. 
10/07/1997  Resolution 
No. 27 
Provides for the internal regulations of the 
Municipal Housing Fund established by Law 
No. 2262, 16 December 1994. 
04/08/1997  15977 Delegates competences to the Municipal 
Treasury Secretariat for creating together 
with Municipal Housing Fund initiatives. 
27/08/1997  Resolution 
No. 2 
Provides that in any project or public work 
contract of the SMH, which contemplates 
hillside stabilization and drainage and 
establishes monitoring group, it should 
include a technical indicated by Geo-Rio.  
14/11/1997  16276 Provides for the institutional coding of the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat.  
24/11/1997 Legislative 
Decree  
No. 167  
 Authorizes the executive branch to contract 
a loan with the federal savings bank, offering 
warranties.  
16/01/1998 2616  Declares as Areas of Special Social Interest, 
for the purpose of land regularization. the 
areas mentioned, and establishes their 
urbanization regulations. 
27/05/1998 2647  Declares as Areas of Special Social Interest, 
for the purpose of land regularization. the 
areas mentioned, and establishes their 
urbanization regulations. 
01/12/1998 2689  Creates the Municipal Institute of Urbanism 
Pereira Passos. 
21/12/1999 Legislative 
Decree  
No. 238 
 Authorizes the executive branch to contract 
a loan with the Inter-American Development 
Bank for the Urbanization Programme of 
Rio de Janeiro's popular settlements - 
PROAP-RIO 2 
30/12/1999  18303 Provides for the co managing system of the 
Municipal Urban Development Fund. 
08/06/2000  18667 Creates the Urbanization Programme for 
Popular Settlements of Rio de Janeiro, phase 
2, PROAP II, and approves its operating 
regulations. 
20/06/2000  Resolution 
No. 2 
According to Decree "N" No. 18667 of 08 
June 2000, Operational Regulations, Part II / 
B, [It] establishes a coordinating "ad hoc" 
unit for implementing Urbanization 
Programme for Popular Settlements of Rio 
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de Janeiro - PROAP II. 
27/06/2000  18712 Provides for the maintenance and servicing 
of equipment deployed in the mentioned 
communities.  
25/09/2000  18989 Provides for the granting of license and 
authorization of establishments by the 
municipality of Rio de Janeiro. 
13/03/2001  Resolution 
No. 11 
Provides for the powers of the SMH 
technical issues sub office. 
23/03/2001 3189  Provides for community participation in the 
drafting process, implementation defining 
and monitoring of Multiannual Investment 
Budget, Budget Guidelines and Annual 
Budget. 
10/04/2001  19777 Determines the sign off of contracts linked 
to the administrative actions that it mention. 
26/04/2001  19821 Creates the programme of Community 
Conservation Agent. 
09/05/2001  Resolution 
No. 5 
Creates the Task Group FB-01 which will 
monitor the Favela-Bairro works in the 
followings communities: Dois de Maio and 
São João e União Del Castilho and Union 
16/05/2001  19903 Urbanization Programme for Popular 
Settlements of Rio de Janeiro -PROAP-RIO. 
Administrative restructuring. 
23/07/2001 3255  Creates the positions and jobs that it 
mentions in the Municipal Housing 
Secretariat. 
14/08/2001  20421 Authorizes the use of the Municipal Housing 
Secretariat as it mention. 
24/08/2001  20454 Approves the guidelines for relocation in 
popular settlement buildings.  
08/10/2001  20600 Provides for the use and occupation of the 
commercial areas created through the 
Favela-Bairro and Morar sem Risco. 
programmes. 
28/12/2001 3351  Declares as Area of Special Social Interest 
for purposes of urbanization and 
regularization, the areas it mention, and 
establishes their urbanization regulations. 
30/01/2002  21018 Delegates competences to the Municipal 
Sports and Leisure Secretariat. 
14/03/2002  Message 
SMDS 
Comitiva do Bid chega a cidade para visitar o 
Projeto Favela-Bairro 
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07/05/2002  Resolution 
No. 1 
Regulates the technical and operational 
cooperation for the realization of project, 
tender, contracting, and execution by indirect 
administration, monitoring and supervision 
of works in the decentralized units of the 
Municipal Education Secretariat under the 
Municipality of Rio de Janeiro. 
15/07/2002  2102 Delegates competences to the Municipal 
Housing Secretariat. 
17/07/2002  Message 
SMDS 
PROAP II social initiatives will reach other 6 
communities. 
25/07/2002  21800 Ceases the effects of Decree No. 19903 
citing. 
17/09/2002  22021 Provides for the use and occupation of the 
commercial areas created through the 
Favela-Bairro and Morar sem Riscos 
programmes.  
22/10/2002  22170 Provides for the monitoring of communities 
that benefited from the Favela-Bairro 
programme that it mentions. 
04/06/2003  22982 Transfers the Urban and Social Orientation 
Office (POUSO) from the Municipal 
Housing Secretariat to the Municipal 
Planning Secretariat.  
20/06/2003 3587   Authorizes the Executive branch to 
implement the Favela-Bairro or Bairrinho 
programmes in the mentioned location.  
20/06/2003 3588   Authorizes the Executive branch to 
implement the Favela-Bairro or Bairrinho 
programmes in the mentioned location. 
21/07/2003  23159 Provides for the organizational structure of 
the Municipal Housing Secretariat and 
Municipal Planning Secretariat 
17/09/2003  23421 Delegates competences to Municipal 
Housing Secretariat. 
07/10/2003  23517 Delegates the competences that it mention.  
30/10/2003  23637 Delegates competences to Municipal 
Housing Secretariat. 
27/11/2003  23731 Delegates competences to Municipal Social 
Development Secretariat. 
16/03/2004  24031 Provides for the institutional coding of the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat. 
04/06/2004  Message UN representative visits Favela-Bairro 
projects. 
08/06/2004  Message Quinta Caju is the first community in Brazil 
to be completely regularized. 
26/07/2004 3807  Determines the obligation for companies 
providing public services to execute work,  
22/11/2004  24852 Establishes the macro-functions it mentions. 
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29/03/2005 3957  Creates the Municipal Council of Urban 
Policy 
20/04/2005 4011  Authorizes the Executive branch to 
implement the Favela-Bairro programme in 
Camarista Méier community. 
12/06/2005  25536 Defines procedures and authorizes the 
exemption of the license fee for 
establishments that exercise economic and 
other activities of any nature in favelas, 
which refers to the section III of Art. 11, 
Decree No. 18.989/2000. 
20/10/2005  25894 Creates the Municipal Council for Social 
Housing.  
05/04/2006 4290  Authorizes the Executive branch to 
implement the Favela-Bairro or Bairrinho 
programme in the area it mentions.  
27/07/2006  26784 Creates the Urbanization programme for 
Popular Settlements in Rio de Janeiro, 
PROAP-RIO III, instituting and 
consolidating the Favela-Bairro programme. 
09/08/2006  26865 Changes the name of the Municipal Housing 
Secretariat. 
17/10/2006  27168 Provides for the advice and consultancy 
work by the Municipal Habitat Secretariat 
(SMH), as it mentions 
20/12/2006  27471 Approves the Urban Development Plan of 
Alemão Complex - PDUCMA of XXIX 
administrative region. 
27/02/2007  313 Delegates competences as it mentions. 
09/03/2007  Message Favela-Bairro already installed over 700 
kilometres of sewer lines 
12/03/2007  Message Municipality initiates activities to urbanize 
Alemão Complex  
25/05/2007 4515  Establishes the Municipal Social Housing 
System- SMHIS. 
08/10/2007  28515 Provides for conservation services it 
mentions. 
04/01/2008 Legislative 
Decree 
No. 663 
 Authorizes the Executive branch to contract 
a loan with the Inter-American Development 
Bank, under Urbanization Programme for 
Popular Settlements (PROAP), phase III, 
offering warranties. 
13/03/2008  29072 Provides for the Favela-Bairro 3 as it 
mentions. 
02/07/2008 4865  Authorizes the Executive to establish the 
Favela-Bairro or Bairrinho program in the 
area mentioned. 
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30/06/2009  30854 Provides for the maintenance, conservation 
and operation of investments in low-income 
informal settlements in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro. 
16/12/2010  33277 Approves PROAP III operational 
regulations.  
22/02/2011  Resolution 
SMH/IPP 
No. 1 
Provides for monitoring of aerial images and 
supporting the Land Use Control System of 
the Urbanization Programme for Popular 
Settlements - PROAP III. 
15/03/2011  33491 Modifies the organizational structure of the 
Municipal Housing Secretariat. 
11/04/2011  33645 Regulates Law No. 2912 of 29 October 
1999, establishing standards for land use in 
the communities of Vila Canoas and Pedra 
Bonita in São Conrado.  
11/04/2011  33648 Regulates the construction of building in 
favelas declared as Areas of Special Social 
Interest, and establishes standards for 
buildings legalization in the areas it 
mentions. 
19/08/2001  34315 Creates housing estates analysis group for 
assessing the viability of the projects 
included in the National Housing Plan - 
"Minha Casa, Minha Vida". 
29/10/2012  36388 Establishes the Municipal Integration 
Program of informal precarious settlements - 
Morar Carioca. 
07/12/2012  36598 Regulates construction of building under the 
Morar Carioca - Municipal Integration Plan 
of informal precarious settlements, in 
Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira 
communities, declared as Areas of Special 
Social Interest Law No. 2912 of October 29, 
2011 
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ANNEXES 
MCMV  
MCMV 1. Subsidies architecture for the lowest income groups Source: SNH 2010. 
Elaborated by the author. 
Range Incentives 
for housing 
constructio
n  
Incentives for purchasing R$ 
billion 
0-3 minimum 
wages up to R$ 
1395 
Special tax 
regime 
Municipalities above 50 thousands 
Instalments corresponding to 10% of family 
income minimum R$50 for 10 years 
16 
3-6 minimum 
wages up to R$ 
2790 
Subsidies 
inversely 
proportional 
to income 
interest 
rate 
reduction 
Access to 
guarantee 
fund 
10 
6-10 minimum 
wages up to R$ 
4650 
none reduction insurance cost 0 
Total Federal 
Government 
subsidies 
 36 
SBPE  
Evolution of housing finance through the SBPE. Source: PAC 2013 
 
 
  
1.7 2.2 3 4.8 
9.5 
18.4 
29 
33 
54.1 
75.1 76.5 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
SBPE in R$ Billions 
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INTERVIEW TEMPLATES 
 
15-06-2011 Fernando Cavallieri, special advisor at the IPP 
1. Professional career  
2. Creation of the SMH 
 Disagreements evolution: alliance, negotiation and abandonment 
 decisions making, organization and management structures  
3. Municipal housing policy  
 Process : alliance, negotiation, abandon, major phases or stages 
 Major disagreements related to the formulation of the technical choices 
 Major conflicts with the others municipal department (SMDS, SMU) 
 Major conflicts with architectural practices and construction companies 
 Major conflicts with the NGOs and CBOs / drug traffic organizations  
4. References  
 Contacts 
 documents publications  
 
24-06-2011 Jorge Jauregui, Architect (Favela-Bairro, PAC, and Morar carioca) 
1. Professional career  
2. Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC)  
 Process/project's implementation 
 Differences with Favela-Bairro ( project/programme level) 
3. Favela-Bairro during the 2000s 
 Process/dates  
 Major changes during Maia's second administration (slum upgrading 
abandonment) 
4. References  
  SMH contacts 
 Others contacts 
 
07-07-2011 Paulo Magalhães, CAIXA  
1. Professional career  
2. PAC 
 Process /project's implementation 
 Project and programme organization and management  
3. References  
 Contacts 
 
08-07-2011 Lilia Sodre, architect (Morar Carioca) 
1. Professional career  
2. Involvement in the municipal housing policy  
3. Morar Carioca 
 Process / project  
4. References  
  SMH contacts? 
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11-07-2011 Itamar Silva, community leader - IBASE 
1. Professional career  
2. Social movements involvement 
 Master Plan  
 Housing policy  
3. 1990s  
 Changes: of social movements 
 Changes: residents associations 
4. 2000s  
  Ibid. 
 
19-07-2011 Isabel Tostes, manager SMH Social Work Office  
1. Professional career  
2. Social work office  
 Functioning: organizations, management 
 Relation with others secretariats 
 Relation with the population  
 
04-08-2011 Jozé Candido Sampaio, former manager SMH Projects' office  
1. Professional career  
2. SMH 2001-2004 
 Organization, management (coordination) 
 Projects coordination office: functioning  
 Relation with other municipal secretaries and secretariats 
3. Clarifications 
 Project/works delays during the 2000s  
 Favela-Bairro: Why was not working as planned?  
4. References  
 Contact other SMH staff ( 2001-2008)  
 
17-08-2011 Fernando Cavallieri, special advisor at the IPP (second meeting) 
1. BID contracts  
 Process/meetings/dates 
 Changes second contract: PASI  
 Housing policy - and relation between legislative/ executive  
2. Favela-Bairro Classification matrix  
 From easier to difficult in the second contract? 
 Entire classification existed?  
 The classification was used all the time? 
 How was born the idea of the classification ? how it changed over time? 
3. Public tender  
 Process from IPP to SMH  
 Evolution of IPP role  
4. SMH change in 1997 
 Relevant? How? 
 Favela-Bairro executive secretariat in 20002: how it worked? 
5.  Favela-Bairro  
 Increasing quantity of projects, how the municipality coped with it?  
 Favela-Bairro 2 : money problems/how the money problems were solved during 
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the Favela-Bairro 1 
6. References 
 Contact Jorge de Oliveira Rodriges ? 
 Contac Lu Petersen? 
 SMH staff during the 2000s 
 
19-08-2011 Leonardo Perazo, former manager SMH engineering works department 
1. Professional career politico administrative background 
2. SMH 
 Organization, management 
 Relation with other secretariats  
3. Favela-Bairro  
 Programme and project processes/ dates 
 Major challenges : delays, lack of money,  
 Public tended: functioning, problems  
 
29-08-11 Alfredo Sirkis, former municipal secretary and municipal councillor 
1. Professional career politico administrative background 
2. Maia's first administration  
 Strengthens and weakness of his administration 
 Relation with the legislative / within the administration  
 Housing policy - and relation between legislative/ executive  
3. Conde/ Maia2/ Maia 3 
 Evolution of these relations  
 Controversy about Favela-Bairro denaturalization in 2001/2002 
 Controversy about relocations in 2005  
4. The role of SMU while he was Secretary ( 2002-2006)  
 Favela-Bairro related activities (POUSO)  
 Relation SMH/ SMU  
 
30-08-2011 Pastoral de Favelas team (Monsegnor Luis Antonio, Maria alice, Luis 
Severino, Erika Gloria, Josefa, Celia, Lucia, Eliana, Maria da Paz) 
1. Involvement of the Pastoral in housing issues 
 Evolution 
2. Changes in the past 20 years 
 NGO's / protestant churches 
 Municipal government  
 Legislative body  
 Current challenges : Morar Carioca, evictions  
 
01-09-2011 Pablo Benetti, architect (Favela-Bairro, PAC, Morar Carioca) 
1. Professional career 
 How many Favela-Bairro projects 
2. Favela-Bairro PROAP I ( 16 favelas) 
 Interest in participating  
 Process / dates / changes / time /costs / participation/ public tenders 
 Technical specification changes  
3. PROAP II 
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09-09-2011 Marcia Vera Vasconcelos, president FAM-Rio 
1. Professional career / FAM-Rio history 
 Government? 
2. Favela- Bairro 
 Urbanization process 
 Organization process 
3. Transformations  
 Communities 
 CBOs 
 FAFERJ  
4. Morar Carioca/ PAC 
 Transformations  
5. PMHIS 
 Aspirations 
 Lack of participation/ interest why? 
 Lack of communication  
 
 Changes 
 Relation with Urban cell / Alemão complex project in 2004 
 Conflict / delays 
4. PAC Morar Carioca 
 Process/ changes  
 Evictions 
 Contact construction companies 
12-09-2011 Sergio Magalhães, president IAB-RJ and former SMH Secretary  
1. Housing policy and SMH 
 Process (chosen as GEAP/municipal secretary/technical staff/story about the 
SMH location) 
 GEAP Idea (technical staff/process/conflicts) 
2. Favela-Bairro 
 Policy guideline: what type of conflicts 
 IAB contests: opposition? methods definition? 
 Classification: problems in the second phase?  
3. PROAP I 
 Conflicts with the BID/ policy transformation 
 Clarification 1997 SMH management restructuring change/conflicts internal-
external 
 Problems with the interventions 
4. PROP II 
 Conflicts with the BID Evictions 
 PASI, what why?  
 Reorganization/disagreement (in reference to Lu Petersen and Sirkis interviews) 
5. Clarifications  
 Articulation between levels of government: how he solved it  
 Communication and information campaign/what why 
 Problem with participation: how he solved 
6. Morar Carioca 
 Differences/evictions/mega events/PAC 
ANNEXES 
 
 
290 
 
14-09-2011 Lucia Petersen, ex Favela-Bairro programme manager  
1. SMH - Favela- Bairro 
 Arrival to SMH/ manager position/ Jorge Rodrigues?  
 Opinion on the Housing policy bases (dec 1993) 
 Work that people do not believe: within and beyond the administration? 
 How was the beginning (location/organization/advantages) 
 Mutirão and Favela-Bairro relation 
2. PROAP I 
 Transformation with the BID contract: (i) conflicts/ disagreements; (ii) technical 
specifications; (ii)architectural practices; (iii)construction companies; (iv) 
participation.  
 Transformation of the SMH at the end of 1997 ( change in law): organization / 
management  
 Consequences and conflicts? 
3. Urban Cell (2002-2007) 
 Political will to develop this approach? why ? why not Favela-Bairro? 
 E solo (2001)/ Alemão complex proposal ( 2004). Comments? Importance? 
 Problems/ conflicts with ( same as before see above + problem with Favela do 
Metro) 
 Opinion about the SMH at that time : organization, management and the Favela-
Bairro 
4. Clarifications  
 José Cândido had problem for completing projects / how she managed ?  
 José Cândido had problem for meeting deadlines/ how she managed? 
 José Cândido had problem as constructor companies changed projects / how she 
managed? 
 PASI: does it worked ? why and how ?  
 Shift 2001: abandonment of all technical staff from the SMH?  
 Providência who was the architect, process, dates?  
 
14-09-11 Jorge Mario Jáuregui (second meeting) 
1. Clarifications 
 Favela-Bairro technical specifications (which difficulties) 
 Which one was the process of projects approval  
 Costs architects/reasons 
 Construction companies/did the profile change over time? Bigger ones?  
2. Vidigal/ Fernão Cardim 
 Process/dates 
 Problem unfinished works 
3. Morar Carioca  
 Changes  
4. Mangueira 
 Process  
 State government relation to the project 
5. Alemão complex 
 Development plan process 
 cable car process 
 PMHIS: relevance  
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21-09-2011 Luis Valverde, SMH staff (2009 - date) 
1. Professional career 
 Arrival to the SMH  
 SMH Heritage of previous administration  
2. Morar Carioca 
 Process/dates 
  SMH organization management  
3. Morar Carioca phase II 
 Process  
 Partners relation (IAB, IPP, IBASE, BID)  
 Heritage of Urban Cell/ Favela- Bairro/PAC 
4. Clarifications 
 Challenges within the municipal administration/with State/Federal  
 Challenges with favela dwellers (evictions) 
 Challenges with other actors (politicians/NGO's/Architects/Construction 
companies 
 Recommendations/improvements to the Morar Carioca 
5. Data references 
 List of projects/programmes/construction companies/architect/costs/phases/ 
plans 
 Favela-Bairro internal evaluations 
 
21-09-2011 Luis Severino, member of the Pastoral de Favelas 
1. Providência evictions  
 Conflict commission: how it works? 
 Mediation process: challenges, conflicts, actors  
2. Favela do Metro evictions  
 Process: challenges, conflicts, actors  
3. PMHIS  
 Lack of participation: why? 
4. References 
 Contact social movements?  
 
22-09-2011 Leandro Balbio, architect (PAC, Alemão Complex ) 
1. Professional career 
 Arrival to the architectural practice  
2. PAC Alemão complex project 
 Description 
 Process/dates/modifications - reasons  
 Conflict CBO's/SMH/State/construction companies 
3. PAC Mangueira project 
 Description 
 Process/dates/modifications - reasons  
 Conflict CBO's/SMH/State/construction companies 
4. Data references 
 Contact association Mangueira/Alemão complex 
 Projects plans/presentations/photos 
 Contact construction companies 
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26-09-2011 Eliomar Coelho, municipal councillor 
1. Professional career 
 Involvement in urban and housing policy and favelas issues  
 As municipal councillor /as militant? 
2. 1990s 
 RJ Urban/housing policy : disagreements - CMRJ 
 RJ Vs other municipalities (ZEIS PB) 
 Conflicts/problems between legislative-executive-favela dwellers 
 Differences between Conde and Maia administration (macro functions)  
3. 2000s 
 Relevance Statute of cities for RJ/SNHIS  
 Conflicts SNHIS-PMHIS (executive - CMRJ - citizens 
 RJ VS national experience  
4. Clarifications : disagreements conflicts within the CMRJ 
 Pac Favelas  
 Evictions 
 MCMV  
 Morar Carioca  
5. References 
 Contacts 
 
 
28-09-2011 Edouardo Poley, project manager at Odebrecht (PAC, Alemão complex) 
1. Professional career  
 Company profile  
2. PAC Alemão complex  
 Process (public tender/phases/dates) 
  Organization, management 
3. Process  
 Challenges: technical/organization/management/financing) 
 Disagreements: State/ architect/private sector/population. 
 Recommendation for future projects 
4. Based on his experience, opinion in relation to Favela-Bairro projects 
 Delays / modifications/unfinished works 
 Lack of quality/ financial problems 
 Different to work in favelas than other neighbourhoods? if yes which ones? 
5. General 
 Competing for this type of works, difficult?/profile of the construction 
companies interested in this market 
 Opinion on MCMV and Morar Carioca 
29-09-2011 Fram, president Favela do Metro resident association 
1. Professional career/slum dwellers association history 
 When did she became president? (date - process) 
2. Evictions 
 Process/meetings/dates (2009) 
 Fight back. How?  
 Evictions second round (2011)? 
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06-10-11 Rosi community leader, Providência 
1. Professional career/slum dwellers association history 
2. Favela- Bairro  
 Process/dates 
 Major issues with the project/municipality/architect/construction companies/ 
other leaders  
 Problems post works  
3. Evictions 
 Process/meetings/information  
 Strategies 
 Current situation  
 Project 
4. Relations with 
 Challenges within the association  
 Other organization (NGO's, Church), the popular council and public defender 
5. Future favela in relation to 
 Evictions/ mega events/ city 
 
10-10-2011 Lu Petersen, ex Favela-Bairro pogramme manager (second meeting)  
1. Providência  
 Mutirão dates/ evolution 
 Discussed process project  
2. Clarifications 
 Changes and relation with Conde and Sergio Magalhães  
3. Internal dynamics 
 Challenges for mobilizing 
 Conflicts/ disagreements  
 Mobilization over time  
4. External dynamics 
 Relation with other CBO's NGO's ( Mangueira association) 
 SMH/other administration/architects 
 Popular council/public defender  
5. Future for the favela and association  
05-10-2011 Claudio, former president Vidigal resident association 
1. Professional career/slum dwellers association history 
2. Favela-Bairro 
 Process/dates  
 Major changes in the process  
 Problems: maintenance/quality/delays  
3. Clarifications 
 Relations with other associations/challenges for mobilizing  
 Relations with the SMH/municipality/architects/construction companies and 
NGO's 
4. Community current challenges and future  
 Recommendations for futures projects  
 Evictions 
 Mega events 
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 Changes during Cesar Maia second administration 
 
10-10-2011 Ana, Vice president, Mangueira residents association  
3. Professional career and background 
4. Favela-Bairro project 
 Process - dates 
 Problems/conflicts with municipal administration/architect/construction 
company /drug traffic/favela dwellers 
 Problems/conflicts after works were finished  
5. PAC 2 project  
 Process/meetings/information/dates 
 Negotiations with government - what did you obtained 
 Problems/conflicts with (same as before see above + problem with Favela do 
Metro) 
6. Relations with 
 Challenges within the association  
 Other organization (NGO's, Church), the popular council and public defender 
7. Future favela in relation to 
 Evictions/mega events/city 
 
13-10-2011 Fernanda Salles, architect (Favela-Bairro, Morar Carioca) 
1. Professional career 
2. Favela- Bairro 
 Project(s) date 
 Major challenges/problems with SMH/ others administration/ favela dwellers 
 Major challenges with construction companies (deadlines, organization, 
management)  
 Recommendations for better implementation? (indentify problems) 
3. Morro da Providência project 
 Project process/relation with the favela dwellers 
 Proposal/organization/ management 
 Major challenges (with SMH/other administration/favela dwellers/etc) 
 Current situation 
4. Evaluation/recommendations/understanding in relation to 
 PAC/MCMV 
 Morar Carioca/PLHIS 
 Evictions/ Mega events 
 
13-10-2011 Eduardo Petersen, architect (Urban Cell Providência). Interview in presence 
of Lu Petersen  
1. Professional career 
2. Morro da Providence project 
 Proposal/ organization/management /dates 
 Major challenges: location/SMH/others/favela dwellers/constructor companies  
 Evaluation/ recommendations  
3. SMH  
 Functioning /organization  
 
10-05-2012 Jose Brakarz, Inter-American Development Bank 
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1. Professional career 
2. PROAP I  
 Process/contact with Rio de Janeiro's municipality: how? 
 Meetings/definition of the contract: problems (management, organization, 
financing) 
 BID role /regulation for instalments  
3. PROAP II 2000 
 Major differences PROAP I (PASI/ roads/ too much architectural design) 
 Did the BID new about problems: water, sewage, maintenance, and lack of 
participation 
 Municipal executive differences (capacity/ legitimacy ) 
4. Administration change  
 Major differences: management/organization/ qualification/expertise in favelas  
 Opinion: Magalhães said denaturalisation of the programme Vs Amaral said that 
the project focus on design rather than essential items 
 2000-2004 PROAP II why extended until 2006  
 PROAP III why it took too long to be approved  
5. Clarifications  
 BID learn /teach to the municipality  
 PROAP III major difference 
 Municipality alone ? not too much to decide 
 Participation challenges/finances/cost of projects  
 
 
24-07-2012 Ines Magalhães, National Housing Secretary 
1. Professional career  
2. Housing sector features before the SNHIS and the MCMV  
 Federal Government : actions/objectives/PRO-Sanear, PRO-Moradia, PAR/ 
CAIXA 
 State and municipal governments: trends/relation with the Federal Governments 
 Construction sector: organization, representation (level) 
 Civil society organization, representation (level) 
3. SNHIS/MCMV/PAC 
 Process  
 Challenges for implementing PNH and the SNHIS (articulation among the 
governments/politics/administrative/ ideas) 
 Challenges civil society (mobilization, participation, social control) 
 Major changes (government dynamics/construction sector/civil society) 
4. Current challenges  
 SNHIS (coordination articulation with the PAC and MCMV 
 Land: who controls ? ZEIS why not? other solutions ?  
 Rio de Janeiro challenges  
 
25-07-2012 Adebal Curvelo, SMH and BID staff 
1. Professional career  
2. PROAP I 
 Major characteristics  
 Challenges: coordination/financing/SMH other programmes 
 Challenges with other actors: Cedae/drug traffic/favela dwellers 
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 Municipal councillors/State/Federal Government 
3. PROAP II  
 Major changes: objectives, political agenda, PASI, organization, management, 
architecture, roads  
 Challenges: coordination/financing/PASI/fragmentation (SMO, SMU)/delays/ 
unfinished works costs/priorities. 
 Challenges: Cedae/State/Federal Government (SNHIS, PAC, MCMV)  
 Pan American Games: impact  
4. PROAP III  
 Major changes: long term/Cedae/maintenance/evictions  
 Challenges Rio de Janeiro: PAC, MCMV, land (who controls ?) 
 What did the BID learn by participating in the PROAP  
 
27-07-2012 Lu Petersen, ex Favela-Bairro programme manager (third meeting) 
1. Exploratory discussion about the investigation  
 Aderbal Curvelo interview 
 Testing hypothesis 
2. Providência project  
 Changes with Favela-Bairro 
3. References 
 Contact Cesar Maia 
 
31-07-2012 Erika, member Pastoral de Favelas 
1. Current situation 
 Popular council: organizations 
 Agenda 
2. Pastoral de Favelas  
 Current role 
 Projects 
3. References 
 Providência 
 Mangueira / Favela do Metro 
 Acarai, Estradinha, Fernão Cardim 
 
16-08-2012 Cesar Maia, ex Mayor of Rio de Janeiro (interview in presence of Lu 
Petersen 
1. Major challenges governing Rio de Janeiro in 1993 ( housing)  
2. 1993 -1996 
 Major characteristics of the housing policy  
 Challenges: municipality/conflicts ( SMH, others)/ drug traffic/ favela dwellers 
 Challenges: State/Federal Government/Legislative 
 Conde Administration: Favela-Bairro for the elections, role?/housing policy 
change? 
3. 2001-2004 
 Major changes housing policy 
 Challenges: municipality (fragmentation SMH, SMO, SMU, Urban Cell)/cf 
autonomy 
 Challenges: Cedae/State/Federal Government/Legislative /drug traffic /favela 
dwellers  
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4. 2005-2008  
 Major changes 
 Challenges: municipality/Pan American Games /PAC/SNHIS 
 Challenges: Cedae /UPP's  
5. 2009-2012  
 Strength and weakness of current housing policy  
 Opinion MCMV  
 Evictions 
 
16-08-2012 Antonio Augusto Verissimo, SMH staff (1990s- date) 
1. Professional career (SMH in the 1990s?) 
2. SMH in the 1990s 
 Major characteristics of the housing policy  
 Challenges: municipality/conflicts ( SMH, others)/drug traffic/favela dwellers 
 PROAP II: changes (PASI)/challenges (critics 2001-2008) 
3. SMH 2009-2012 Housing policy  
 Major characteristics of the housing policy: 1990s difference?/State and Federal 
Government alignment, changes?  
 Challenges Morar Carioca: State(UPPs, Cedae)/social programmes ( IBASE)/ 
drug traffic/dwellers associations/quality/delays/construction companies 
 Challenges quantitative deficit: land, AEIS?/other instruments?  
 Evictions: typology/process/SMH role  
4. References  
 SMH PPT CMRJ  
 Number of houses produced from 2001-2008 
 Investments  
 
21-08-2012 Paulo Magalhães, CAIXA (second meeting) 
1. Investigation gap between policy aspirations and outcomes 
 Evolution instruments  
 Governance - coordination (municipal government limitations) 
2. References 
 Data about the alliance of the three levels of government since 2009  
 Data about Pro-Sanear, Pro- Moradia, PAR, PAC, MCMV (investments, major 
challenges)  
 Contacts : state government/CAIXA  
 
23-08-2012 Zezinho da Torre Branca, ex president of the FAFERJ 
1. Professional career  
2. Production of movie about the Favela-Bairro (2006) 
 Process/dates/participants (municipal councillors? others?) 
3. Movie content  
 Major changes that the Favela-Bairro brought to the Favelas  
 Problems: municipality, municipal secretaries/architects, construction 
companies/Cedae, state/municipal councillors/community leaders, mobilization, 
conflicts, fragmentation/Pastoral, other NGO's/drug traffic, militias 
 Movie effects on the discussions and debates 
4. Current problems  
 Changes under Paes administration (relation with favela dwellers) 
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 PMHIS/Morar Carioca/MCMV (participation?) 
 Current problems in the communities: evictions/Cedae/relation with the SMH, 
municipal executive and legislative/community leaders, mobilization/drug traffic, 
UPP/NGO's/World Cup, Olympics  
5. References  
 Movie/visit projects 
 
28-08-2012 Andrea Gouvêa Veira, municipal councillor (2005-2012)  
1. Professional career  
2. Cesar Maia 2005-2008: 
 CMRJ and housing: dynamics, groups, opposition/relation with the executive 
/relation with the population/relation with the construction companies/ 
developers/others? 
 Housing policy: guidelines, problems, financing/use of investments for other 
works/ problems within the SMH and municipality (competition?)/tensions with 
the state government, Federal Government (PAC)/Pan American Games and 
municipal budget (impact SMH?)  
3. Eduardo Paes 2009-2012  
 Major changes CMRJ and housing  
 Housing policy: changes (organization, aspirations, managements, financing)/ 
problems within the SMH and municipality (competition?) tensions with the 
state government, Federal Government (PAC, Cedae, competition ?/MCMV 
(land issues, evictions, clientelism, capacity of developers to influence housing 
initiatives?) 
4. Clarifications 
 Municipal public finances  
 Movie/ report/ power points?  
 
03-09-2012 Gilda Blank, CAIXA 
1. Professional career  
2. Before PAC and MCMV: 
 1995-1998: CAIXA and Pro-Sanear, Pro-Moradia (challenges, money problems, 
RJ and Federal Government articulation). 
 1999-2002: ibid, plus PAR  
 2003-2006: ibid  
3. Lula second administration 2007-2010  
 PAC: selection, process, guidelines cf Favela-Bairro?/challenges coordination 
(why state received more money?)/State government housing secretariat and 
EMOP ( competition?)/State municipality competition?/legislative, population, 
drug traffic?)  
 MCMV: process/challenges organization, management (coordination with the 
local government) 
4. Rousseff 2011- current 
 PAC 2: changes organizations, management (CAIXA role)/challenges 
coordination (federal, state, municipal), Cedae? alliance or competition?  
 MCMV 2: Changes/relation with the SNHIS/challenges: land, municipal 
government, developers (capacity to select)  
5. References  
 Reports evaluations Caixa role  
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04-09-2012 Ricardo Gouvêa, Bento Rubiao NGO 
1. Professional career  
2. 1990s -2000 NGO and housing  
 Involvement 
 Relation with the SMH (municipality)opposition to the municipal housing policy  
  Relation among NGOs, community leaders, private sector 
3. 2001-2008 NGO and housing 
 Changes  
 Relation with the SMH (cooptation?) 
 Relation among NGOs, community leaders, private sector 
 Relation with the state and Federal Government  
4. 2009- current NGO and housing 
 Changes  
 Role in current housing policy/challenges: SMH, municipality 
 community leaders fragmentation/private sector 
 Relation federal and state government ( PAC, MCMV)/challenges 
 PMHIS: process/challenges: coordination with SMH, others, community leaders, 
private sectors)/perspective  
5. Clarifications  
 Land issues and MCMV  
 Housing construction Indiana : problem of discrimination 
 Land regularisation and the Favela-Bairro (what happened in the 1990s)  
 
 
